FRANK HOFFMAN V CITY OF WARREN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANK HOFFMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 227222
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 98-2407 NO
CITY OF WARREN and SAMUEL JETT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Markey and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this slip and fall action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting
defendants’ motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
On December 17, 1997, plaintiff went for a walk in the neighborhood, as was his routine.
The weather was cold and clear. However, as he approached defendant Samuel Jett’s residence,
he noticed that the length of the sidewalk was covered with snow. According to plaintiff, the
sidewalk in front of the Jett residence was filled with thick ruts of ice resulting from footprints
and tire tracks that thawed out, refroze and then snowed over.
Because the area was covered with snow, plaintiff did not notice the ice and proceeded
across the driveway area. As he walked, he noticed that this area was slippery. Plaintiff moved
farther to his right towards the edge of the sidewalk where the sidewalk meets the driveway
apron, because it appeared a little smoother. There is a one inch gap between the sidewalk and
the driveway. As plaintiff moved to his right, his foot slipped and he fell. As a result of his fall,
plaintiff sustained injury to his left hip.
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the City of Warren breached its duty to keep the sidewalk
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel by failing to repair defects1 in the sidewalk
1
Plaintiff submitted the portion of sidewalk in front of the Jett residence was defective in that it
was heaved higher and lower in several directions causing a place for water to accumulate and
freeze. Plaintiff also cited that the sidewalk at issue is separated by more than one inch, forms a
(continued…)
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which allowed water to pond and freeze in the area between Jett’s driveway and the sidewalk.
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant Jett altered the otherwise natural accumulation of ice and
snow by continuously driving over that area thus causing deep ruts of ice to form on that portion
of the sidewalk. Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
The trial court found the natural accumulation doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim and granted both
defendants’ respective motions. Plaintiff appeals of right. We affirm.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition.
Altairi v Alhaj, 235 Mich App 626, 628; 599 NW2d 537 (1999). A summary disposition motion
brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint. Id.
In ruling upon a (C)(10) motion, the trial court must consider the “pleadings, affidavits,
admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties and, giving the benefit of
reasonable doubt to the nonmoving party, must determine whether a record could be developed
leaving an issue on which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. To survive a (C)(10) motion for
summary disposition, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts, beyond the pleadings,
demonstrating that a genuine, material, factual issue exists for resolution by the trier of fact. Id.
at 629.
III. The Natural Accumulation Doctrine
As an initial matter, we note that the general rule governing the liability of a municipality
or a property owner for injuries sustained by a plaintiff2 occasioned by icy conditions is the well
established natural accumulation doctrine. Zielinski v Szokola, 167 Mich App 611, 615; 423
NW2d 289 (1988) overruled in part on other grounds in Robinson v Detroit (On Remand), 231
Mich App 361, 363; 586 NW2d 116 (1998). This doctrine provides that “neither a municipality
nor a landowner has an obligation to a licensee to remove the natural accumulation of ice or
snow from any location.” Id.
There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule. First, where the municipality or
property owner takes affirmative action to alter the natural accumulation of ice and snow thus
increasing the hazard of travel to the public, liability may attach. Id. For purposes of this
exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant’s act “introduced a new element of
danger not previously present or created an obstacle to travel, such as a snow bank, that exceeds
the inconvenience posed by natural accumulation.” Skogman v Chippewa County Road Com’n,
221 Mich App 351, 354; 561 NW2d 503 (1997). (Citations omitted.)
(…continued)
lip, and has a grade change that exceeds five percent all of which violate the City’s own
standards rendering the underlying sidewalk “defective.”
2
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court misidentified him as a licensee. Plaintiff
argues that as he traveled the public sidewalks, he was an invitee of the City of Warren and as
such, owed a more stringent duty. We do not need to reach this issue. The plaintiff’s status is
inconsequential considering that the duty owed by the municipality to either a licensee or an
invitee is identical and the natural accumulation doctrine applies with equal force to both. See
generally Gillen v Martini, 31 Mich App 685; 188 NW2d 43 (1971).
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Alternatively, liability may attach where a defendant takes affirmative action to alter the
underlying condition of the sidewalk itself which then causes an artificial or unnatural
accumulation of ice. Zielinski, supra at 617. In the case at bar, plaintiff does not contend that
the municipality or defendant Jett altered the underlying condition of the portion of sidewalk
currently at issue.
A. The City of Warren’s Liability
Plaintiff maintains that the portion of the sidewalk upon which plaintiff fell was defective
as violative of the City’s own standards delineating the acceptable limits for existing sidewalks
and that defendant City of Warren breached its duty to repair these defects3. Plaintiff further
contends that the City’s failure to maintain its sidewalks pursuant to its own standards caused an
unnatural accumulation of ice and snow which proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. We
disagree.
