ROBERT THOMAS V MICHIGAN BASIC PROPERTY INS ASSN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT THOMAS and THERESA THOMAS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
MICHIGAN BASIC PROPERTY INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION,
No. 226517
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-826409-NF
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: White, P.J., Whitbeck, C.J., and Holbrook, Jr., J.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Robert and Theresa Thomas appeal as of right. They challenge the trial court’s
order denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial, and
additur, granting defendant Michigan Basic Property Insurance Association’s motion for partial
relief from judgment, and denying their request for case evaluation sanctions under MCR
2.403(O). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Fire destroyed the Thomases’ Detroit house and its contents in December 1997.
According to the insurance adjusters, the fire caused a total loss, which, when added to other
associated costs, exceeded the limits of the Thomases’ coverage under their policy with the
Association. The Thomases then sought the maximum coverage allowed under their policy.
First, they requested the $65,000 coverage for loss of the dwelling. Second, they asked for the
$13,000 coverage for “loss of use” of their home because it was uninhabitable. Third, they asked
for money for additional living expenses, which was defined in the policy as “any necessary
increase in living expenses [they] incurred” so that their “household” could “maintain its normal
standard of living,” but only for “the shortest time required for [their] household to settle
elsewhere.” Fourth, they asked to collect on the loss of contents provision in their policy, which
covered up to $32,500 in lost personal property as determined by its “actual cash value at the
time of loss but not more than the amount required to repair or replace.” The Association denied
the Thomases’ claim, accusing them of fraud and arson, prompting this suit.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on a breach of contract theory.1 At trial, the Thomases
presented evidence that the family members, consisting of plaintiffs and their eight children,
1
The trial court disposed of other claims in the complaint before trial. They are not at issue in
this appeal.
-1-
were not present at the time the fire started. The Thomases denied setting fire to the home or
having anyone else do so. Sergeant Robert Gray of the Detroit Fire Department responded to the
fire and subsequently investigated it to determine whether to refer the case to the Arson Squad.
He said that he did not detect flammable liquids that might have been used as an accelerant,
found nothing else suspicious about the fire, and concluded that it was a result of faulty wiring.
In support of their claim for additional expenses under the policy, the Thomases
presented motel and grocery receipts for expenses incurred after the fire, as well as evidence that
their mortgage payment for their new home was $140 more each month than the mortgage
payment for their home that had been destroyed. They also provided a detailed list of the
personal property destroyed in the fire as evidence that they were entitled to recover for their loss
of contents.
According to the Association’s witnesses, the Thomases were heavily in debt and arson
caused the fire. After the parties finished presenting their evidence, the Association moved to
dismiss the Thomases’ claims for additional living expenses and loss of contents. The
Association argued that the Thomases had failed to present any evidence that the time they spent
in the motel was the shortest amount of time necessary for them to relocate or any evidence that
the costs incurred while staying in the motel were extra expenses necessary to maintain the
family’s standard of living. Further, the Association claimed that the Thomases’ evidence
concerning the cost to replace the contents of their home lost in the fire was inadequate to
demonstrate the actual value of those items.
The trial court agreed with the Association, ruling:
I concur with the defendant in this matter. I’m of the opinion plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to the two areas being argued, one, the
personal property and the other, the additional living expenses incurred by the fire
in this matter. I think the language is clear in the contract and there is no dispute
as to the contract between the parties.
Accordingly, the trial court granted the Association’s motion for a directed verdict on the claim
for loss of contents and additional living expenses.
The jury found that the Thomases did not commit arson and that the Association
breached the insurance policy. The jury rendered a judgment in the Thomases’ favor in the
amount of $68,250, which the parties had stipulated was the amount of allowable damages
sustained.2 Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in the Thomases’ favor in the amount
of $68,250, with costs, interests and attorney fees to be taxed.
Shortly after the jury rendered its verdict, the Association moved for partial relief from
judgment under MCR 2.612(C), seeking a reduction in the judgment amount by $23,204, which
was the amount the insurer for the Thomases’ mortgage company had paid for the loss. The
Association also sought to withhold fifteen percent of the judgment in accordance with MCL
2
This figure apparently represents $65,000 for the destruction of the house (the policy limit) and
$3,250 which was authorized under the policy for debris removal.
-2-
500.2845.3 Finally, the Association asked the trial court to reduce the award by $1,500, the
advance payment it had already given the Thomases.
At the same time, the Thomases moved for mediation (case evaluation) sanctions under
MCR 2.403. The case had mediated for $71,700, which the Thomases had accepted and the
Association had rejected. The Thomases also sought JNOV or a new trial on the issue of
damages only, and for additur in the amount of $30,603. They contended that the trial court had
erred in directing a verdict in the Association’s favor on their claims for additional living
expenses and loss of contents.
