PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217478
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007655-FH
KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Hoekstra and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL
769.10, to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
In January 1998, the complainant, a young woman, was assaulted while sitting alone in
her truck behind her friend’s home. She did not recognize her attacker and had difficulty
providing a description of him. At the crime scene, photographs were taken of footprints made
in the snow by a distinctive double-S (SS) tread pattern. The investigating officer, a Traverse
City police detective, sent photographs of the SS imprint to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and was informed that the tread pattern corresponded to the Tektite model shoe made by
K-Swiss. K-Swiss informed the detective that none of that particular model shoe had been
shipped to the Traverse City area, and that they stopped producing that model sometime in 1997.
The assault investigation stalled.
Approximately a month later, a young woman was murdered at the condominium
complex where she worked in the Traverse City area. Defendant became a suspect and on
February 26, 1998, Grand Traverse County sheriff deputies executed a search warrant at his
condominium. Also present were laboratory technicians from the state police and Sergeant
Michael Imhoff, a laboratory technician from the sheriff’s department. The warrant authorized
seizure of, among other things, blood and trace evidence. Once the search was completed and
the deputies had seized everything they intended to seize pursuant to the warrant, condominium
employees asked Sergeant Robert Monroe what they should do with the items remaining in
defendant’s condominium. They were told that they should do whatever they normally would do
with such property. The condominium employees asked Monroe if he would remove the
property, because they were afraid that defendant would return for it and they had no appropriate
-1-
place to store it. Monroe declined, but the employees persisted. Monroe testified at the hearing
on defendant’s motion to suppress that he contacted the prosecutor, who told him that the sheriff
detectives should take the property if the condominium employees were not going to keep it, with
the understanding that such action was to be taken for safekeeping purposes, and that they were
to inventory and secure the property. The sheriff detectives inventoried and bagged the property,
and then placed it in the locked property room at the sheriff’s department.
About a month later, Detective Daniel Hill, the lead investigating officer in the assault
case that is the subject of this appeal, was shown a photograph of K-Swiss tennis shoes that was
taken during the execution of the search warrant at defendant’s condominium.1 Hill learned from
Sergeant Imhoff that the shoes were in the sheriff department’s property room and asked to see
them. Although Hill recognized that the shoes were not the Tektite model, he turned them over
and observed that the pattern on the soles of the shoes was similar to the footprints made at the
assault scene. He and Sergeant Monroe then took the shoes across the hall to be examined by
Imhoff. After examining the shoes with a magnifying device, Imhoff discovered what he
believed was a blood stain on the stitching of one of the shoes. Hill obtained a search warrant
and the section of shoe with the blood stain and a sample of the complainant’s blood were sent to
a laboratory for DNA testing. Comparison of the blood samples showed that the probability that
the blood on defendant’s shoe belonged to someone other than the complainant was 1 in 17.5
million.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the shoes and DNA evidence on the basis that the
removal of the shoes from defendant’s condominium was an unconstitutional seizure and that the
warrantless inspections of the shoes at the sheriff department property room and laboratory were
unconstitutional searches. In denying defendant’s motion, the trial court concluded that
defendant had abandoned the property he left in his condominium and so retained no reasonable
expectation of privacy in that property; that the removal of defendant’s property from his
condominium was not a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes because the property had been
removed as an accommodation to the landlord and not as part of a criminal investigation; and, in
any event, the exclusionary rule did not apply because the shoes inevitably would have been
discovered.
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
shoes and subsequent blood tests, key evidence at his trial, on the basis that they were obtained in
violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. To
the extent that a lower court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence is based on an
interpretation of the law, appellate review is de novo. People v Kaslowski, 239 Mich App 320,
323; 608 NW2d 539 (2000). We review for clear error the court’s factual findings regarding a
motion to suppress. Id.
1
The record shows that the city police department and the county sheriff department are housed
in the same building. An officer familiar with the assault investigation was present in the room
where sheriff detectives were viewing pictures of defendant’s condominium and discussing the
murder investigation. That officer contacted Hill when he realized that one of the pictures
showed a pair of K-Swiss shoes.
-2-
The Fourth Amendment is not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only
against those that are unreasonable. People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 52; 378 NW2d 451 (1985);
People v Rasmussen, 191 Mich App 721, 724; 478 NW2d 752 (1991). Accordingly, the key
inquiry in a Fourth Amendment analysis is always whether the government’s invasion of the
citizen’s personal security was reasonable under all the circumstances. Id., citing Michigan v
Long, 463 US 1032, 1051; 103 S Ct 3469; 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983). The Michigan Constitution
does not impose a higher standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures than that imposed
by the United States Constitution. Rasmussen, supra. The test for determining whether a search
has occurred is whether police activity violated a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
People v Whalen, 390 Mich 672, 677; 213 NW2d 116 (1973), citing Katz v United States, 389
US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). An expectation of privacy is legitimate if the
individual has exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and that actual expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable. People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 17-18; 475 NW2d
684 (1991), citing Katz, supra at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in finding that he abandoned the
property in his condominium such that he retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
tennis shoes to warrant Fourth Amendment protection. We need not determine whether
defendant abandoned the property in question, however, because we conclude that in any event,
the removal and storage of defendant’s property that was not seized pursuant to the warrant was
not an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, given the
particular circumstances of this case, the sheriff department deputies reasonably took possession
of the property for safekeeping.
