SANDRA BRIGGS V DEPT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANDRA BRIGGS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH,
No. 227725
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 98-089115-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Doctoroff and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition of her claim of retaliation. We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff, who is Caucasian, began working at Northville Psychiatric Hospital (NPH) in
1985 as a safety supervisor. In July 1992 she was appointed Acting Safety Director, and in
October 1992 she was promoted to Assistant Safety Director. On May 5, 1996, defendant
appointed Kenneth Daniels, who is an African-American, to the position of Safety Director.
Plaintiff, who had applied for that position, filed a Civil Service grievance on May 15, 1996.
Subsequently, plaintiff received two written reprimands regarding her job performance.
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging violations of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA),
MCL 37.2101 et seq., including discrimination and retaliation. She alleged that defendant
discriminated against her based on her race, gender, and age by refusing to appoint her to the
position of Safety Director, and retaliated against her for filing the Civil Service grievance. She
asserted that the retaliation included the written reprimands and a profane tirade from Daniels.
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The
parties stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims of race and gender
discrimination. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s
claim of retaliation pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding that while the internal grievance
process constituted protected activity, plaintiff failed to establish that a genuine issue of fact
existed as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s claims of race and
gender discrimination proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action.
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We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under the ELCRA, a claimant must show that she engaged in a
protected activity, that the protected activity was known by the defendant, that the defendant
took an employment action adverse to the claimant, and that a causal connection existed between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Barrett v Kirtland Community
College, 245 Mich App 306, 315; 628 NW2d 63 (2001). In construing the ELCRA, a court may
consider federal court interpretations of the federal Civil Rights Act. These interpretations are
not binding, but should be afforded substantial consideration. Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463
Mich 297, 313-314; 614 NW2d 910 (2000); Barrett, supra at 314.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition of her retaliation claim. We disagree and affirm. An adverse employment action
need not have monetary considerations. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich
App 347, 363-364; 597 NW2d 250 (1999). However, it must be materially and objectively
adverse, and must be more than a “mere inconvenience.” Meyer v City of Center Line, 242 Mich
App 560, 569; 619 NW2d 182 (2000). Plaintiff presented no evidence that the reprimands she
received after she filed the grievance resulted in a loss of status, responsibility, salary, etc. She
continued to hold the position of Assistant Safety Director at NPH. We conclude that plaintiff’s
receipt of a reprimand, without further consequences, does not constitute a materially adverse
employment action.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s assertion that a question of fact existed as to whether the obscene
tirade directed at her by Daniels resulted in a hostile work environment is without merit.
Whether a hostile work environment exists is determined by whether a reasonable person, under
the totality of the circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially
interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451
Mich 358, 369; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Plaintiff presented no evidence that the tirade in which
Daniels engaged had such an effect. The trial court correctly granted summary disposition of
plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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