IN RE MARTISE ELEXUS QUESADA MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MEQ, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 1, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 235629
Ingham Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 00-032550-NA
MARTIN QUESADA,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Hoekstra and Meter, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). We affirm.
We conclude from a review of the record that the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that the above-referenced subsection was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
5.974(I); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The record shows
that respondent has a lengthy criminal history, was incarcerated when the child was born, was
incarcerated during the pendency of the proceedings and would remain incarcerated for a number
of years, first in state, then in federal prison. Concern arose that he would not be able to provide
medical care for the child because he was on a restrictive tether when he was not incarcerated.
Respondent could not fulfill his obligations toward reunification with his daughter while
incarcerated nor maintain custody or care for the child. Moreover, the caseworker testified that
she does not believe that there is any reasonable likelihood that the conditions leading to the
original adjudication of jurisdiction will be rectified within a reasonable time, given the child’s
age. She further testified that because of his incarceration, there is no likelihood that in the
reasonable future respondent would be able to provide medical care, food, clothing, or a home
for the child, or provide care or custody of his child. Under these circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the court clearly erred in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate
respondent’s parental rights to the minor child.
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Respondent also argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the child’s best
interest. Once a statutory ground for termination is established, parental rights must be
terminated unless the court finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly
not in the child’s best interest. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, supra at 354, 356-357.
Here, the trial court affirmatively found that termination was in the child’s best interest because
she needed stability. Despite respondent’s bond with his child and his “exceptional parenting
skills,” he is unavailable to care for his daughter. Respondent’s argument that his parental rights
should not have been terminated because she “was flourishing in her present environment” is a
non sequitur and is unsupported by law. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination
of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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