PEOPLE OF MI V COLLIN DENNARD PITTMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226950
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-166000-FH
COLLIN DENNARD PITTMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Whitbeck, C.J., and Holbrook, Jr., J.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of delivery of less than five kilograms or less than
twenty plants of marijuana, in violation of MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). Defendant was sentenced
as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to an enhanced sentence of 2 to 15 years in prison.
He appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from defendant’s sale of marijuana to undercover officer Darren
McAllister of the Pontiac Police Department.
Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis of
entrapment. We disagree.
The trial court’s specific findings regarding entrapment are subject to appellate review
under the clearly erroneous standard. People v Connolly, 232 Mich App 425, 428; 591 NW2d
340 (1998). The trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a firm
conviction that a mistake was made. Id. at 429.
“Michigan courts use the objective test of entrapment. The objective test focuses on the
propriety of the government’s conduct which resulted in the charges against the defendant rather
than on the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime.” People v Hampton, 237 Mich App
143, 156; 603 NW2d 270 (1999) (citation omitted). Entrapment occurs when (1) the police
engage in impermissible conduct which would induce a person similarly situated to the
defendant, although otherwise law-abiding, to commit the crime, or (2) the police engage in
conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated by the court. People v Ealy, 222 Mich App
508, 510; 564 NW2d 168 (1997).
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The trial court correctly concluded that defendant failed to establish police conduct so
reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated regardless of its relationship to the crime. People v
Fabiano, 192 Mich App 523, 531-532; 482 NW2d 467 (1992). According to defendant’s
testimony at the entrapment hearing, Officer McAllister waived him down as he was
approaching the corner of Wilson Street in his truck. McAllister approached him as he reached
the corner, and said “who got the weed.” Also according to defendant, defendant then responded
that he had “a personal dime bag of weed.” According to defendant, he had just purchased the
bag from someone else. Defendant informed McAllister that he only had this “10 dollar bag” but
McAllister offered him $20 for it, at which point defendant sold it to him. Defendant represented
that he had not intended to sell marijuana that night; in fact, he was only in that area because he
had been at a friend’s house “trying to get [his] hair done” and had stopped at McDonald’s to get
something to eat. Defendant’s testimony does not support a finding that the police conduct was
reprehensible. People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 86, 89; 461 NW2d 884 (1990); Connolly, supra
at 429.
The trial court also correctly determined that defendant failed to establish police conduct
that would induce a person, although otherwise law-abiding, to commit an offense. Fabiano,
supra at 531. To determine whether the challenged police conduct constituted an improper
inducement to commit a crime, consideration must be given to the willingness of the accused to
commit the act weighed against how a normally law-abiding person would react under similar
circumstances. People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34, 54; 475 NW2d 786 (1991). The mere furnishing
of an opportunity to commit a crime is not entrapment. Ealy, supra at 510. Many factors are
relevant to whether the police conduct would induce a hypothetical law-abiding citizen to engage
in criminal conduct. People v Williams, 196 Mich App 656, 661-662; 493 NW2d 507 (1992).
This Court examines the facts “to determine whether the government activity would induce a
hypothetical person not ready and willing to commit the crime to engage in criminal activity.”
Id. at 662.
Defendant asserts that McAllister’s offer to pay $20 for an amount of marijuana valued at
$10 constitutes an inducement that would make the commission of a crime unusually attractive
to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen. Defendant’s position is untenable. A $10 or $15 profit
would not, by any standard of reasonableness, induce an otherwise law-abiding citizen to commit
a crime.
Defendant has not established entrapment and the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury an “order of
deliberation” instruction after instructing the jury with regard to the principle charge and a lesser
included offense. Defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. People v
McCrady, 244 Mich App 27, 30; 624 NW2d 761 (2000). Accordingly, we review defendant’s
claim to determine whether the trial court committed plain error that affected defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); McCrady,
supra at 30.
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the principle charge of delivery of
marijuana and of the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana. The trial court also
instructed the jury with regard to the meanings of the terms “delivery” and “possession.” The
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trial court failed to instruct the jury, however, regarding the order in which the jury was to
consider lesser included offenses. Defendant argues that this omission constitutes error on the
part of the trial court. We agree. A trial court must instruct the jury on the order of deliberations
when the jury is allowed to consider lesser included offenses. People v Gonzales, 197 Mich App
385, 399; 496 NW2d 312 (1992), citing People v Handley, 415 Mich 356, 361; 329 NW2d 710
(1982).
Defendant argues that the trial court compounded its error by giving a supplemental
instruction that was so confusing as to take the lesser included offense from the jury’s
consideration. Defendant did not object to this instruction below. Regardless of how inadequate
the supplemental instruction may have been, this instruction alone, or in combination with the
initial instructional error of failing to instruct on the order of deliberations, did not affect
defendant’s substantial rights, Carines, supra at 763-764, where defendant was not entitled to an
instruction on the lesser included offense in the first instance. Here, the evidence presented at
trial did not support giving the instruction. People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 444-445; 521
NW2d 546 (1994), citing People v Steele, 429 Mich 13, 19; 412 NW2d 206 (1987); see also
People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386, 403; 585 NW2d 1 (1998).
Alternatively, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as a
result of counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s omission of the instruction. Allegations
pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel must first be heard by the trial court to establish a
record of the facts pertaining to such allegations. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212
NW2d 922 (1973). In cases such as this, where a Ginther hearing has not been held, review by
this Court is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Hurst, 205 Mich App 634,
641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 327; 521 NW2d 797
(1994). Because defendant has failed to establish that counsel’s failure to object to the alleged
instructional error was prejudicial , he has not established an ineffective assistance claim.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument to the
effect that the evidence was “completely uncontroverted” was an improper comment on
defendant’s right not to testify. We disagree. A prosecutor may observe that evidence against
the defendant is “uncontroverted” or “undisputed” even if defendant is the only one who could
have contradicted the evidence, or if the defense has failed to call witnesses, or it has failed to
prove what it said it would in opening statement. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 115-116; 538
NW2d 356 (1995). Moreover, because the challenged remarks were proper, defense counsel did
not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the remarks. Pickens, supra at 327.
Next, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in concluding that an endorsed
witness did not have to be produced at trial by the prosecutor absent a hearing at which the
prosecutor was required to show due diligence in attempting to produce the witness.
Additionally, he contends that the court abused its discretion by denying the defense request to
play a videotape of the witness’ testimony to the jury, and that it erred by failing to give the
missing witness instruction.
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A trial court’s decision to permit amendment to a witness list is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 291; 537 NW2d 813 (1995). The court’s decision
to admit evidence, in this case, the videotaped testimony from a prior hearing, is also reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 709; 542 NW2d 921 (1995).
An abuse of discretion occurs where a court’s action is so violative of fact and logic as to
constitute perversity of will or defiance of judgment. People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 456;
554 NW2d 586 (1996). Additionally, because defendant failed to request the missing witness
instruction, this Court reviews the court’s failure to give the instruction for plain error. Carines,
supra at 763-764.
A defendant must show prejudice before relief is warranted under the res gestae statute.
Burwick, supra at 284. Here, defendant has failed to show prejudice where the testimony
defendant wished to elicit from officer McLaughlin was cumulative to the testimony given by
two other police officers. For the same reason, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s request to show the jury a videotape of officer McLaughlin’s testimony taken at an
earlier probation violation hearing involving defendant or by failing to sua sponte give the
missing witness instruction.
Finally, defendant’s claim of trial court bias fails for lack of record support, especially
where the allegations of misconduct against the trial court in other drug cases were proven false
and the court was exonerated of any wrongdoing by the Michigan Attorney General’s office.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
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