FRANKENMUTH MUT INS CO V CHRYSLER CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 225013
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-622826-CZ
CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant/Cross-PlaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant,
and
OVERHEAD CRANE & SERVICE
CORPORATION,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant/ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee,
and
COMMERCIAL UNDERWRITERS RISK
MANAGEMENT, INC., a/k/a COMMERCIAL
RISK MANAGEMENT UNDERWRITERS, INC.,
and MARY KAY SMITH,
Third-Party Defendants/CrossDefendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants-Cross-Appellees.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and Doctoroff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Overhead Crane & Service Corporation (Overhead Crane) appeals as of right
from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to third-party defendants Commercial
Underwriters and Mary Kay Smith (hereinafter collectively referred to as Commercial
Underwriters). Commercial Underwriters cross-appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for
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actual costs. Defendant Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler) cross-appeals from the trial court’s
order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance
Company (Frankenmuth), Overhead Crane, and Commercial Underwriters on its claim for
indemnification and the court’s dismissal of its estoppel claim against Frankenmuth. We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Chrysler solicited bids for a construction project at its Indiana plant involving an
overhead crane. Overhead Crane submitted the only bid for the project. A purchase order
governing this project contained an indemnification provision. However, Overhead Crane
recommended that the runway on which the crane was to run should be reinforced. Following
additional review, Chrysler determined that reinforcement was required, and Overhead Crane
performed this reinforcement. There was no separate indemnification agreement governing this
reinforcement project. However, Chrysler alleged that the reinforcement was assigned the same
project number and was considered a “bulletin.” According to Chrysler’s “General Conditions
for Construction Contracts,” a “construction bulletin” is a “form used to describe an intended
change in plans and specifications and to request the contractor’s quotation of the increase or
reduction in cost of the proposed change.” Various documents identifying the reinforcement
project did not contain the same purchase number. However, Chrysler asserted that the
documents referred to each other and any error in the project number was corrected.
In March 1994, Fred Bradburn, an Overhead Crane worker, was injured at the Indiana
plant during the reinforcement and sued Chrysler. Chrysler tendered the defense of the litigation
to Overhead Crane based on the indemnity provision. Overhead Crane submitted the lawsuit to
its insurer, Frankenmuth, which undertook the defense of the Bradburn lawsuit. The Bradburn
litigation was settled for $1.25 million. In January 1996, Frankenmuth filed suit alleging that it
owed no duty to indemnify or defend and the policy did not cover the bodily injury that occurred
during the completed operation. Frankenmuth later amended its complaint to expand its position
that there was no coverage for this injury through Overhead Crane’s policy and alleged that there
was no contract of indemnity between Chrysler and Overhead Crane. Overhead Crane filed a
third-party complaint against Commercial Underwriters essentially alleging breach of contract.
Chrysler filed a countercomplaint against Frankemuth alleging estoppel and filed a cross-claim
against Overhead Crane seeking indemnification. The trial court held that Bradburn’s injury did
not arise from the contract to which the indemnity clause applied and granted the motion for
summary disposition brought against Chrysler. Commercial Underwriters moved for summary
disposition of a claim for “attorney fees” in the third-party action filed by Overhead Crane. The
trial court granted Commercial Underwriters’ motion by concluding that the claim for attorney
fees did not fall under the exception to the rule that each party bears the expense of litigation.1
Chrysler alleges that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary disposition
regarding its indemnification claim. We agree. Our review of a summary disposition motion is
de novo. Oade v Jackson National Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 251; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). If
1
At this hearing, the parties acknowledged that Chrysler had previously filed a claim of appeal
prior to the resolution of the entire action. The parties also discussed the fact that the trial court’s
ruling covered only partial summary disposition. Therefore, a discussion ensued regarding the
language of the order in order to obtain appellate court jurisdiction.
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contract language is clear, the construction of the contract presents a question of law for the
court. Meagher v Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 721; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).
