OAKLAND CO PROSECUTOR V DANIEL RAY THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
UNPUBLISHED
February 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227546
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-018755-AP
DANIEL RAY THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J. and Murphy and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted an order granting the prosecutor’s motion to vacate
defendant’s parole. We reverse.
Defendant claims on appeal that the circuit court improperly substituted its judgment for
that of the Parole Board when it ordered that defendant’s parole be vacated. We agree. The
Parole Board’s decision to grant parole to a prisoner is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Hopkins v Parole Bd, 237 Mich App 629, 632; 604 NW2d 686 (1999). “[A]n abuse of discretion
is found where an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the decisionmaker acted,
would say there is no justification or excuse for the ruling” or decision made. Id. at 632-633.
The Legislature has entrusted the Parole Board with the decision whether to grant parole
to prisoners. Id. at 632. The parole board may not grant a prisoner parole until it “has
reasonable reassurances, after consideration of all the facts and circumstances, including the
prisoner’s mental and social attitude, that the prisoner will not become a menace to society or to
the public safety.” Id. at 633 (citing MCL 791.233(1)(a)). Furthermore, the Parole Board’s
discretion is limited by statutory guidelines, and whether the Parole Board abused its discretion
must be determined in light of the record and these statutory guidelines. Id.
These statutory guidelines govern the exercise of the Parole Board’s discretion as to the
release of prisoners on parole, and include the offense for which the prisoner is incarcerated at
the time of parole consideration, the prisoner’s institutional program performance, the prisoner’s
institutional conduct, the prisoner’s prior criminal record, the prisoner’s statistical risk screening,
the prisoner’s age, and any other relevant factors as determined by the department, if not
otherwise prohibited by law. MCL 791.233e(2)(a)-(e) and (3)(a)-(b). While the Parole Board’s
exercise of discretion under these guidelines is broad, it is still subject to judicial review. In re
Parole of Johnson, 219 Mich App 595, 596-597; 556 NW2d 899 (1996). However, the
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reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Parole Board when determining
whether the Parole Board abused its discretion. Hopkins, supra, 237 Mich App 633.
After reviewing defendant’s entire record in light of the foregoing guidelines, we
conclude that the circuit court’s order vacating defendant’s grant of parole was improper.
Defendant is currently incarcerated for a conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
This conviction arose out of an incident which occurred on June 7, 1988. On that day, defendant
approached the victim in the parking lot of a party store in Walled Lake, and while the victim
insisted that she wanted to be alone, defendant led her to a secluded spot in the woods and
insisted that she lay down. When the victim refused, defendant grabbed her, forced her to the
ground, and raped her. The Parole Board acknowledged and calculated defendant’s underlying
offense in the parole guidelines scoresheet and found that defendant had accepted responsibility
for his crime.
Defendant has been very active in institutional programs while in prison. He completed
his high school GED, substance abuse programming, a correspondence bible course, and sex
offender therapy. In regard to the sex offender therapy, defendant attended fifty-four out of a
possible fifty-seven sessions, resulting in positive improvements in defendant’s attitude and
behavior. According to defendant’s psychological report, while in therapy, defendant worked
through the issues behind his manipulative and aggressive behavior. The Parole Board
recognized that defendant completed his GED and that his involvement in work assignments was
adequate. The Parole Board also found that defendant completed the necessary substance abuse
programming and that defendant gained from his institutional program involvement.
In regard to defendant’s institutional conduct, defendant accrued countless misconducts
while in prison, including a conviction in 1994 for prisoner in possession of contraband,
specifically a marijuana “joint.” The Parole Board did not mention this factor in its reasons in
support of Parole Board action, but did consider it when calculating defendant’s conduct score
on his guidelines scoresheet. Although the prosecution documents sixty-five instances of
institutional misconduct by defendant during his incarceration, defendant’s parole scoresheet
indicates that he has had only two major misconducts in the last five years and none in the last
year of his incarceration.
Defendant’s prior criminal record includes a felony conviction for attempted larceny in a
building and a juvenile adjudication for breaking and entering. Again, the Parole Board
considered defendant’s prior record when it scored defendant’s parole guidelines scoresheet.
The Parole Board also noted that defendant had accepted responsibility for these crimes.
Defendant’s age at the time of review was thirty-two. While his statistical risk screening
projected him to be a high assaultive and property risk, his parole guidelines final score
evaluated him as having an average probability of parole. The Parole Board also found that
defendant maintained family support, showed suitable arrangements for work, identified realistic
plans for relapse prevention, and recognized his need for continued treatment, and ultimately
granted defendant parole for a term of two years.
Although defendant’s instant offense was certainly heinous, and considering defendant’s
poor behavior and numerous misconducts while in prison, not to mention that defendant was
found to be a high assaultive risk, we cannot find that the Parole Board abused its discretion in
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granting defendant parole in this case. The parole board properly considered all the factors
outlined in the statutory guideline and determined, based on defendant’s entire record, that there
was a reasonable assurance that defendant would not become a menace to society or to the public
safety. Thus, this Court cannot conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the Parole
Board’s decision. Rather, the record indicates that the circuit court simply disagreed with the
Parole Board’s decision and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Parole Board
when it determined that the Parole Board abused its discretion. Hopkins, supra, 237 Mich App
633. Accordingly, the trial court’s order vacating defendant’s parole is reversed.
Reversed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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