RICHARD SCRIBNER V BEVERLY MCELMEEL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD SCRIBNER,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF INDEPENDENCE,
No. 222510
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007133-CZ
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
RICHARD SCRIBNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 222649
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-014085-CZ
BEVERLY McELMEEL,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Doctoroff and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from orders granting defendants’ motions for summary
disposition. Plaintiff sought to recover damages from defendant Charter Township of
Independence (“defendant Township”) and defendant Beverly McElmeel (“defendant
McElmeel”) under a variety of legal theories. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleged essentially the same facts in both complaints. Plaintiff was defendant
Township’s plumbing, heating, and cooling inspector from 1982 through 1997. Plaintiff’s
compensation from 1982 to 1994 was based solely on the permit fees generated by his work,
according to oral agreements between the parties. Typically, the oral agreements were renewed
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on an annual basis. Plaintiff received 75% of the permit fees during 1992, and 60% of the permit
fees between 1992 and 1994. The instant disputes involve the terms covering plaintiff’s work for
defendant Township between 1995 and 1997.
According to plaintiff’s complaints, he and defendant McElmeel, defendant Township’s
building director, negotiated an agreement which provided that plaintiff would receive $4,000
per month, and that any difference between the 60% of the permit fees and the $4,000 he was
paid would be “banked.” Between 1995 and 1997, defendant was paid $48,000 annually.
However, because of increased construction in the township, sixty percent of the permit fees, less
the $48,000 per year, resulted in approximately $182,000. Defendant Township disputed that it
ever agreed to pay plaintiff the $182,000, and denied plaintiff’s requests to pay him the money.
Plaintiff sought to recover from defendant Township under ten different legal theories.1
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim (Count I) alleged that defendant Township was contractually
obligated to pay plaintiff according to their oral agreement. Alternatively, plaintiff sought to
recover damages under the quasi-contractual theories of unjust enrichment (Count VII);
promissory estoppel (Count VIII); and quantum meruit (Count IX). Plaintiff also contended that
he was entitled to recover the values stated in the “banked” account ledgers under an “account
stated” theory (Count II). In addition, plaintiff sought to recover under the tort theories of fraud
(Count III); negligent misrepresentation (Count IV); and innocent misrepresentation (Count V).
Plaintiff also pleaded a “proprietary function” claim (Count VI). Each of the aforementioned
claims sought approximately $182,000 in damages. Finally, in a separate claim entitled
“exemplary damages,” plaintiff sought $1,000,000 in damages for humiliation, embarrassment,
outrage, indignation, and extreme emotional distress (Count X).
The trial court denied defendant Township’s request to dismiss the breach of contract and
account stated claims as barred by the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132(1)(a). The trial court also
denied defendant Township’s request to dismiss the quasi-contractual theories pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could granted, rejecting defendant
Township’s contention that alleging breach of contract precluded recovery under the quasicontractual theories. However, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract and quasicontractual theories pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), concluding that they were barred by public
policy. Similarly, the trial court dismissed the account stated claim because it did not apply to a
claim where an express contract existed.
In addition, the trial court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8). In regard to the tort claims, the trial court
opined that the representations made during the formation of the purported contract could not
serve as the promise in a separate tort action. The trial court declined, however, to dismiss these
claims under a governmental immunity theory. Alternatively, the trial court opined that
plaintiff’s fraud claim failed to plead the allegations with the requisite degree of specificity
required by MCR 2.112(B)(1). The trial court ruled that “proprietary function” was not an
independent cause of action. Finally, the trial court dismissed the “exemplary damages” claim,
1
These were the legal theories alleged in plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
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opining that they were not available for an action arising out of a breach of commercial contract.
Consequently, plaintiff’s entire lawsuit against defendant Township was dismissed.
Before the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit against defendant Township, plaintiff had
filed a separate lawsuit against defendant McElmeel, which is the subject matter of docket no.
