PEOPLE OF MI V DARRYL OWENS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 225961
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 99-005892
DARRYL OWENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and armed robbery, MCL
750.529,1 for which he was sentenced to two concurrent terms of nine to twenty years’
imprisonment. He appeals by right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a
separate jury. On the third day of trial, before jury selection was complete, defendant moved for
a separate jury, arguing that he had learned new information that made his defense antagonistic
to that of his codefendants. Defense counsel, however, could not articulate how defendant’s
defense was antagonistic to the codefendant’s defense. In the absence of any legal authority to
support the position that defendant was advocating, the trial court denied the motion for a
separate jury. We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. People v Hana,
447 Mich 325, 346, 355; 524 NW2d 682 (1994).
“Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant demonstrates that
his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means of rectifying
the potential prejudice.” Hana, supra at 331. A defendant requesting severance must provide
the court with a supporting affidavit, or make an offer of proof, “that clearly, affirmatively, and
fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is the
necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice.” Id. at 346. “The failure to make this
showing in the trial court, absent any significant indication on appeal that the requisite prejudice
in fact occurred at trial, will preclude reversal of a joinder decision.” Id. at 346-347. Severance
1
He was acquitted of a charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b.
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is not automatically required where an argument of antagonistic defenses is presented. Id. at
347-348. In fact, “[i]nconsistency of defenses is not enough to mandate severance; rather, the
defenses must be “mutually exclusive” or “irreconcilable.” Id. at 349; see, also, People v PerezDeLeon, 224 Mich App 43, 59; 568 NW2d 324 (1997). The use of separate juries is a “form of
severance to be evaluated under the standard . . . applicable to motions for separate trials.”
Hana, supra at 351.
In this case, defendant failed to clearly, affirmatively, and fully demonstrate to the trial
court that his substantial rights would be prejudiced without a separate jury. On appeal, we have
reviewed the record and find that the requisite prejudice did not occur at trial. Defendant’s
defense was not antagonistic to the codefendant’s defense. The codefendant argued that he did
not believe a carjacking occurred and that the incriminating evidence against him was not
credible. Similarly, defendant questioned whether a carjacking took place. Defendant also
argued that he was not involved in the crimes. He stressed that other people, including a male of
similar description to himself, were arrested in the stolen automobile. Neither defendant nor the
codefendant attempted to escape liability by pointing the finger at the other. Because both
pursued similar, compatible defenses, the defenses were not mutually exclusive or irreconcilable.
We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny separate juries.
We note that on appeal defendant’s primary argument is that separate juries were
necessary because then his jury would not have heard incriminating testimony that was
admissible only against the codefendant, which violated his right to confrontation. This
argument was not specifically articulated in the trial court. We also note that defendant never
objected to the testimony at issue on the ground that it was inadmissible as substantive evidence
against him. The argument is not properly preserved for appeal. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich
App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001); In re Weiss, 224 Mich App 37, 39; 568 NW2d 336 (1997).
The plain error rule applies to unpreserved claims of constitutional and nonconstitutional error.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant argues that the testimony of Tanya Farrow, which implicated him in the
crimes, was admissible only against the codefendant. Defendant argues that its admission as
substantive evidence against him violated his right to confrontation. The codefendant made
statements to Farrow that he carjacked a car and that defendant and Treveda Cooper were with
him. Defendant does not argue that the statements were admissible against the codefendant as
statements against the codefendant’s penal interest. MRE 804(b)(3). Defendant argues,
however, that the statements were not admissible against him. This argument has no merit.
In People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713; 613 NW2d 370 (2000), this Court discussed a
similar situation and stated:
Generally, we presume that a codefendant’s inculpatory hearsay statement
against another codefendant is unreliable and therefore inadmissible under MRE
804(b)(3). The entire hearsay statement of an accomplice may be admissible
against an accused, however, where the declarant’s inculpatory statement is made
in narrative form, by his own initiative, and is reliable because as a whole it is
against the declarant’s own interest.
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. . . Admission of a hearsay statement by an unavailable declarant will not violate
a defendant’s right to confront his accusers if the statement falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception or if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Because
Michigan has not recognized a declaration against interest as falling within a
“firmly rooted hearsay exception,” . . . [the] statement must be examined to
determine if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability.
