PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS ALAN SCHRAM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 235340
Emmett Circuit Court
LC No. 01-001711-FC
THOMAS ALAN SCHRAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant appeals by delayed application for leave granted
from an order granting the prosecution’s motion to admit other acts evidence under MRE 404(b).
We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant, a registered nurse working in a mental health unit at Lockwood Hospital in
Petoskey, was originally charged with a total of eight counts of first- and second-degree criminal
sexual conduct involving three of his adult female patients. Defendant was bound over on seven
of the eight counts and successfully moved to sever the charges for three separate trials. The
prosecution then filed a motion under MRE 404(b) to introduce in the first trial evidence of
defendant’s alleged actions against the other two complainants. In relevant part, the prosecution
argued that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose, namely, to show defendant’s plan,
scheme, or design. The prosecution noted that the victims were all defendant’s adult patients in
lock-up areas who were on medication, that each incident involved isolating the victim in either a
bathroom or bedroom, and that the incidents took place over a relatively short time period.
Defendant countered that each incident involved different circumstances and noted that the
women had different mental illnesses causing each to respond differently. Relying primarily on
People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43; 614 NW2d 888 (2000), the trial court found that
the incidents were sufficiently similar to make them admissible for the purpose of showing plan,
scheme, or design.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the
prosecution’s motion to introduce the other acts evidence. Specifically, he contends that (1) the
prosecution did not meet its burden of showing a proper non-character purpose for the other acts
evidence, and (2) the prosecution did not show that the acts were sufficiently similar to support
an inference that they were part of a common plan, scheme or system. “The decision whether
evidence is admissible is within the trial court’s discretion and should only be reversed where
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there is a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
An abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the
trial court acted, would conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made.
People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
We find no abuse of discretion in this case. To be admissible under MRE 404(b) the
other acts evidence must first be offered for a proper purpose, that is, it must be relevant to
something other than a propensity theory. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d
114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Second, “the evidence must be relevant under
MRE 402, as enforced though MRE 104(b), to an issue or fact of consequence at trial.” Id.
Defendant does not dispute that using the evidence to establish a defendant’s common
scheme or plan is a permissible purpose; rather, his contention is that the prosecution failed to
adequately demonstrate the logical relevance of the evidence, citing People v Crawford, 458
Mich 376, 387; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). See also Sabin, supra at 60. This argument must be
addressed in tandem with defendant’s argument regarding the similarity or dissimilarity of the
acts. “[E]vidence of other instances of sexual misconduct that establish a scheme, plan, or
system may be material in the sense that the evidence proves that the charged act was
committed.” Id. at 62. Thus, “evidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that
the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are
sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan,
scheme, or system.” Id. at 63.
Here, contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecution established that the other acts
were sufficiently similar to each other to support an inference that they were part of a common
plan or scheme, and thus were relevant to show that the charged act occurred. Each involved one
of defendant’s adult female patients who was heavily medicated. Each complainant recalled that
defendant touched her breasts and either digitally penetrated her or compelled her to touch his
penis. Each incident occurred either in the victim’s bed or in a private room such as a bathroom.
All took place within a relatively short time frame. Paraphrasing Sabin, supra at 66, one could
infer from these common features that defendant had a system that involved taking advantage of
the nurse-patient relationship to perpetrate abuse. See also People v Katt, ___ Mich App ___;
___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 225632, issued 11/13/01), slip op 13; People v Pesquera, 244 Mich
App 305, 318-319; 625 NW2d 407 (2001). Concededly, as defendant argues, there were
differences between the incidents as well. However, although reasonable minds could differ
with regard to whether the charged and uncharged acts contained sufficiently similar features to
infer the existence of a common scheme or plan, a trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary
decision is not an abuse of discretion. Katt, supra, slip op 13.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to ascertain the nature of
defendant’s defense before admitting the other acts evidence. The contention is without merit.
The claim is based on the prosecution’s alternative argument that the other acts evidence was
also admissible to rebut the anticipated defense theory that the women’s delusional or
suggestible mental state amounted to a fabrication of the alleged offenses. However, the trial
court expressly declined to rule on that argument. In light of that ruling, the court had no need to
inquire about the defense theories.
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We decline to address defendant’s final issue, whether the probative value of the other
acts evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the confusing
nature of the evidence. The issue is not properly before this Court because it was not raised in
defendant’s application for leave supporting brief. MCR 7.205(D)(4).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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