IN RE EST OF EUGENE T CAPUZZI MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of EUGENE T. CAPUZZI, M.D.,
Deceased.
MICHAEL CAPUZZI and EUGENE T.
CAPUZZI, JR,
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants,
v
No. 227750
Cheboygan Probate Court
LC No. 99-011693-SE
CHRISTINA FISHER,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Hood and Sawyer, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right the probate judge’s denial of her petition for return of assets
and grant of summary disposition to plaintiffs. The probate court held that under MCR
2.116(C)(10) there was no genuine issue of fact concerning whether plaintiff Michael T.
Capuzzi, as power of attorney for the decedent, was authorized to complete a sale of stock he
began before the decedent’s death, but that was incomplete on the decedent’s death. Plaintiffs
also filed a cross appeal of the probate court’s minimal award of costs to plaintiffs. We reverse
and remand.
The first issue on appeal is whether a transfer of stocks made under a power of attorney
(POA) should be completed when the principal dies after the request for transfer is made but
before the transfer is actually accomplished. This Court reviews decisions on motions for
summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d
201 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim
and is reviewed to determine whether the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, or any other
documentary evidence establish a genuine issue of material fact to warrant a trial. Spiek, supra
at 337. This Court will give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences when
determining whether summary disposition is appropriate. Betrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich
606, 615; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). However, review of estate petitions requires the abuse of
discretion standard. In re Rice Estate, 138 Mich App 261, 269-270; 360 NW2d 587 (1984).
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The first step in the analysis of the case at bar is to examine and give effect to the
language of the POA at issue. Crane v Kangas, 53 Mich App 653, 655; 220 NW2d 172 (1974).
Although the document in the present case is general, even under a strict construction, it did
authorize Michael to “transfer . . . any . . . stock,” indicating the decedent’s intent. Id.; Muller v
Bank of America, 28 Kan App 2d 136, 139; 12 P3d 899 (2000) (citing the Uniform Durable
Power of Attorney Act). Nevertheless, the POA itself stated that it was only effective simply
“until revoked,” also indicating that intent. Crane, supra at 655; Muller, supra at 139. It is
virtually undisputed that death of the principal terminates the agency relationship and the powers
it vests immediately. Restatement Agency, 2d, § 120(1), see also comment (a), and illustration
(1). POA issues may be resolved using agency law, and death of a principal automatically
terminates the POA. Vanderwall v Midkiff, 166 Mich App 668, 677-678; 421 NW2d 263 (1988),
appeal after remand on other grounds 186 Mich App 191; 463 NW2d 219 (1990).
Michael sent the facsimile requesting the transfer at issue on August 10, clearly before
the decedent (the principal) died on August 14. Therefore, because it is undisputed that Michael
initiated the transfer before the principal’s death, whether Michael knew of the decedent’s death
on August 14 is of no consequence. See, generally, Persinger v Holst, ___ Mich App ___; ___
NW2d ___ (Docket No. 224635, issued December 4, 2001), slip op 3-4; see also Vanderwall,
supra at 678, MCL 700.5504(1), 700.5505, and ULA § 4(a)-504, § 5-505; see, generally,
Persinger, supra at slip op 3-4.
If the proposed stock transfer had been completed before the decedent died, it would have
been valid. Henritzy v General Electric Co, 182 Mich App 1, 11; 451 NW2d 558 (1990).
However, if the transaction was actually being conducted precisely when the decedent died, the
authority to conduct the transfer under the POA was revoked. 2A CJS, § 137, pp 757-758, and n
78-80, 82.
Subject to exceptions, the general rule is that revocation of authority is
effective immediately upon the principal’s death,[] and the fact that the agent has
performed, as authorized, one or several acts of that which was contemplated as a
single transaction does not operate to preserve or keep alive the power until the
completion of the transaction. [Crow v Day, 96 SW2d 100 (Tex, 1936); Brown v
Skotland, 12 ND 445; 97 NW 543 (1903); see also In re Gibbons’ Will, 234 App
Div 153; 254 NYS 566 (1931).]. . . .
Those cases where the death of the principal occurs intermediate the
commencement and the completion of the particular transactions must be
distinguished from those situations where the transaction has been substantially
completed during the lifetime of the principal . . . . [2A CJS, § 137, pp 757-758,
and n 78-80, 82, citing Young v W E Hutton & Co, 31 NE2d 728 (1936)
(emphasis added).]
Plaintiffs are not entitled to the stocks simply because Michael had fully performed to
accomplish the transfer. Several acts were required for this one transaction, and the transferor
still needed to perform. Brown, supra, 97 NW at 544-545. In Young, supra at 729-730, the
transferee actually received the stocks (the transfer) on the day of the principal’s death, and no
evidence could show that the transfer actually occurred after the death, so the transaction was
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deemed valid. In contrast, the transferor-partnership in the present case specifically stated that it
had not made the transfer requested, and because the principal had since died, the transaction
could not then be completed. Young, supra at 729-730; see also Brown, supra, 97 NW at 544545, and In re Gibbons’ Will, supra at 154. If the principal had been alive, in the present case,
he could have cancelled the transaction, because it was not completed, according to the
transferor-partnership. The partnership had to complete its part of the transaction during the
decedent’s lifetime to make it valid under the law. 2A CJS, § 137, pp 757-758, and n 78-80, 82;
Brown, supra, 97 NW at 544-545; Young, supra at 729-730; In re Gibbons’ Will, supra at 154.
Therefore, we hold that the better view of agency law as applied to the POA in the
present case is that the decedent’s POA was revoked on his death, before the transfer was
completed, and consequently prohibiting completion. Vanderwall, supra at 678. Thus, under de
novo review, defendant did show a genuine issue of fact concerning the authorization of the
transfer. MCR 2.116(C)(10); Spiek, supra at 337. The transferor’s statement that the stock
transfer was incomplete and consequently unauthorized on the decedent’s death is dispositive.
2A CJS, § 137, pp 757-758, and n 78-80, 82; Young, supra at 729-730. The partnership was
correct in refusing to make the stock transfer and the stock should pass according to the will. As
a result, the probate court abused its discretion in ordering the stock transfer to plaintiffs. In re
Rice Estate, supra at 269-270.
Because of our decision in favor of defendant, we also reverse the trial court’s award of
costs to plaintiffs. Defendant’s action was neither frivolous nor poorly grounded in fact. MCR
2.114(D)-(F); MCL 600.2591. Resolution of the remaining issue raised by plaintiffs’ cross
appeal is thus unnecessary.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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