222649. It should be noted that the trial court denied plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint
to add defendant McElmeel as a party in the defendant Township lawsuit. Plaintiff’s lawsuit
against defendant McElmeel, in her individual capacity, alleged the following theories: (i)
promissory estoppel; (ii) fraud; (iii) gross negligence; (iv) quantum meruit; (v) equitable
estoppel; (vi) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (vii) negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage; and (viii) “exemplary damages.”
Defendant McElmeel moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6),
which allows a trial court to dismiss a complaint where “[a]nother action has been initiated
between the same parties involving the same claim.” The trial court opined that “the theories of
liability against defendant McElmeel arise out the same transactions and occurrences as those
identified in the suit against the Township.” The trial court further opined that the complaints in
both lawsuits involved the same or substantially the same parties, and sought the same relief.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant McElmeel.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s dismissal of both lawsuits.
II. Standard of Review
Both complaints were dismissed on motions for summary disposition. Generally, a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Beaudrie v Henderson,
465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001).2
2
In regard to a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), the Beaudrie
Court opined:
A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of the pleadings alone. The purpose of
such a motion is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The motion should be granted if no factual development
could possibly justify recovery. [Id.]
“All well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Madejski v Kotmar Ltd, 246 Mich App 441, 444; 633 NW2d 429 (2001), lv
den 465 Mich 883 (2001).
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the nonmoving
party’s well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true and the court should “construe the
allegations in the nonmovant’s favor to determine whether any factual development could
(continued…)
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III. Docket No. 222510
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by dismissing each count of his complaint
against defendant Township. Plaintiff concedes, however, that there is no independent cause of
action for “proprietary function.” Thus, plaintiff could not have recovered damages under Count
VI. Consequently, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition on that legal theory
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his tort claims. However,
future promises that are contractual in nature cannot form the basis for a fraud claim. Marrero v
McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp, 200 Mich App 438, 444; 505 NW2d 275 (1993), modified on
other grounds by Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 433 n 3; 526 NW2d (1994). Indeed, a
fraud claim must be based on past or existing facts. Marrero, supra at 444. Here, plaintiff’s
fraud claim arose out of defendant McElmeel’s purported promise, on behalf of defendant
Township, that the excess fees would be “banked.” Because the alleged representation was
contractual and did not relate to a past or existing fact, the trial court correctly concluded that the
fraud claim should be dismissed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
In Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 212; 580 NW2d 876 (1998), our Supreme Court noted
that in an innocent misrepresentation action, the representation must also relate to a past or
existing fact, rather than a promise regarding the future. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded
that plaintiff’s innocent misrepresentation pleadings also failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
We note that plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation count was pleaded as a traditional
negligence claim, with references to duty, breach, causation, and damages. However, plaintiff
failed to allege that defendant Township breached a legal duty, confining his analysis to
defendant McElmeel’s “duty” and “breach.” Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed
plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), albeit under a
different rationale. We may affirm where the trial court reaches the right result, but for the
wrong reason. People v Jory, 443 Mich 403, 425; 505 NW2d 228 (1993).
(…continued)
provide a basis for recovery.” Diehl v Danuloff, 242 Mich App 120, 123; 618 NW2d 83 (2000).
“The court must consider any pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence that has been submitted by the parties, although the moving party is not
required to file supportive material.” Id.
In reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), we
consider “the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in
the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Haliw v Sterling Heights, 464 Mich 297, 302; 627 NW2d 581 (2001). “Summary
disposition may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine issue with
respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id
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In Franzel v Kerr Mfg Co, 234 Mich App 600, 606; 600 NW2d 66 (1999), we opined that
exemplary damages are not recoverable in a breach of contract action, even if the breach is
malicious or willful. Similarly, in Kewin v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 420421; 295 NW2d 50 (1980), our Supreme Court held: “[A]bsent allegation and proof of tortious
conduct existing independent of the breach . . . exemplary damages may not be awarded in
common-law actions brought for breach of a commercial contract.” However, in tort actions,
“exemplary damages are generally permitted.” Phillips v Butterball Farms Co Inc, 448 Mich
239, 257; 531 NW2d 144 (1995). Thus, having already concluded that the trial court properly
granted defendant Township’s motion for summary disposition with respect to the tort claims,
plaintiff’s request for exemplary damages could not be maintained. Therefore, the trial court did
not err by dismissing Count X.
