PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD P HODGSON JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227319
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-005750
RICHARD P. HODGSON, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., Whitbeck, C.J., and Holbrook, Jr., J.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Richard Hodgson of two counts of assault with intent to
commit murder1 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm)
for shooting fourteen-year-old Alicia (Maria) Hernandez and her friend, Scott Anderson.2 The
trial court sentenced Hodgson to concurrent prison terms of sixteen to forty years’ for the assault
convictions and a consecutive two-year prison term for the felony-firearm conviction. Hodgson
appeals by delayed leave granted. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
According to Maria Hernandez, she knew Hodgson because he had dated her aunt and
because her brother, Lorenzo Hernandez, had been in an altercation with Hodgson. Maria
Hernandez stated that, on the evening in question in April 1998, she was standing with her
brother when Hodgson and a group of individuals approached them. Lorenzo Hernandez walked
away, and Hodgson approached her. Hodgson asked about her brother’s whereabouts and, when
she refused to answer, they argued. Maria Hernandez said that, as they were arguing, she heard
someone yell, “[s]hoot this bitch.” Hodgson then reached into his waistband and pulled out a
gun, which prompted her to begin running. She heard shots, and then she realized that a bullet
had hit her in the leg. Maria Hernandez blacked out momentarily and, when she regained
consciousness, saw Hodgson jumping up and down while saying, “I’m a crazy motherf-----r.”
1
MCL 750.83.
2
MCL 750.227b.
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Scott Anderson’s account of the incident was highly similar. He stated that he was with
his brother, Thomas Anderson, and Maria Hernandez when Hodgson approached them with three
or four other individuals and began arguing with Maria Hernandez. Anderson heard Hodgson
say, “I’m the baddest motherf----r on the face of the earth” and that he would shoot Maria
Hernandez. Immediately before Hodgson pulled a gun from his pants, Scott Anderson said,
Hodgson stated, “[s]hoot this bitch.” At that point, Scott Anderson turned to run, but bullets hit
his leg, his temple, and both of his arms.
Thomas Anderson confirmed that he was with Maria Hernandez and his brother, Scott
Anderson, when Hodgson and his friends approached. Thomas Anderson heard Hodgson tell
Maria Hernandez that he was looking for her brother and heard Maria Hernandez refuse to tell
him her brother’s whereabouts. He then saw Hodgson pull out a gun, at which time he grabbed
his brother. They ran until Scott Anderson was shot.
Sometime later, Ubaldo Mendoza was in a Friend of the Court office when he overheard
Hodgson bragging to someone else that he had just been released from the Fourth Precinct,
where he had been brought in because of a child support issue and a murder charge, evidently
related to the two shootings. Mendoza recounted that Hodgson (who was unaware that Maria
Hernandez was Mendoza’s daughter) said that he had been looking for Lorenzo Hernandez.
Hodgson said that when he saw Maria Hernandez, she refused to reveal where Lorenzo
Hernandez was, which made Hodgson angry. Then, Hodgson indicated, someone told him to
shoot Maria Hernandez. Mendoza said that Hodgson
got a 9mm and say he just went to scare her, you know, shot at her leg and you
know, he didn’t want to kill her, he just shot at the leg and you know, she fell
down and somebody else came out and he said you want some too, and he shot at
him, too, you know.
According to Mendoza, Hodgson said that he planned to tell the police that he did not know who
was doing the shooting and that the real assailant shot at him as well.
At trial, the testimony concerning who shot Maria Hernandez and Scott Anderson was
somewhat varied. In addition to Maria Hernandez’ testimony, two police officers stated that she
had identified Hodgson as the shooter. On direct examination, Scott Anderson retold his version
of the shooting and said that he saw Hodgson with a gun. Defense counsel then impeached Scott
Anderson with a portion of his preliminary examination testimony in which he said that he did
not actually see Hodgson with a gun, prompting the prosecutor to rehabilitate Scott Anderson’s
testimony with his other statements at the preliminary examination. Other witnesses to the
shooting generally corroborated what Maria Hernandez and Scott Anderson said occurred, but
two witnesses indicated that Hodgson did not have a gun and one witness testified that he saw a
man, apparently not Hodgson, step out from between two houses and shoot.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, Hodgson moved for a directed verdict, which the
trial court denied. After his conviction, Hodgson moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial
court should grant the motion because of newly discovered evidence. In the alternative, he
contended that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial. The trial court denied this motion as well.