After hearing arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Several
months later, the trial court granted the Association’s request for the two setoffs and withholding,
thereby reducing the judgment to $43,545. The trial court concluded that the Thomases were not
entitled to sanctions under MCR 2.403 because the verdict was now $43,545; the Association
therefore had, according to the trial court, improved its position by going to trial instead of
agreeing to pay the $71,700 case evaluation figure. The trial court denied the Association’s
motion for a new trial, concluding that a new trial was not required because the jury’s findings
were not against the great weight of the evidence. Further, additur was not necessary because the
verdict was adequate.
II. Directed Verdict
A. Standard Of Review And Legal Standards
The Thomases argue that the trial court erred when it directed a verdict in favor of the
Association on their claims for additional living expenses and loss of contents. This question of
law requires review de novo.4
In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a directed verdict, this Court must “review
the evidence and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Only if the evidence so viewed fails to establish a claim as a matter of law, should the motion be
granted.”5
B. Additional Living Expenses
The Thomases’ policy from the Association specifically provided coverage for “any
necessary increase in living expenses incurred by the insureds to enable their household to
maintain its normal standard of living” “for the shortest time required for the household to settle
elsewhere.” While the Thomases were able to document their post-fire expenses, they did not
demonstrate that all these were expenses above and beyond what they normally would have
occurred while living in the insured property. For instance, though the Thomases claim that the
fire forced them to replace groceries, dishes, and utensils that they already owned with new
3
1998 PA 216 amended the amount an insurer must withhold, but that amendment is not at issue
in this case.
4
See Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 204; 580 NW2d 876 (1998).
5
Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388, 391; 617 NW2d 305 (2000).
-3-
groceries, and disposable plates and utensil, the only relevant evidence at trial were receipts.
There was no testimony that these expenses were for replacements or in addition to their normal
living expenses. Additionally, there is no merit to the Thomases claim that the Association is
estopped to deny coverage for these items because the Association’s adjuster encouraged them to
keep their receipts. Unlike the explicit promises by the insurer’s agent at issue in Industro
Motive Corp v Morris Agency, Inc,6 the evidence at trial merely indicated that the adjuster
advised the Thomases that they “might be able” to be reimbursed for some of these expenses, not
that they actually would be entitled to reimbursement.
With respect to the Thomases’ argument that they should be reimbursed for the additional
money spent on their monthly mortgage payments for their new home, the language of the
additional expenses provision in the policy excludes any such reimbursement. In particular, by
defining covered additional expenses in relation to the shortest period necessary for the family to
“settle elsewhere,” the policy plainly anticipates paying expenses for a transitional period, not
the long-term financial consequences of acquiring new housing. By the time the Thomases
found their new home on Robson and acquired their mortgage, they had “settled” there.7
However, we do agree with the Thomases that the trial court erred in directing a verdict
in favor of the Association concerning their claim for coverage of their short-term housing
expenses following the fire before they found a new home. All ten members of the Thomas
family were made homeless by the fire, causing the family to incur the added expense of living
in motels for the ten weeks it took to locate suitable housing. Construing the evidence in favor
of the Thomases,8 a reasonable jury certainly could have found9 that this expense was necessary,
an increase over their usual expenses, and incurred for the shortest period required for them to
settle elsewhere, making the directed verdict inappropriate.
C. Loss Of Contents
The Thomases also claim that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed
verdict concerning their claim for loss of contents coverage. As we have already noted, the
Association’s policy provides that covered property losses are settled at “actual cash value at the
time of loss but not more than the amount required to repair or replace.” Though the policy does
not define “actual cash value,” the Michigan Supreme Court has defined it as “replacement cost
less depreciation.”10 The Thomases’ testimony concerning how they calculated the values they
attached to the personal property they lost does not directly reveal that they relied on this
definition of actual cash value. However, the exhibit included the ages of the property they lost
and their testimony and detailed written descriptions of the property did support a conclusion that
6
Industro Motive Corp v Morris Agency, Inc, 76 Mich App 390, 392-396; 256 NW2d 607
(1977).
7
See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997), p 1184 (“settled” means “to cause to
take up residence”).
8
See Wilkinson, supra.
9
See, generally, Chiles v Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462, 471; 606 NW2d 398 (1999).
10
Smith v Michigan Basic Property Insurance Association, 441 Mich 181, 196, n 28; 490 NW2d
864 (1992).
