HARTLAND MEADOWS V L LOYER CONSTRUCTION CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
L. LOYER CONSTRUCTION CO.,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2002
Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellant,
v
No. 227233
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-935163-CK
HARTLAND MEADOWS,
Defendant/Counter PlaintiffAppellee.
HARTLAND MEADOWS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227818
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-733295-CK
L. LOYER CONSTRUCTION CO.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Doctoroff and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
L. Loyer Construction Company appeals as of right in these consolidated cases from the
order dismissing its cause of action against Hartland Meadows and from the order affirming an
arbitration award in favor of Hartland Meadows. We affirm. These appeals are being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Hartland owned land on which it planned to develop a manufactured home community.
Loyer is an earth-moving contractor. After Hartland accepted Loyer’s bid for the rough grading
work, the parties entered into a standard form AIA contract in October 1994 in which Hartland
agreed to pay Loyer $600,000 for the work. The AIA standard form contract contains preprinted
references to a separate document, AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for
Construction (“General Conditions”). However, it is undisputed that neither party had a copy of
the General Conditions document and that neither party abided by the conditions during the
course of the contract.
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Over the next year, Loyer performed the rough grading work for Phases I and II of the
development. Loyer’s last day on the job was September 23, 1995, and it received final payment
from Hartland on January 17, 1996. However, it became apparent in May and June of 1996 that
Loyer had not properly graded Phase I, because some of the corners of the lots were low. In
1997, Hartland was informed that the grade in Phase II was so uneven that underground utilities
could not be installed. At a meeting in late June 1997, Loyer said it would return to correct the
deficiencies; however, on July 3, 1997, Loyer changed its mind and refused to return to the site.
Hartland made a written demand for performance on July 9, 1997, in which it informed Loyer
that it would seek legal remedies. Hartland was later forced to hire others to correct the grading
work.
Hartland brought suit for damages for breach of contract. Pursuant to the parties’
contract, they stipulated to arbitration of the claim, and Hartland’s suit was dismissed without
prejudice to its reinstatement following arbitration. Among other things, Loyer contended that
Hartland’s claim was barred by the time limits for asserting such claims set forth in § 4.3.3 of the
General Conditions, which required that any claims be filed in writing with the architect on the
project within a twenty-one day time limit. The time limit ran either from the date of the event
giving rise to the breach or from the date the claimant first recognized the conditions giving rise
to the claim. The arbitrators found for Hartland and awarded it $190,000 in damages.
Hartland moved in circuit court to reinstate its suit and to enforce the arbitration award.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. At the same time, Loyer initiated a
separate suit to vacate the award, again arguing that Hartland could not recover because its claim
was untimely under the terms of the General Conditions. The circuit court granted summary
disposition to Hartland and dismissed Loyer’s claim, concluding that it was impossible to find
error on the face of the award because there were questions of fact with regard to the parties’
intent. Loyer then filed these claims of appeal, which were consolidated by an administrative
order of this Court on August 8, 2000.
Loyer contends that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by ignoring the time limits
for asserting a claim set forth in the General Conditions. Arbitrators exceed the scope of their
authority “whenever they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they
primarily draw their authority, or in contravention of controlling principles of law.” Collins v
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 228 Mich App 560, 567; 579 NW2d 435 (1998), quoting
DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 434; 331 NW2d 418 (1982).
Judicial review of a binding arbitration award is strictly limited by statute and court rule.
Konal v Forlini, 235 Mich App 69, 74-75; 596 NW2d 630 (1999). Pursuant to MCR 3.602,
parties are conclusively bound by a binding arbitrator’s decision absent a showing
that the award was procured by duress or fraud, that the arbitrator or another is
guilty of corruption or misconduct that prejudiced the party’s rights, that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers, or that the arbitrator refused to hear material
evidence, refused to postpone the hearing on sufficient cause, or conducted the
hearing in a manner that substantially prejudiced a party’s rights. [Konal, supra
at 75.]
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“A reviewing court may vacate an arbitration award where it finds an error of law that is
apparent on its face and so substantial that, but for the error, the award would have been
substantially different.” Collins, supra at 567. However, claims that challenge an arbitrator’s
factual findings are not subject to appellate review. Konal, supra at 74. “Courts may not engage
in contract interpretation, which is a question for the arbitrator.” Id.
In this case, the parties stipulated to an award that contained no findings of fact, but
merely provided for a result. Nevertheless, the record indicates that Hartland disputed whether
the General Conditions, including the 21-day time limitation, were part of the contractual terms
between the parties. In fact, Hartland contended in its arbitration brief that either (i) the General
Conditions were not part of the original contract or (ii) even if the General Conditions were part
of the original contract, to the extent that the parties’ performances “ignored” the General
Conditions, strict compliance with the General Conditions was waived.
In light of Hartland’s arguments, the arbitrators may have found from the parties’ course
of performance that they did not intend to incorporate the General Conditions into the contract.
Indeed, neither party had a copy of the General Conditions until after litigation had been
initiated. A finding that the General Conditions were never incorporated into the contract would
either be a factual finding or contractual interpretation by the arbitrators beyond the scope of
judicial review. Konal, supra at 74-75. Alternatively, the arbitrators may have found that the
parties’ performances waived strict compliance with the General Conditions. If the arbitrators
made either of these findings, the 21-day notice requirement would not have operated to prevent
Hartland’s recovery as a matter of law. Consequently, we are not persuaded that the trial court
erred by dismissing Loyer’s cause of action against Hartland or by affirming the arbitration
award in favor of Hartland.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Martin D. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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