PEOPLE OF MI V BERTHA MAE PROVOST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226571
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 99-011965-FC
BERTHA MAE PROVOST,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of bank robbery, in violation of MCL 750.531. The trial court
sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to four to twenty years’
imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting, under MRE 404(b), evidence of
defendant’s prior bank robbery convictions. We agree, but conclude that the error was harmless.
The admissibility of bad acts evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and this Court
will reverse only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich
376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). An abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person,
considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or
excuse for the ruling made. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 439; 597 NW2d
843 (1999).
Generally, a party may not introduce evidence of prior crimes committed by a defendant
unless there is some relevant purpose other than to show bad character or propensity to commit
the crime charged. MRE 404(b). Concerning admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, our
Supreme Court set out a four-part test in People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). However, in People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 186;
585 NW2d 357 (1998), this Court concluded that when the evidence is used to prove identity
through modus operandi, the test originally set forth in People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298,
308-309; 319 NW2d 518 (1982) applies. “Accordingly, and because Golochowicz was specially
crafted to test whether modus operandi evidence is admissible, neither VanderVliet nor its
progeny . . . would have us apply any other test.” People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 671; 625
NW2d 46 (2000), remanded on other grounds for supplemental opinion, ___ Mich ___,
12/18/2001 (Table No. 118530).
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If the bad acts evidence is offered to establish identification through a system in doing an
act, the following factors must be present before admission of the evidence is permissible: (1)
there must be substantial evidence that the defendant committed the bad act, (2) there must be
some special quality or circumstance of the act tending to prove the defendant’s identity or
system, (3) it must be material to the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense, and (4) the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Golochowicz, supra at 309; Smith, supra at 670.
The first of these factors is not at issue in the present case. Defendant admitted
committing the 1988 robberies, and was in fact charged and convicted of those crimes. The third
factor is also not in dispute. Defendant’s identity is clearly material because the person who
robbed the bank was wearing a ski mask at the time of the robbery. It is the second factor with
which we are here concerned. That factor requires that there be some special quality or
circumstance of the prior robberies that tends to prove defendant’s identity. In arguing the
existence of such quality or circumstance, the prosecutor relies on this Court’s recent decision in
Smith, supra. In that case, the defendant had been charged with a robbery and sexual assault that
occurred outside a University of Michigan dormitory in Ann Arbor. Id. at 660. At trial in that
matter, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of two additional robberies that had occurred
in the Ann Arbor area within two weeks of the charged crime – one near a middle school and
another in the lobby of a hotel. Id. at 661-662. The trial court admitted evidence regarding both
incidents. Id. at 666. On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded that although the evidence
regarding the middle school robbery was properly admitted, the evidence regarding the hotel
robbery was not. In doing so, the panel found that, with respect to the “special quality or
circumstance” factor, the middle school incident and the charged crime had “sufficient
similarities that tend to prove that the same assailant committed both crimes.” Id. at 673. For
instance, a “uniquely damaged white car” that had been linked to defendant was seen near the
scene of both crimes. Id. The panel also noted similarities in the manner in which the crimes
were committed, i.e., both crimes were committed in the early morning, and in both cases the
perpetrator “staked out” the place where the crime occurred and then “forced his victim into a car
by grabbing her from behind and pressing a small silver weapon against her head.” Id.
Although noting that “the charged offense may not have been precisely identical to the offense at
the [middle school],” the panel found that “there [were] sufficient similarities that tend to prove
that the same assailant committed both crimes.” Id.
In contrast, the panel found that because of differences in the clothing descriptions (the
hotel robber was not wearing a hood), as well as the fact that the hotel robbery did not involve a
sexual assault or a perpetrator who attempted to force the victim into a car, the charged offense
and the hotel robbery were not sufficiently similar to warrant admission under the test announced
in Golochowicz. Id. at 679. In doing so, the panel noted that there was “nothing unique about
the serious but rather ordinary robbery” at the hotel. Id.
Relying on People v Daughenbaugh, 193 Mich App 506; 484 NW2d 690, mod 441 Mich
867 (1992), defendant here contends that although the previous robberies and the charged
offense were all committed using a mask, gloves, and a handwritten note, those facts are not
sufficiently distinctive characteristics because bank robberies are often committed in such a
manner. Daughenbaugh involved the “Blue Bandit” robberies that occurred in Lansing in 1988,
so-called because the robber in each case wore blue jeans and a blue hooded sweatshirt. Id. at
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508. The defendant challenged on appeal his four convictions of armed robbery on the ground
that he should have had separate trials for the robberies. Id. at 508-509. A panel of this Court
agreed, and because the issue of the admissibility of evidence of the separate robberies was likely
to occur in each of the trials, addressed that issue. Id. at 511-517. In finding evidence of the
individual robberies to be inadmissible at the separate trials, the panel stated that it was not
convinced that the mere fact that each of the robberies was committed by a person wearing blue
jeans and a blue sweatshirt, carrying a blue gym or duffel bag, and using a sawed-off shotgun
establishes a “signature crime” as required by Golochowicz. Id. at 514. In doing so, the panel
remarked that “[t]hese are rather common items; there is nothing out of the ordinary about them
to establish a signature.” Id.
We conclude that the facts of the present case are more analogous to those in
Daughenbaugh than in Smith, and that defendant is correct that, like the clothing, bag, and
sawed-off shotgun in Daughenbaugh, the use of a ski mask, gloves, and a handwritten note are
not so distinctive as to constitute a “signature.” This is particularly so because the contents of
the notes at issue here are dissimilar. Unlike the note in the present case, the notes in the two
prior robberies referenced a partner and the presence of a bomb. Therefore, the evidence of the
two prior robberies should not have been admitted.
Ultimately, however, the admission of the evidence was harmless. An “error is not
ground for reversal unless ‘after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’
that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460
Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), quoting MCL 769.26.
At trial, there was significant evidence in support of defendant’s guilt, apart from the
testimony concerning her prior bad acts. Police officers testified that defendant admitted to the
crime and in fact showed them where some of the money was hidden in her bedroom.
Additionally, the bank teller who actually handed the robber the money testified that she
included in the bag a device set to emit tear gas and a reddish dye once the device leaves the
bank. Consistent with this testimony, a guest who had been staying in defendant’s house only a
short time after the robbery testified that defendant’s grandnephew showed him a bill stained
with red dye that was found in defendant’s bedroom.
Although the above evidence was disputed, there was additional evidence demonstrating
defendant’s guilt. In searching defendant’s bedroom, law enforcement officials found well over
$1,000 in bills stained with red dye, including two “bait bills,” whose serial numbers matched
those recorded by the bank where the robbery occurred. Additional evidence indicated that four
days after the robbery, defendant attempted to purchase $1,000 worth of money orders from a
local convenience store using bills stained with red dye. A pile of money stained with this same
red dye was also found at the apartment complex where defendant’s nephew resided.
In light of the strength and weight of this untainted evidence, we conclude that the error
in admitting testimony concerning defendant’s prior bad acts was harmless. Defendant has not
established that “it is more probable than not that the error in question ‘undermine[d] the
reliability of the verdict,’ thereby making the error ‘outcome determinative.’” People v Snyder,
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462 Mich 38, 45; 609 NW2d 831 (2000), quoting Lukity, supra. Accordingly, reversal is not
warranted.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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