In People v Lacey, 530 F2d 821 (CA 8, 1976), during a search of an apartment after the
defendant’s valid arrest pursuant to a warrant, federal drug enforcement agents found cash that
the defendant claimed was his. Id. at 822. Because the agents had broken down the door to the
apartment and it could no longer be secured, the agents removed the currency from the apartment
and took it to the local police station where the defendant was held. Before depositing the money
in the property room, one of the agents recorded the serial number of each bill on an inventory
slip. After the money had been returned to the defendant when he was released on bond, the
agents learned from the inventory slip that serial numbers of two of the bills taken matched those
of “buy money” that had been given to an informant to purchase heroin from the defendant. The
defendant sought suppression of the inventory slip on the basis that the removal and retention of
the currency and warrantless recording of the serial numbers constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure. Id. at 822-823. The court denied the motion. In affirming the defendant’s
conviction on drug charges, the Eighth Circuit stated:
Once the currency was validly exposed to the view of the agents and [the
defendant] had indicated that it belonged to him, the warrantless removal of the
currency into protective custody cannot be typified as a “seizure” for Fourth
Amendment purposes. As the District court properly found, the evidence clearly
established that the currency was not removed from the apartment for evidentiary
purposes or as contraband. The money was lawfully taken into custody for the
sole purpose of safekeeping, since the apartment door could not be secured after it
had been forced during entry. [Id. at 823; citations omitted.]
-3-
The court further noted:
There was no evidence that [the defendant] protested this safekeeping procedure.
Moreover, there is no suggestion anywhere in the record that the action of the
agents was pretextual or anything other than a reasonable procedure calculated to
safeguard the currency as well as protect the agents from potential future claims
should the money later “disappear” from [the] apartment. [Id. at 823 n 3.]
Here, the record strongly supports the trial court’s finding that the sheriff department
deputies did not take possession of the items remaining in defendant’s condominium, after the
search conducted pursuant to the warrant was complete, for evidentiary purposes. There is no
evidence that the sheriff department detectives took possession of those items as a pretext for
further investigation. Indeed, the detectives did not offer to take the property and initially
declined the request to do so. The detectives took possession of the property only after they were
asked repeatedly by condominium personnel, who expressed fear that defendant would return to
retrieve the property and indicated that they had no appropriate place to store it. The prosecution
has acknowledged that the condominium personnel had no right to give defendant’s possessions
to anyone or to otherwise dispose of them. However, given the extreme reticence expressed by
the condominium employees regarding the retention of defendant’s possessions, it was not
objectively unreasonable for the officers to be concerned about the safekeeping of defendant’s
belongings and to agree to take them. Further, although Sergeant Morgan acknowledged at the
hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress that it was not department policy to take possession of
property in such a situation, the deputies did follow procedure in inventorying the items and
placing them in a locked property room at the sheriff’s department.
Moreover, as in Lacey, there is no indication in the record that defendant protested the
sheriff’s possession of his property. When defendant was told that the property not seized
pursuant to the warrant was in the possession of the sheriff’s department, he expressed no
concern, nor did he request immediate return of the property. Rather, the record shows that he
simply indicated that he would leave it to his family to retrieve the property. When defendant’s
brother first attempted to retrieve the property, he was unable to do so because Morgan wanted to
do a more specific inventory than had been done when the property was removed from
defendant’s condominium. When defendant’s father later inquired about retrieving defendant’s
property, he was told that there was a hold on the property because sheriff department detectives
were seeking another warrant to do further testing for blood evidence that may not have been
observed during the first search.2 Again, however, the record does not show that defendant or his
family indicated any concern about the police department’s retention of defendant’s property;
rather, their concern was with the logistics of obtaining and transporting the items. Further, there
2
In the interim, the police received information that defendant had washed some of his clothing
shortly after the murder. The day after defendant’s father was told about the “hold,” sheriff
department detectives obtained a warrant to search the remaining clothing using a chemical that
causes blood trace evidence to “luminesce.” The warrant was not executed immediately,
however, because the detectives were waiting for delivery of the chemical. It was after the
warrant was obtained by the sheriff’s department, but before it was executed, that Hill removed
the shoes from the property locker.
-4-
was no suggestion that Morgan’s decision to complete a more specific inventory was a pretext
for further investigation. We conclude, therefore, that under the circumstances, the removal and
storage of defendant’s property by the county sheriff’s department was not an unreasonable
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in finding that the warrantless
inspection of his shoes by Traverse City police detectives was not an unconstitutional search.
Again, the test for determining whether a search has occurred is whether police activity violated a
person’s legitimate expectation of privacy. Whalen, supra. The determination whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy is made considering the totality of the circumstances.
People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 317-318; 462 NW2d 310 (1990).