This Court is charged with looking at each case on an individual basis for
sufficient indicia of the reliability of the declarant’s statement. “The indicia of
reliability necessary to establish that a hearsay statement has particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns
must exist by virtue of the inherent trustworthiness of the statement and may not
be established by extrinsic, corroborative evidence.” The Court in [People v]
Poole, [444 Mich 151; 506 NW2d 505 (1993)] supra at 165, stated:
“In evaluating whether a statement against penal interest that inculpates a
person in addition to the declarant bears sufficient indicia of reliability to allow it
to be admitted as substantive evidence against the other person, courts must
evaluate the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement as well as its
content.
The presence of the following factors would favor admission of such a
statement:
whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made
contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends,
colleagues, or confederates – that is, to someone to whom the declarant would
likely speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the
declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a
finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law
enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes
the role or responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3)
was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant
had a motive to lie or distort the truth.
Courts should also consider any other circumstances bearing on the
reliability of the statement at issue. While the foregoing factors are not exclusive,
and the presence or absence of a particular factor is not decisive, the totality of the
circumstances must indicate that the statement is sufficiently reliable to allow its
admission as substantive evidence although the defendant is unable to crossexamine the declarant.” [Id. at 717-719 (citations omitted).]
In Poole, supra at 153, a codefendant made statements that implicated him and two other
codefendants to his cousin. The Court specifically addressed the same question that is presented
in this case:
[W]hether a declarant’s noncustodial, out-of-court, unsworn-to statement,
voluntarily made at the declarant’s initiation to someone other than a law
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enforcement officer, inculpating the declarant and an accomplice in criminal
activity, can be introduced as substantive evidence at trial . . . . [Id. at 153-154.]
The Court ruled that the declarant’s cousin could testify about the declarant’s hearsay statements
because the statements met the guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 157-159. The Court further
determined that the admission of the statements did not violate the other codefendants’ right to
confrontation because the declarant was unavailable and the statement bore adequate indicia of
reliability to establish that the hearsay statement had a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness. Id. at 162-166.
In this case, the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that the
codefendant’s statement possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted against
defendant despite defendant’s inability to cross-examine the codefendant about the statement.
The statement was voluntarily made to Farrow, the codefendant’s friend. The testimony
demonstrated that the statement was uttered spontaneously, without prompting. The statement
did not minimize the codefendant’s role in the crime or shift blame to defendant. It was not
made to exculpate the codefendant. There also is no evidence that the codefendant had reason to
distort the truth when speaking to Farrow. Under the circumstances, the statement had a
“sufficient indicia of reliability ‘to provide the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the statement’ and thus to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns.” Schutte, supra at 719720. Further, defendant, having declined to testify pursuant to his Fifth Amendment rights, was
properly unavailable. See Poole, supra at 163.
Defendant also argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
armed robbery. His argument ignores the evidence presented at trial and hinges on his invalid
claim that, because the jury acquitted him of felony-firearm charges, they must necessarily have
determined that he was not armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of the crimes. If he was
not armed with a dangerous weapon, he could not be guilty of armed robbery. This argument is
erroneous because juries may reach inconsistent verdicts as a result of leniency, mistake or
compromise. People v Goss (After Remand), 446 Mich 587, 597-598 (Levin J.); 521 NW2d 312
(1994); People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443; 330 NW2d 16 (1982); see, also, People v Duncan 462
Mich 47, 54; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). A jury may reach different conclusions concerning an
identical element of two different offenses in a criminal case. Goss, supra at 597 (Levin J.);
Lewis, supra. In People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463, 466; 295 NW2d 354 (1980), the Court stated:
Juries are not held to any rules of logic nor are they required to explain
their decisions. The ability to convict or acquit another individual of a crime is a
grave responsibility and an awesome power. An element of this power is the
jury's capacity for leniency. Since we are unable to know just how the jury
reached their conclusion, whether the result of compassion or compromise, it is
unrealistic to believe that a jury would intend that an acquittal on one count and
conviction on another would serve as the reason for defendant's release. These
considerations change when a case is tried by a judge sitting without a jury. But
we feel that the mercy-dispensing power of the jury may serve to release a
defendant from some of the consequences of his act without absolving him of all
responsibility.
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In this case, there were inconsistent verdicts on the armed robbery and felony-firearm
charges. This does not mean, however, that the armed robbery conviction is invalid. A review
of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution supports that all of the elements
necessary for an armed robbery conviction were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
We affirm.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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