In a very recent case, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the “well-settled” principle that
governmental agencies, while engaging in governmental functions, are immune from tort
liability absent a specific exception. Haliw v Sterling Heights, 464 Mich 297, 302; 627 NW2d
581 (2001). The exception implicated in the case at bar is the “highway exception” to
governmental immunity which provides in pertinent part that:
[E]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall
maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to
his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a
highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably
safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the
governmental agency. (MCL 691.1402(1)).
For purposes of the statute, the term “highway” includes public sidewalks. MCL
691.1401(e). According to MCL 691.1402(1), the duty imposed upon a municipality is to
“maintain” sidewalks “in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.”
Plaintiff argued that the failure of the City to maintain its sidewalks in accord with its own
standards caused the unnatural accumulation of ice and snow to form on the sidewalk at the
driveway. The trial court found that although the sidewalk in front of the Jett residence was “not
completely even,” it was not “substantially damaged” either making it reasonably safe for public
travel. In granting defendant City’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court found that
plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the City either took affirmative steps to
alter the natural accumulation of ice and snow or otherwise altered the condition of the
3
Plaintiff argues that the portion of sidewalk at issue does not comport with the City of Warren’s
own standards for existing sidewalks thus rendering it “defective” in the following respects: 1)
the sidewalk had an elevation change of 5 degrees; 2) the sidewalk had “gapping” of more than
one inch; 3) the sidewalk’s cross-slope did not permit surface drainage toward the street but
permitted water to accumulate at the driveway; and 4) the sidewalk had a one inch change in
elevation.
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underlying sidewalk itself sufficient to circumvent application of the natural accumulation
doctrine. We agree.
As our Supreme found in Court Haliw, supra, the plaintiff can not “demonstrate that it
was the combination of ice and a defect in the sidewalk that cause[d] her to slip and fall.”
Haliw, supra at 310. (Emphasis in original.) To that end, the Court opined:
Simply put, a plaintiff cannot recover in a claim against a governmental
agency where the sole proximate cause of the slip and fall is the natural
accumulation of ice or snow. This is true even where the ice or snow naturally
accumulates in a portion of the [sidewalk] that was otherwise not `reasonably
safe and convenient for public travel.’ (Citation omitted.) Rather, there must
exist the combination of the ice or snow and the defect that, in tandem,
proximately causes the slip and fall. Id. at 311. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, according to the rule set forth in Haliw, even accepting plaintiff’s claim that the
sidewalk at issue was not “reasonably safe and convenient for public travel,” unless plaintiff can
establish that the defect in the sidewalk combined with the accumulation of ice and snow caused
plaintiff to slip and fall, summary disposition in favor of the municipality is proper.
In the instant case, a review of plaintiff’s deposition testimony demonstrates that the
presence of ice and snow on the sidewalk caused plaintiff to slip, fall and sustain injury. Counsel
inquired whether the apparent rise in the sidewalk “had anything to do with” plaintiff’s fall to
which plaintiff responded, “I could not see it. [I] could not make a statement because it was
covered with snow and ice; ice and snow . . . .” Thereafter, in response to counsel’s question as
to why plaintiff veered slightly to his right, plaintiff responded “[b]ecause in the sidewalk there
were all footprints in there and they were all frozen. That’s why you had such an uneven walk
on that piece.” According to plaintiff’s own testimony, the accumulation of the ice and snow
created the treacherous condition on that stretch of the sidewalk which caused plaintiff to slip
and fall. Indeed, the plaintiff himself testified that the “uneven walk” was occasioned by ice
formations that naturally accumulated in that region of the sidewalk as opposed to an underlying
defect. The mere presence of ice alone “which naturally accumulates and which is the sole
proximate cause of a slip and fall [does not] satisf[y] the remaining elements of the negligence
analysis employed in actions against governmental agencies.” Id. at 312.