Although this Court has not addressed whether property that has been lawfully viewed by
law enforcement and is being held for safekeeping under the circumstances presented in this case
may subsequently be examined without a warrant, we have addressed whether property viewed at
the time of a lawful arrest and held for safekeeping is subject to a “second look” by law
enforcement officers. In People v Rivard, 59 Mich App 530; 230 NW2d 6 (1975), a sapphire
ring that the defendant was wearing when he was arrested for robbery was inventoried and stored
in a personal property locker. After reviewing a list of property taken in the robbery with which
the defendant was charged, a detective realized that the ring could be stolen property. The
detective obtained the ring from the defendant’s personal property locker without a warrant. The
trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the ring. Id. at 532. In affirming the
defendant’s conviction, this Court concluded that
[o]nce the ring had been exposed to police view under unobjectionable
circumstances and lawfully taken by the police for safekeeping, any expectation of
privacy with respect to that item had at least partially dissipated so that no
reasonable expectation of privacy was breached by [the detective] taking a
“second look.” [Id. at 533-534, citing United States v Grill, 484 F2d 990, 991
(CA 5, 1973).]
See also People v Robinson, 37 Mich App 115, 120-121; 194 NW2d 537 (1971) (Levin, J.,
concurring).
Here, the shoes in question had already been viewed and photographed by law
enforcement officers and were legitimately in the sheriff department’s property room. As in
Rivard, the evidence at issue was “not first seen because of an unjustified invasion of defendant’s
right of privacy,” id. at 532-533, but was viewed during the execution of a valid search warrant,
albeit a warrant issued to search for evidence related to the murder, not the assault. Federal case
law indicates, however, that the analysis does not change where the person taking the “second
look” belongs to a different law enforcement agency than the person who first viewed the item,
or where the “second look” is taken as part of an investigation of a different crime than that
which initially caused the item to be exposed to police view.
In People v Thompson, 837 F2d 673 (CA 5, 1988), the court held that where property was
properly taken from a person by county jail officials pursuant to a lawful arrest, a later
examination of that property by a federal law enforcement officer was not an unreasonable search
-5-
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 674. In Thompson, the defendant was
arrested on a state drug charge and, incident to his arrest, jail officials inventoried and stored his
personal property. A friend of the defendant who subsequently was arrested under a federal
statute for dynamite theft gave information to federal agents that implicated the defendant in the
theft. He also indicated that the dynamite was in a locked storage unit and that the defendant had
the keys. Without obtaining a warrant, the federal agent examined the defendant’s property
being held at the county jail and found a set of keys with the same label as the storage facility.
The agent obtained warrants to seize the keys, unlock the storage facility, and seize the dynamite.
Id. at 674-675.
On appeal, the defendant argued that because the federal agent’s search “went beyond the
scope of the justification for the initial search and inventory incident to his arrest on the state
drug charge” and his “subsequent search was to look for evidence of a crime unrelated to [the
defendant’s] initial arrest,” the search was invalid. Id. at 675. Relying, in part, on Grill, supra,
the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “the police had earlier, at the time of the
inventory, lawfully viewed the ABUS keys and it cannot be said that another look at them by the
federal agent unduly intruded upon Thompson’s expectation of privacy.” Id. The court also
noted that the federal agent was not searching the defendant’s property on “mere hunches that
something of evidentiary value might be found.” Id. at 676. Rather, the officer who arrested the
defendant had told the federal agent that the defendant’s personal effects included keys. Id.
Similarly, here, Hill knew of the shoes from the photograph; he did not ask to see
defendant’s property on the “mere hunch” that something of evidentiary value was in the locker.
Further, the Traverse City police detectives’ examination of the shoe did not exceed the scope of
the search authorized by the warrant executed at defendant’s condominium. The warrant
authorized a search for, among other things, blood and trace evidence. If the detectives had
noticed the blood on the shoe during execution of the warrant, they could have seized them
pursuant to that warrant. See also United States v Johnson, 820 F2d 1065, 1072 (CA 9, 1987)
(where defendant arrested by state authorities for driving under the influence, subsequent
warrantless inspection by federal authorities of serial numbers on currency taken from defendant
at time of arrest and placed in sealed envelope not a Fourth Amendment violation, even though
serial numbers not recorded when currency originally seized); United States v Jenkins, 496 F2d
57, 73-74 (CA 2, 1974) (where defendant arrested by state authorities for carrying concealed
weapon, subsequent inspection by federal agent of serial numbers on money taken from
defendant and held for safekeeping determined not to require warrant).
We conclude that because any reasonable expectation of privacy defendant had in his
tennis shoes was significantly dissipated after they were viewed and photographed during the
execution of the valid search warrant, Hill and Imhoff’s subsequent warrantless inspection of, or
“second look” at, the shoes did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
In light of our determination that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
by the removal and storage of his tennis shoes and subsequent inspection by Traverse City police
-6-
detectives, we need not address his argument that the trial court erred in finding that the tennis
shoes were subject to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
Collins, P.J. did not participate.
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.