-4-
these many individual items had some cash value. Viewed in a light most favorable to the
Thomases,11 this evidence was sufficient for the jury to evaluate the actual cash value of the
property destroyed had they received proper instruction. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s
decision to remove this question from the jury’s decision by directing a verdict in favor of the
Association was erroneous.
III. Relief From Judgment
A. Standard Of Review
The Thomases argue that the trial court erred in granting the Association’s motion for
relief from judgment, reducing the $68,250 jury verdict to $43,546 and allowing the Association
to withhold an additional fifteen percent pursuant to MCL 500.2845. Instead, they claim, the
trial court should have enforced the Association’s stipulation to $68,250 in damages. We review
the trial court’s decision to grant relief under MCR 2.612(C) for an abuse of its discretion.12
B. The Stipulation
On the last day the jury heard evidence, but before the parties made their closing
arguments, the parties engaged in a lengthy discussion concerning instructions on the record
outside the presence of the jury. At the conclusion of the discussion, the trial court invited the
attorneys into chambers to discuss other matters. There is no record of that discussion.
However, the next morning, the attorneys and the trial court made comments on the record that
indicate that the parties had agreed to stipulate that the Thomases had sustained compensable
damages in the amount of $68,250 if the jury found that the Association had breached the policy.
There are no more details regarding this stipulation, which apparently was never rendered in
writing.
A stipulation, which is construed like a contract,13 “is given full force and effect and is
binding upon the parties unless abandoned or disaffirmed.”14 In this case, there is no dispute that
the amount of the stipulation was $68,250. Yet, we have no way of determining from the record
whether the stipulation embraced any other matters, including the setoffs for what the mortgage
insurer had already paid, the advance that the Association had already paid the Thomases, or the
statutory withholding. As we noted, the parties discussed the stipulation at argument on the
motion. However, the trial court’s opinion does not mention the stipulation or its consequences,
if any. Courts ordinarily refrain from reading additional terms into a contract15 unless otherwise
required by law.16 With no evidence of an agreement concerning setoffs to enforce or a statutory
11
See Wilkinson, supra.
12
See Blue Water Fabricators, Inc v New Apex Company, Inc, 205 Mich App 295, 300; 517
NW2d 319 (1994).
13
See Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Ins Co v Thomas, 206 Mich App 265, 268; 520 NW2d
708 (1994).
14
Nuriel v YWCA, 186 Mich App 141, 147; 463 NW2d 206 (1990).
15
See Michigan Twp Participating Plan v Federal Ins Co, 233 Mich App 422, 428; 592 NW2d
760 (1999).
16
See Depyper v Safeco Ins Co of America, 232 Mich App 433, 438 ; 591 NW2d 344 (1998).
-5-
mandate concerning whether a stipulated judgment amount is subject to setoffs, the trial court
properly concluded that the stipulation did not bar lawful setoffs.
IV. Evaluation Sanctions
Having decided to remand for a new trial, we need not address in any real depth the
Thomases’ additional argument that the trial court erred when denying their motion for case
evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O). The mediation evaluation was for $71,100 and the
jury verdict was for $68,250, which was not ten percent more favorable to the Association than
the evaluation. The trial court should have considered the assessable costs but ignored the postjudgment setoffs when determining the amount of the verdict to decide whether evaluation
sanctions were appropriate.17
V. Conclusion
Because our decision that the trial court erred in granting the Association a directed
verdict regarding the Thomases’ claims for additional expense for short term housing expenses
and for loss of contents coverage, we must remand this case to the trial court for a new trial on
these issues. The Association’s breach of contract and damages related to the coverage for the
structure and cost of removing debris is already settled and not to be tried anew.
On remand, the parties may present evidence with respect to any appropriate setoffs. The
trial court shall, based on that evidence, determine which, if any, setoffs should be granted,
notwithstanding the stipulation. The trial court shall ensure that any proper setoffs ordered are
for amounts that actually have been paid, that the Thomases are no longer liable for the amounts
that are setoff, and that the Thomases recover as much as their remaining insurable interest
allows within the damages set in the stipulation. With respect to the $1,500 advance the
Association paid the Thomases, the trial court shall assure that the amounts were paid for items
that are included in the judgment, or amended judgment, before allowing setoff. As for the
fifteen percent setoff in MCL 500.2845, the trial court shall determine whether these amounts
have already been paid and make any required adjustments. On remand, the trial court shall also
adjust the verdict to include assessable costs in accordance with MCR 2.403(O)(3).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
17
See Hall v Citizens Ins Co of America, 141 Mich App 676, 689; 368 NW2d 250 (1985); MCR
2.403(O)(3).
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.