Similarly, a review of the record does not reveal any evidence indicating that defendant
municipality acted affirmatively to alter the natural accumulation of ice and snow upon the
public sidewalk or otherwise altered the condition of the sidewalk itself sufficient to remove this
case from within the purview of the natural accumulation doctrine. Additionally, a review of the
record does not contain evidence to demonstrate that the combination of the alleged defect and
the accumulation of ice and snow together proximately caused plaintiff’s slip and fall to permit
plaintiff to prevail “against an otherwise immune municipality.” Id. The evidence plaintiff
submitted did not establish that the sidewalk where plaintiff fell was cracked or broken, nor did it
indicate that the height differential between the slabs where plaintiff fell exceeded one inch. The
evidence submitted demonstrates a one inch height differential between the sidewalk and the
driveway apron as opposed to between the slabs of concrete forming the sidewalk. The facts
contained in the record here before us, establish that although the sidewalk permitted the
accumulation of ice, as a factual matter, `no other danger to the steps of the traveler than that
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arising from the presence of the ice . . .’ existed. Id. (Citation omitted.) Considering the
documentary evidence presented, in a light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to reveal a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary disposition. Accordingly, we find that the
trial court did not err by granting defendant City of Warren summary disposition in accord with
MCR 2.116(C)(10).
B. Defendant Samuel Jett’s Liability
Plaintiff argues next that defendant Jett created an unnatural accumulation of ice and
snow thus increasing the travel hazard to the public by driving through the snow and creating “a
rutting of snow on the sidewalk” which, according to plaintiff, is an affirmative action that alters
the natural accumulation of ice and snow thus defeating application of the natural accumulation
doctrine as a bar to recovery. We disagree.
It is a well settled principle in Michigan jurisprudence that a landowner does not have an
affirmative duty to remove the natural accumulation of ice and snow from a public sidewalk.
Taylor v Saxton, 133 Mich App 302, 306; 349 NW2d 165 (1984). Conversely, a landowner does
have an affirmative duty not to take affirmative actions that would alter the natural accumulation
of ice and snow in such a way as to increase the hazard of travel to the public. Zielinski, supra at
615. As one court instructed, “[t]o be liable under the increased hazard theory, the defendant’s
act of removing ice and snow must have introduced a new element of danger not previously
present, or created an obstacle to travel, such as a snow bank, that exceeds the inconvenience
posed by the natural accumulation.” Skogman, supra at 354. (Emphasis added.)
A review of the record in the case sub judice establishes that plaintiff failed to come forth
with documentary evidence to establish that defendant Jett, by driving through the snow,
“increased the travel hazard to the public,” Morrow v Boldt, 203 Mich App 324, 327; 512 NW2d
83 (1994) beyond that which is ordinarily present as a result of the natural accumulation of ice
and snow during the winter months in Michigan. See Skogman, supra at 354 (stating that `the
interference with travel must be unusual or exceptional, that is, different in character from
conditions ordinarily and generally brought about by winter weather in a given locality.’).
(Citation omitted.) The alleged “rutting” effect created by defendant Jett’s ingress and egress
from his driveway does not definitively establish that Jett created an impediment to the public’s
travel that “exceed[ed] the inconvenience posed by a natural accumulation” Id. sufficient to
defeat the bar to recovery imposed by application of the natural accumulation doctrine.
A review of the applicable caselaw reveals that the term “unnatural accumulation”
contemplates the creation of an artificial condition such as a snow bank, hump, or some other
condition which makes travel along the highway at issue more onerous. See eg, Johnson v City
of Marquette, 154 Mich 50; 117 NW 658 (1908) (stating that an unnatural accumulation of snow
and ice obtained where the shoveling of the snow from the railroad track produced a “hump” on
either side of the track which increased the height of the bank on each side.); Hampton v Master
Products, Inc, 84 Mich App 767, 773; 270 NW2d 514 (1978) (holding that the trier of fact could
reasonably infer that the village was responsible for “unnatural accumulation” of snow where the
municipality plowed the snow in such a way as to create a “drift” across the sidewalk.)
In the instant case, there is no evidence that defendant Jett undertook to remove the ice
and snow from the sidewalk thus producing an “unnatural” or artificial condition such as a snow
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bank, hump, drift or ridge. Plaintiff contends that the “unnatural” accumulation derived from
Jett repeatedly driving over the snow creating ruts of ice to form on the sidewalk. Driving over
existing snow and ice does not transform an otherwise natural accumulation into an unnatural
impediment. Indeed, in Elam v Marine, 116 Mich App 140, 142-143; 321 NW2d 870 (1982) we
stated “[i]n Michigan, the result of a change in the natural condition because of others traveling
over the snow does not give rise to a duty on the part of another to maintain that sidewalk free
from ice and snow.” Jett’s conduct in compacting the snow on the public sidewalk by driving
into and out of his driveway did not transform the natural accumulation of ice and snow on the
sidewalk into an artificial or otherwise “unnatural” condition as that term is defined by the
applicable caselaw. On the facts herein presented, the trial court did not err by determining that
the ice and snow on the sidewalk was a natural accumulation. Upon de novo review of the
record, we find that plaintiff failed to create genuine issues of material fact upon which
reasonable minds could differ sufficient to preclude judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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