IN THE MATTER OF CONTEMPT OF WILLIAM ROBERT ELDRIDGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of Contempt of
WILLIAM ROBERT ELDRIDGE.
ELIZABETH ANN ELDRIDGE,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 225732
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 95-509557-DM
WILLIAM ROBERT ELDRIDGE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Griffin and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order finding him in contempt of
court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff
$22,000 for violating a prior order and sentenced defendant to ninety-three days in jail, sixtythree days of which were suspended. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that he could not be found guilty of criminal contempt because the
personal protection order issued against him failed to meet the requirements of MCL
600.2950(11), and because he was improperly summoned to respond to charges of criminal
contempt. We find no error. The amended personal protection order issued April 8, 1997 met all
of the applicable requirements of MCL 600.2950(11). Moreover, that order was not superceded
by subsequent orders that were intended to enforce its provisions. Indeed, the March 11, 1999
order specifically provided that “[a]ll other provisions of the Personal Protection Orders remain
in full force and effect.” Defendant was summoned to appear by an order to show cause, issued
upon plaintiff’s petition accusing him of violating a PPO and a March 11, 1999, order for
contempt. This was appropriate under MCR 3.606(A)(1).
Defendant further suggests that he was not properly notified of the criminal nature of the
proceedings and that he was compelled to testify against himself in violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. We disagree. Defendant was fully notified that he faced a
finding of criminal contempt and a possible jail term if the court found that he violated the PPO
or the order for contempt. Both the PPO and the order for contempt provide that violations could
be treated as criminal contempt and punished with incarceration. Plaintiff was also informed of
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the nature of the proceedings and the potential of a jail sentence on the record before the
evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the trial court informed defendant that he could be
incarcerated for the latest violations and that plaintiff requested his incarceration. We also note
that defendant was and is a licensed attorney in the State of Michigan. Clearly, defendant was
not denied his due process right to notice. In re Contempt of ACIA, 243 Mich App 697, 713-714;
624 NW2d 443 (2000); Jaikins v Jaikins, 12 Mich App 115, 120; 162 NW2d 325 (1968).
Nothing in the record indicates that defendant was compelled to testify. Indeed, defendant failed
to object to being called as an adverse witness and never asserted his right against selfincrimination. Defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying without
objection. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 405; 552 NW2d 663 (1996).
Lastly, defendant claims that the fine imposed exceeded the statutory limit. The record
shows that the parties agreed to the sanctions contained in the order for contempt. One of the
sanctions agreed to required defendant to pay $1,000 for each telephone call made in violation of
that order. A party is bound by his own stipulations and may not later raise them as errors on
appeal. Weiss v Hodge (After Remand), 223 Mich App 620, 636; 567 NW2d 468 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Helene N. White
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