Further, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim on a public policy rationale. Defendant Township conceded, for the limited
purpose of considering the motion for summary disposition, that there was a contract between
the parties, but argued that the contract was contrary to two statutory provisions. Indeed, it “is
well established that the courts of this state will not enforce, either in law or in equity, a contract
which violates a statute or which is contrary to public policy.” Shapiro v Steinberg, 176 Mich
App 683, 687; 440 NW2d 9 (1989).
Specifically, defendant contended that the contract terms violated Const 1963, Art 9,
§ 24, which provides in pertinent part that, in the context of pension and retirement plans,
“[f]inancial benefits arising on account of service rendered in each fiscal year shall be funded
during that year and such funding shall not be used for financing unfunded accrued liabilities.”
Defendant Township noted plaintiff’s testimony that he considered the “banked” fees to be his
retirement plan. Thus, defendant Township contended that the agreement to bank the excess fees
was violative of Art 9, § 24. However, the contractual terms, which defendant Township did not
dispute for purposes of the motion for summary disposition, provided that plaintiff’s share of the
permit fees, less the $48,000 annually, would be banked for plaintiff’s future use. In other
words, so long as defendant Township complied with the banking requirement, the agreement
provided for the current funding of the “retirement plan” and, therefore, did not run afoul of Art
9; § 24. Accordingly, we do not believe that the contract was violative of that constitutional
provision.
Nevertheless, defendant Township also contended that the contract was contrary to
sections 24 through 28 of the Charter Township Act, MCL 42.24 through MCL 42.28. In
particular, defendant Township references MCL 42.28, which provides:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury of the township nor shall any
obligation for the expenditure of money be incurred, except pursuant to the
budget appropriation, or pursuant to any supplemental appropriation which may
be made from surplus received. The township board may transfer any
unencumbered appropriation balance, or any portion thereof, from 1 fund or
agency to another. The balance in any appropriation, which has not been
encumbered, at the end of the fiscal year shall revert to the general fund and be
reappropriated during the next fiscal year.
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Defendant Township contends that the contract was contrary to MCL 42.28 because it required
the township to incur obligations in excess of the $48,000 per year approved by the board
through the budget appropriation process.
However, it is undisputed that plaintiff was paid a percentage of the permit fees generated
by his work, based on oral agreements, for approximately twelve years. Plaintiff’s income was
always conditional on the amount of work he performed, which was, in turn, conditional on the
amount of construction in the township. Thus, the parties had a long history of plaintiff’s income
being percentage-based, rather than pre-determined by the normal budget appropriations process.
Regardless, the only moneys in dispute are the difference between the $48,000 that was
budgeted for and paid to plaintiff, and the sixty percent of the permit fees generated through the
inspection process. Plaintiff’s entitlement to any money remained conditional on his performing
the necessary inspections to generate more than $48,000 in “commissions.” Thus, defendant
Township was not “bound” by the contract to pay plaintiff any sums; rather, the contract
obligated defendant Township to pay plaintiff a percentage of the fees he earned for the township
if and when the $48,000 was exceeded.
Moreover, because defendant Township retained forty percent of the fees generated by
plaintiff’s work, as plaintiff’s entitlement to additional money increased, so would the fees
retained by defendant Township. Put another way, the contractual terms alleged by plaintiff
provided him an incentive to work harder to increase his fees, which would also increase
township revenue. To the extent that plaintiff’s increased entitlement to his share of fees would
also represent an incurred liability not contemplated by the budget process, defendant
Township’s revenue would also increase in a commensurate fashion. While defendant
Township’s budget would not have contemplated the expense of plaintiff’s fees, the budget
process would also have failed to contemplate the increased revenue. It would be a curious
result for this Court to hold that public policy prohibits a contract that provides a party an
incentive to make both parties additional money. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
contract violated MCR 42.28.