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In May 2000, Hodgson filed a delayed application for leave to appeal, arguing that he
was entitled to a new trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, there was newly
discovered evidence, and evidence of his prior bad acts had been erroneously admitted at trial.
This Court granted Hodgson’s application for delayed leave to appeal limited to the issues raised
in the application. While retaining jurisdiction, the Court remanded the matter for a Ginther3
hearing on Hodgson’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
At the Ginther hearing, Hodgson called his trial counsel, Kerri Mitchell, to testify.
Mitchell recalled having a number of conversations with Hodgson concerning trial strategy and
which witnesses would be called to testify. Mitchell also recalled visiting the scene of the
shooting and concluding that the place where police found spent bullet casings did not match the
testimony incriminating Hodgson, which meant that it was physically impossible for Hodgson to
be the shooter, a point he presented and argued to the jury. Mitchell could not specifically
remember why certain witnesses did not testify, but explained that he would ordinarily make a
determination concerning which witnesses to call according to the facts specific to each witness,
taking into consideration whether the witnesses were incarcerated, involved with gangs, or likely
to appear at trial.
Of the six other witnesses who testified on behalf of Hodgson at the Ginther hearing, two
witnesses, Michael Hinton and Virginia Smith, said that they did not see Hodgson with a gun at
the time of the shooting. Smith, who was subpoenaed to testify at trial, said that Maria
Hernandez indicated that she did not know who shot her immediately after the shooting; she
never testified because, though she appeared at court on the first day, she overslept the next day
because she had been drinking the previous night. Edwardo Hinton, his brother, Michael Hinton,
and Joseph Probe all claimed to have seen Robert (“Fat Rob” or “Big Rob”) Wyatt with a gun
before and after the shooting, though none of the men saw Wyatt shoot the gun. Henry Fields
was the only witness at the Ginther hearing to claim that he saw Wyatt pull out a gun and shoot
at Hodgson and Maria Hernandez. Edwardo Hinton, Probe, and Fields all claimed to have heard
Wyatt make statements incriminating himself after the shooting. Each of these three men were
also embroiled in their own trouble with the law and were incarcerated, evidently soon after the
shooting. None of these men approached the attorneys or the police to reveal their knowledge of
the shooting.
Hodgson also called Lieutenant Vickie Close to testify at the Ginther hearing to explain
what she had seen while working as a security threat coordinator at Standish Correctional
Facility. According to Close, she was assigned to monitor mail of known gang members. One
of those individuals was Michael Hodgson, Hodgson’s brother. She had an opportunity to see
two or three letters a person named “Rob” or “Fat Rob” had sent to Michael Hodgson sometime
in 1999. In this letter, the author purported to be the shooter and suggested that he was going to
reveal this information. Close photocopied the letters and sent them to a Central Office, but
could not be certain whether Wyatt actually signed or sent the letters. Wyatt could not confirm
this supposed confession because he died before the Ginther hearing.
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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The trial court denied Hodgson’s motion for new trial, concluding that Hodgson had not
met his burden of showing by the preponderance of the evidence that Mitchell’s performance
was deficient because there was no proof that he knew any of the witnesses other than Smith
existed. Other than Close, the trial court did not believe that any of the witnesses would have
actually testified if called to do so, noting the history of incarceration that a number of the men
had and Smith’s drinking problem. Further, Mitchell engaged a logical tactic at trial by
challenging the prosecution testimony with the physical evidence suggesting Hodgson could not
have been the shooter.
II. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
Hodgson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Mitchell failed to subpoena and
call the Hinton brothers, Smith, Close, Probe, and Fields as witnesses at trial. He claims that the
Hintons, Probe, and Fields all would have testified that Rob Wyatt, not Hodgson, was the
shooter, and that Smith and Close would have also given relevant information tending to
exonerate him. He also contends that Mitchell was ineffective for failing to ask the trial court to
require the prosecutor to produce Smith to testify or to instruct the jury pursuant to CJI2d 5.12
when Smith failed to appear after the first day of trial. We review constitutional questions de
novo,4 a standard that is particularly relevant in this case because the legal test we apply to
ineffective assistance of counsel issues does not require us to defer to the trial court to any
extent.