However, if the contract is subject to different, reasonable interpretations, factual development is
necessary to determine the parties’ intent. Id. While parol evidence is not admissible to vary a
clear and unambiguous contract, parol evidence may be admissible to clarify the meaning of an
ambiguous contract. Id. When a contract’s meaning is obscure and its construction is contingent
upon other and extrinsic facts connected to what is written, the question of interpretation should
be submitted to the jury with proper instructions. D’Avanzo v Wise & Marsac, P.C., 223 Mich
App 314, 319; 565 NW2d 915 (1997).
In the present case, we conclude that the question of interpretation of the contract
presents a question for the trier of fact. It is undisputed that the parties entered into an initial
contract that contained an indemnification provision. However, when the issue of reinforcement
arose, a second indemnification provision was not executed. Chrysler employee Stanley
Woodrum acknowledged that there were different numbers on correspondence between the
parties. However, he also testified that the runway reinforcement was part of the same job. He
categorized the reinforcement project as a bulletin or amendment to the original contract.
Indeed, Chrysler’s contract conditions provide that a bulletin is essentially an amendment to a
contract. There is no indication in the available record that Overhead Crane was not provided
with the rules governing contracts with the auto maker. Additionally, Chrysler presented
numerous documents to indicate that different numbers were in error and the project number,
with the reinforcement, remained consistent. Chrysler also asserted that even if purchase
numbers were erroneous labeled, the documents nonetheless could be traced to refer to each
other through the relevant numbers. We note that David Gaines of Overhead Crane submitted an
affidavit indicating that Chrysler did not advise him that the reinforcement project would be
subject to the original provisions of the contract involving the crane. The credibility of that
statement, particularly in light of Chrysler’s contract provisions, and the parties’ intentions
presents a question for the trier of fact. See Arbelius v Poletti, 188 Mich App 14, 18; 469 NW2d
436 (1991). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of the issue of
indemnification.2
Overhead Crane argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of its
claim for attorney fees. We disagree. Our review of this issue is de novo. Oade, supra.
Overhead Crane contends that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the exception to the
general rule that each party bears its own expenses because of wrongful conduct. However,
review of the rationale of the exception reveals that it is inapplicable to this case. G & D Co v
Durand Milling Co, Inc, 67 Mich App 253, 257-258; 240 NW2d 765 (1976). Furthermore, any
2
Chrysler also argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition when it had a
pending claim of estoppel raised against Frankenmuth. The parties never briefed, raised,
addressed, or argued the propriety of summary disposition of the estoppel claim. However,
pursuant to the judgment of the parties, our decision to reverse the grant of summary disposition
of the indemnification issue renders an analysis of the estoppel issue moot. The claim is
reinstated due to our decision to reverse regarding indemnification.
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allegation that an award of attorney fees is warranted based on the interests of justice is without
merit.3
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
3
We have addressed this issue in accordance with the briefs filed by the parties. However,
review of the record reveals that the briefs do not comport with the pleadings filed by Overhead
Crane. Overhead Crane filed a third-party action alleging that Commercial Underwriters
deviated from its standard practice by failing to ensure that Overhead Crane signed off on any
revisions to its policy. In its motion for summary disposition, Commercial Underwriters
characterized the third-party complaint as an action for negligence. However, in its brief in
opposition to the motion, Overhead Crane alleged that its third-party complaint alleged
malpractice, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. Despite this disparity in defining the
nature of the pleadings, Commercial Underwriters’ motion only sought disposition of the claim
of “attorney fees.” Thus, Commercial Underwriters’ motion only governed an element of
damages and did not dispose of the third-party claim in its entirety. The parties did not
acknowledge or relate the motion to the pleadings, but did acknowledge that summary
disposition granted only partial relief. Thus, in order to obtain appellate court jurisdiction, the
parties stipulated to dismiss all remaining claims. We conclude only that the exception
warranting attorney fees does not apply. We have not reached any conclusion regarding the
nature of the third-party complaint and the propriety of its continuation upon remand. While it is
alleged that the judgment disposing of all claims was “stipulated,” there is no accompanying
signed stipulation in the record available and the pleading attached to the motion states only that
it was reached through “agreement.” There is no transcript provided to indicate whether the
parties reached an agreement on the record. In light of the fact that the third-party complaint was
not disposed of on the merits, the interests of justice do not require that the trial court grant
Commercial Underwriters request for actual costs.
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