Further, according to defendant Township’s argument, it was obligated to pay plaintiff
$48,000 without regard to the number of inspections that he performed in a year. Under
plaintiff’s version of the contract, which defendant Township conceded was valid for the
purposes of the summary disposition motion, defendant Township provided plaintiff an incentive
to perform many more inspections, thereby facilitating the undisputed growth in construction
that occurred in the township. Increased inspections, additional construction within the
township, and additional revenue for the township certainly refute defendant Township’s
contention that the contract was contrary to public policy. Consequently, we conclude that the
trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory
estoppel, and quantum meruit claims under a public policy rationale.
Defendant Township contends that, even if the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim under a public policy theory, dismissal was nevertheless warranted by
the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132. As noted above, the trial court rejected this alternate theory.
MCL 566.132 provides as follows:
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(1) In the following cases an agreement, contract, or promise is void unless that
agreement, contract, or promise, or a note or memorandum of the agreement,
contract, or promise is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the
party to be charged with the agreement, contract, or promise:
(a) An agreement that, by its terms, is not to be performed within 1 year
from the making of the agreement.
Defendant Township notes that plaintiff did not request any of the banked fees until 1997 in
support of its contention that the agreement was for more than one year.
We have recognized that “an agreement for an indefinite term of employment is generally
regarded as not being within the proscription of the statute of frauds.” Phinney v Perlmutter, 222
Mich App 513, 523; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). Here, although plaintiff alleged that he worked for
three years under the contract, there is no indication that the agreement was for any period of
years. In fact, an argument could be made that the parties’ history of renewing their oral
agreement on an annual basis suggests that the contract was for one year. As such, we do not
believe that the trial court erred by rejecting defendant Township’s challenge to the contract
under a statute of frauds theory.
Defendant Township also contends that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the
unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit counts because plaintiff was also
pleading a breach of contract claim. Indeed, defendant Township was willing to concede the
existence of a contract, albeit an unenforceable one, for the purpose of justifying the dismissal of
these claims.
A party may attempt to recover on alternate theories, such as breach of contract and
quantum meruit. HJ Tucker & Associates, Inc v Allied Chucker and Engineering Company, 234
Mich App 550; 595 NW2d 176 (1999). In addition, MCR 2.111(A)(2) expressly allows the
pleading of inconsistent, alternate theories. Id. at 573. Accordingly, plaintiff was certainly
permitted to plead alternate, inconsistent theories. We agree with defendant Township’s
assertion that a party may not recover under alternate theories, such as breach of contract and
quantum meruit. Scholz v Montogemery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 83, 93; 468 NW2d 845
(1991). However, defendant Township’s concession that a contract existed falls short of a
recovery under a breach of contract theory. In the absence of a recovery under a breach of
contract theory, dismissal of the quasi-contractual claims would have been premature.
Therefore, the trial court correctly declined to dismiss plaintiff’s unjust enrichment, promissory
estoppel, and quantum meruit claims on an alternate, inconsistent pleading theory.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his “account stated”
claim. An “account stated” is “an agreement, between parties who have had previous
transactions of a monetary character, that all the items of the accounts representing such
transactions are true and that the balance struck is correct, together with a promise, express or
implied, for the payment of such balance.” Leonard Refineries, Inc v Gregory, 295 Mich 432,
437; 295 NW 215 (1940), quoting Thomasma v Carpenter, 175 Mich 428, 434; 141 NW 559
(1913). The Thomasma Court added: “An account stated is an agreement between persons who
have had previous transactions, fixing the amount due in respect of such transactions and
promising payment.” Id., quoting Abbott’s Trial Evidence, p. 458. Put another way, an “account
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stated” is a “balance struck between the parties on a settlement; and where a plaintiff is able to
show that the mutual dealings which have occurred between the parties have been adjusted,
settled, and a balance struck, the law implies a promise to pay that balance.” Thomasma, supra
at 437. Here, plaintiff did not allege that there was any adjustment, settlement, or balance struck
between the parties. Thus, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred by dismissing
plaintiff’s “account stated” claim.