B. Legal Standards
As this Court explained in People v Knapp,5
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for defense counsel's errors, there was a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). A defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate that counsel's performance was objectively
unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must also overcome
the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991),
citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984).
4
See People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 144; 605 NW2d 49 (1999).
5
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
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C. Failure To Present Witnesses
Case law settles that failing to present a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel if the failure to do so deprives the defendant of a “substantial defense.”6 However,
decisions concerning which witnesses to call and what evidence to present are often considered
part of trial strategy.7
We agree with the trial court that the record is devoid of any evidence that Mitchell was
made aware of or could have discovered the witnesses who would have allegedly identified
Wyatt as the shooter. At the Ginther hearing, Mitchell said that he discussed strategy and which
witnesses to call with Hodgson. Though Mitchell could not give much detail concerning these
discussions because of the time that had passed since they occurred, during which he had also
transferred Hodgson’s case to another attorney, the record does not indicate that these potential
witnesses’ names came to light. Though their motivations were varied, the Hintons, Fields, and
Probe each had reasons for not revealing that they had arguably relevant information regarding
the crime before trial when Wyatt may have still been alive. This makes us question how even
diligent inquiry would have allowed Mitchell to find them. Further, Close did not discover the
letters until after trial in this case, and Smith had been subpoenaed, but failed to appear.
Even setting aside all the reasons that Smith, the Hintons, Probe, and Field, made poor
witnesses – including their relationships with Hodgson, each man’s criminal history, and two
witnesses’ intoxication at the time of the shooting – Mitchell clearly chose to pursue a specific
strategy at trial. While these witnesses’ testimony may have bolstered the defense theory that the
physical evidence was incompatible with the prosecution testimony, thereby eliminating
Hodgson as the shooter, the defense still existed without their participation in the trial. Further,
that Mitchell’s strategy failed is not reason enough to conclude that he was ineffective.8
D. Missing Witness
Hodgson also claims that Mitchell was ineffective for failing to insist that the prosecutor
present Smith as a witness or request that the jury be instructed pursuant to CJI2d 5.12, the
instruction concerning a missing endorsed witness. The prosecutor no longer has a duty to
endorse or produce res gestae witnesses.9 In any event, contrary to Hodgson’s claim, the
prosecutor did not endorse Smith as a witness. Further, Hodgson has failed to establish that, but
for Mitchell’s failure to secure Smith’s presence at trial, the result of his trial would have been
different. The thrust of Smith’s testimony at the Ginther hearing was that she was standing near
Hodgson and the victims when the shots were fired, that Hodgson did not have a gun, and that
the gunshots originated from down the street. This testimony, however, was cumulative to other
trial testimony that Hodgson did not have a gun.
6
People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990).
7
People v Julian, 171 Mich App 153, 158-159; 429 NW2d 615 (1988).
8
People v Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996).
9
MCL 767.40a; People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 288-289; 537 NW2d 813 (1995).
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In sum, Hodgson has failed to demonstrate that Mitchell’s performance was below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing norms and that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the failure to introduce the evidence, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.
III. Newly Discovered Witnesses
A. Standard Of Review
Hodgson argues that, in the alternative, he should be granted a new trial because the
witnesses and letters incriminating Wyatt were newly discovered evidence. This Court reviews a
trial court’s post conviction ruling denying a new trial when new evidence becomes known for
an abuse of discretion.10
B. Reasonable Diligence And Effect On The Outcome
A court may grant a motion for new trial involving newly discovered evidence when the
defendant demonstrates:
(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, is newly discovered, (2) the
evidence is not merely cumulative, (3) the evidence is such as to render a different
result probable on retrial, and (4) the defendant could not with reasonable
diligence have produced it at trial.[11]
Hodgson, however, has failed to satisfy the second and third of these requirements.
With respect to Hodgson’s argument, apparently concerning all the defense witnesses at
the Ginther hearing except Mitchell and Close, he has failed to prove that they could not be
discovered with reasonable diligence. Smith had been subpoenaed, and therefore discovered.