In summary, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s account
stated, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation, proprietary function, and
exemplary damages claims. We also conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit claims.
IV. Docket No. 222649
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his lawsuit against defendant
McElmeel, in her individual capacity, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6). As noted above, MCR
2.116(C)(6) allows a trial court to dismiss a complaint where “[a]nother action has been initiated
between the same parties involving the same claim.” Here, the trial court opined:
On review of the previous action against the Township, this Court is satisfied that
the theories of liability against Defendant McElmeel arise out of the same
transactions and occurrences as those identified in the suit against the Township.
This Court also finds that the Complaints involve the same or substantially the
same parties, and that plaintiff seeks the same relief from each lawsuit. Thus, this
lawsuit will be dismissed.
MCR 2.116(C)(6) is “a codification of the former plea of abatement by prior action.” Ross v
Onyx Oil & Gas Corp, 128 Mich App 660, 666; 341 NW2d 783 (1983). Abatement served to
protect “parties from the harassment of new suits filed by the same plaintiffs involving the same
questions as those in pending litigation.” Id. However, “complete identity of the parties is not
necessary” to justify a dismissal pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6), nor must the issues and claims be
identical. Id.; JD Candler Roofing Co, Inc v Dickson, 149 Mich App 593, 598; 386 NW2d 605
(1986). Rather, the two suits must be based on the same, or substantially the same, causes of
action. Id., quoting Ross, supra at 666-667.
Although there were similarities between the two lawsuits, an argument can certainly be
made that the two lawsuits were not substantially the same. There were four theories of recovery
against defendant McElmeel that were not raised against defendant Township. Similarly, there
were claims raised against defendant Township, such as unjust enrichment and breach of
contract, which were not raised against defendant McElmeel. The lawsuit against defendant
Township was an action against a governmental body, whereas the action against defendant
McElmeel was against an individual.
More importantly, the trial court had already foreclosed plaintiff’s earlier attempt to join
defendant McElmeel in the lawsuit against defendant Township by denying his motion to amend
his complaint. Indeed, plaintiff’s only remaining method of pursuing his claims against
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defendant McElmeel was to file a separate lawsuit against her. Regardless, we note that the trial
court had already granted defendant Township’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit when it
was considering defendant McElmeel’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(6). Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6) is inapplicable when there is
no other action pending at the time the motion is being considered. Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235
Mich App 541, 549; 599 NW2d 489 (1999). Consequently, the trial court erred by dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint against defendant McElmeel pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6).
On cross-appeal, defendant McElmeel contends that, alternatively, we should affirm the
dismissal of plaintiff’s lawsuit against her under the doctrine of res judicata. Generally, the
doctrine of res judicata “bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or
essential facts are identical.” Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 586; 597 NW2d 82 (1999). A “second
action is barred when (1) the first action was decided on the merits, (2) the matter contested in
the second action was or could have been resolved in the first, and (3) both actions involve the
same parties or their privies.” Id. The doctrine is broadly applied, and will include “not only
claims already litigated, but every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” Id.
Here, there is no dispute that the trial court did not actually resolve the merits of
plaintiff’s claims against defendant McElmeel, in her individual capacity, when it resolved his
claims against defendant Township. Moreover, the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to
amend his complaint to add defendant McElmeel as a party prevents a conclusion that the issues
“could have been resolved” in that action. Dart, supra at 586. Instead, plaintiff’s attempt to add
defendant McElmeel as a party was an exercise of the reasonable diligence necessary to preclude
a broad application of res judicata. Therefore, we decline to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s action against defendant McElmeel under the doctrine of res judicata.
Defendant McElmeel also urges this Court to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s action under a collateral estoppel theory. “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same
parties or their privies when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the
issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding.” Ditmore v Michalik, 244
Mich App 569, 577; 625 NW2d 462 (2001). For “collateral estoppel to apply, ‘the issues must
be identical, and not merely similar.’” Horn v Dep’t of Corrections, 216 Mich App 58, 62; 548
NW2d 660 (1996), quoting Eaton Co Bd of Co Road Comm'rs v Schultz, 205 Mich App 371,
376; 521 NW2d 847 (1994). Here, all of plaintiff’s claims against defendant McElmeel were
against her as an individual. In contrast, the action against defendant Township involved claims
against defendant Township that, while involving defendant McElmeel’s conduct as an employee
of the township, did not involve defendant McElmeel’s liability as an individual. Consequently,
even those legal theories that were raised in both complaints were not identical, as necessary to
justify the application of collateral estoppel.3
3
The legal theories raised in plaintiff’s complaint against defendant McElmeel, but not raised in
his complaint against defendant Township, were obviously not subject to collateral estoppel.
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Nevertheless, we note that several of plaintiff’s legal theories were facially defective.
For example, equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action; rather, it is a doctrine used
to preclude the opposing party from asserting or denying the existence of a particular fact.
Conagra, Inc v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 140-141; 602 NW2d 390 (1999). As
noted above, we may affirm where the trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong
reason. Jory, supra at 425. Thus, even though the trial court’s rationale for dismissing that
count was erroneous, the result was proper pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claim against defendant
McElmeel.
Similarly, as noted above, a fraud claim must be based on past or existing facts, and
“future promises that are contractual in nature cannot form the basis for a fraud claim.”
Marrero, supra at 444. As such, we believe that plaintiff’s fraud claim against defendant
McElmeel was also properly dismissed, albeit pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
In addition, in order to recover under the doctrine of quantum meruit, the defendant must
have received or accepted a benefit from plaintiff’s actions. Nahan v Peiprzak, 40 Mich App
223, 226; 198 NW2d 427 (1972). Here, plaintiff did not allege that defendant McElmeel derived
any benefit from plaintiff’s actions, much less that she derived one in her individual capacity.
Thus, plaintiff’s quantum meruit count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Moreover, a party seeking to recover under a promissory estoppel theory must demonstrate:
[T]hat (1) there was a promise, (2) the promisor reasonably should have expected
the promise to cause the promisee to act in a definite and substantial manner, (3)
the promisee did in fact rely on the promise by acting in accordance with its
terms, and (4) and the promise must be enforced to avoid injustice. [Crown
Technology Park v D&N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538, 548-549; 619 NW2d 66
(2000), lv den 463 Mich 1013 (2001).]
Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege that the promise must be enforced against defendant
McElmeel in her individual capacity to avoid injustice. Indeed, as noted above, there is no
indication that defendant McElmeel derived any benefit from the purported promise.
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s quantum meruit and promissory estoppel
theories pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit
against defendant McElmeel pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6). We further reject defendant
McElmeel’s contention that dismissal of the lawsuit or any issues is required by the doctrines of
res judicata or collateral estoppel. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we affirm the
trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s fraud, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and quantum
meruit claims because they failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. MCR
2.116(C)(8); Jory, supra at 425.
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V. Conclusion
In regard to docket no. 222510, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed
plaintiff’s account stated, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation,
proprietary function, and exemplary damages claims. However, we conclude that the trial court
erred by dismissing plaintiff’s breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and
quantum meruit claims.
In regard to docket no. 222649, we conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing
plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant McElmeel pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6). We are not
persuaded that the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel provide an alternate basis for
supporting the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim. However, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of plaintiff’s fraud, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit
claims because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. MCR
2.116(C)(8); Jory, supra at 425.
In docket no. 222510, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings. In docket no. 222649, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings. On remand, the trial court shall consolidate plaintiff’s claims in Docket Nos.
222510 and 222649. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Martin D. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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