Hodgson contends that concluding he was afforded the effective assistance of counsel because
Mitchell could not discover the Hinton brothers, Probe, and Hines also logically requires us to
conclude that their testimony was newly discovered. However, Hodgson personally knew these
men. Hodgson’s failure to reveal their existence to Mitchell excuses Mitchell’s failure to call
them to testify. This failure also suggests that if Hodgson had been reasonably diligent in
preparing his own defense with Mitchell, Mitchell would have been able to find and produce at
trial most, if not all, of these men because they were incarcerated and therefore possible to
produce at trial with a writ of habeas corpus.
While we seriously consider Hodgson’s argument that the letters from “Rob” or “Big
Rob” were newly discovered, having been sent after trial, and therefore impossible to produce at
trial, we question what effect they would have had on the outcome of this case. Though the
letters did not include precisely the same information conveyed through other witnesses at trial,
the jury was well-aware that the defense theory was that another person was the shooter.
10
People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 271; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).
11
Id.
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Hodgson’s point that the letters would have given a name to this other person is valid. However,
Maria Hernandez and Scott Anderson both gave vivid and compelling testimony, which a
number of other witnesses corroborated. Thus, we cannot say that it is reasonably probable that
this additional piece of information from a witness who could not be examined because he is
dead and who also had a criminal history, would have tipped the scales in favor of Hodgson.
IV. Prior Bad Acts Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Hodgson argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it admitted
Mendoza’s testimony that he heard Hodgson say that he was brought into the Fourth Precinct for
child support payments and a murder charge. Because Hodgson failed to object to this evidence,
this Court reviews this claim for plain error affecting his substantial rights.12
B. Mendoza’s Testimony
In People v Hawkins,13 this Court explained:
MRE 404(b)(1) governs a trial court's decision to admit or exclude prior
bad acts evidence, providing:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.”
The majority in People v VanderVliet, [444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), amended 445 Mich 1205; 520 NW2d 338 (1994)] set out a four-legged
test for a court to follow when determining whether to admit prior bad acts
evidence at trial. Prior bad acts evidence is admissible if: (1) a party offers it to
prove “something other than a character to conduct theory” as prohibited by MRE
404(b); (2) the evidence fits the relevancy test articulated in MRE 402, as
“enforced by MRE 104(b)”; and (3) the balancing test provided by MRE 403
demonstrates that the evidence is more probative of an issue at trial than
substantially unfair to the party against whom it is offered, defendant in this case.
A fourth factor articulated in VanderVliet, which does not fully conform to the
idea of a test expressed in the preceding three factors, suggests that a party may
request a limiting instruction under MRE 105 if the trial court decides to admit the
challenged evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court revisited MRE 404(b)
12
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
13
People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 447-448; 628 NW2d 105 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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recently in People v Sabin (After Remand), [463 Mich 43; 614 NW2d 888 (2000)]
emphasizing not only that VanderVliet continues to state the law accurately, but
that MRE 404(b) is a rule of inclusion and courts should adopt a flexible approach
when ruling on the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence.
With respect to Mendoza’s testimony referring to Hodgson’s contact with the police for
“child support payments,” the transcripts make clear that the prosecutor was attempting to elicit
Mendoza’s recollection of Hodgson’s confession to the charged offense, which was a proper line
of inquiry. While this nonresponsive answer may have warranted an objection from Mitchell,
there was no such objection or request for a curative instruction.14 This was also an “incidental”
part of the “complete story” of the offense and its aftermath as Hodgson decided to relate it in a
public place where he risked being overheard.15 More importantly, the prosecutor did not ask
any further questions regarding child support nor discuss the issue during closing argument.
Thus, we cannot conclude that this remark was at all prejudicial, much less that it affected
Hodgson’s substantial rights.
Further, with respect to Mendoza’s testimony referring to Hodgson’s statement about his
police contact related to murder charges, this was not a prior, or other, bad act. Instead, this
murder charge was for the criminal conduct at issue in this case, which Mendoza related as
Hodgson described it. This was specifically admissible against Hodgson at trial as an
admission.16 Therefore, Hodgson has again failed to demonstrate a plain error affecting his
substantial rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
14
See People v Lumsden, 168 Mich App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645 (1988).
15
See People v Delgado, 404 Mich 76, 83; 273 NW2d 395 (1978).
16
See MRE 801(d)(2).
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