WILLIAM WASHINGTON V CHRYSLER CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM WASHINGTON and YVONNE
WASHINGTON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a/k/a DAIMLER
CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
No. 226390
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-810057-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Neff and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion
for summary disposition based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.
Plaintiff, William Washington,1 worked as a pipefitter repairing spray guns in the paint
shop in defendant’s Jefferson North Assembly Plant. During his time working for defendant,
plaintiff filed numerous civil rights complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR), alleging race
discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliatory discrimination based on plaintiff’s filing of the
civil rights complaints. In March 1993, plaintiff was cleaning spray guns on a scaffold when he
slipped and fell and injured himself. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was certified as disabled
and unable to work from March 1993 to January 1995. In January 1995, plaintiff’s family doctor
opined that he could return to work without restrictions, but defendant’s plant doctor disagreed.
The collective bargaining agreement provided that, where there was a difference in medical
opinions, the employee would be evaluated by an independent doctor. An independent doctor
opined that plaintiff could return to work, but that he should avoid heavy lifting and repetitive
bending. Defendant’s medical department classified plaintiff as PQX 51 and 61 under
defendant’s Physical Qualification Code [code], meaning that plaintiff could not lift anything
over twenty pounds, and he could only do stooping, squatting, bending, or twisting intermittently
1
For the remainder of this opinion, reference to plaintiff in the singular will refer to William
Washington.
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and for not more than half of the work shift. Defendant’s agents determined that, with plaintiff’s
physical limitations, he would not be able to return to work as a pipefitter.
Based on defendant’s determination that plaintiff could not return to work, plaintiff was
placed on layoff status on February 6, 1995. Plaintiff was notified that he was on layoff status, at
the latest, on March 2, 1995, when he received a letter from his life insurance company. While
he was laid off, defendant hired several pipefitters at the Jefferson North Assembly Plant.
Plaintiff was later diagnosed with severe hypertension and was assigned PQX 190 by plant
doctors, meaning that there was a “[c]ondition found on physical examination which does not
allow work at present time but may after surgical or medical treatment.” Plaintiff was later told
by a plant doctor that he would not be able to return to work without restrictions until he brought
a letter from his family doctor stating that he was able to return to work without restrictions at a
specified date. In 1996 and 1997, plaintiff brought several letters from his family doctors stating
that he could return to work without restrictions, but none of the letters gave a date that he could
return. On August 19, 1997, plaintiff brought a letter to the plant doctor from his family doctor
stating that he could return to work without restrictions on August 15, 1997. Defendant recalled
plaintiff to work in August or September 1997.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant on March 31, 1998. In their subsequent
amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s determination not to immediately recall
plaintiff to work violated the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA),2 MCL 37.1101 et seq.,
because plaintiff’s physical limitations did not prevent him from doing his former job (Count I)
and that defendant’s determination not to immediately recall plaintiff to work was in retaliation
for plaintiff having filed prior civil rights charges, in violation of the Civil Rights Act (CRA),
MCL 37.2101 et seq. (Count II). Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that: (1) plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred by the
statute of limitations, (2) plaintiff was not a “handicapped person” within the meaning of the
HCRA because he was not “disabled” and his inability to do a particular job was insufficient to
define him as “disabled,” and (3) plaintiffs’ retaliation claim under the CRA lacked merit
because there was no evidence that defendant refused to recall plaintiff to work because of its
actual knowledge of plaintiff’s civil rights complaints. The trial court granted defendant’s
motion for summary disposition, finding that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. Although the
trial court did not specify whether it granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or
(C)(10), it granted defendant’s motion based on the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we will
review the trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Pursuant to MCR 2.116(G)(5), when reviewing a motion for summary disposition based
on MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The contents of the complaint are
accepted as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the moving party. Id.
Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the moving party is not required to file supporting documentation, and
the opposing party need not reply with supportive material. Id. If none of the facts are in dispute
2
The “Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act” is now called the “Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights
Act.” 1998 PA 20; MCL 37.1101.
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and reasonable minds could not differ concerning the legal effect of those facts, whether a
plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law for the court to decide.
Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 244 Mich App 234, 238; 625 NW2d 101 (2001). A trial
court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is reviewed de
novo. DiPonio Construction Co, Inc v Rosati Masonry Co, Inc, 246 Mich App 43, 46; 631
NW2d 59 (2001). Further, a trial court’s decision whether a plaintiff’s claim is statutorily timebarred is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. at 47.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition because their claims were not statutorily time-barred. Plaintiffs argue, in part, that
their claims are not barred by the statute of limitations because they alleged a continuing
violation that extended the limitations period. We disagree. “The period of limitations is 3 years
after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a
person, or for injury to a person or property.” MCL 600.5805(9). An action alleging
employment discrimination under the CRA must be brought within three years after the cause of
action accrued. Meek v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 193 Mich App 340, 343; 483 NW2d 407
(1992). The parties do not dispute that plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case are governed by the
three-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 31, 1998. Therefore,
the acts of employment discrimination must have occurred after March 31, 1995, in order for
plaintiffs’ claims to fall within the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs do not dispute the trial court’s
finding that the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff was laid off; however, they
argue that defendant’s actions constituted continuous violations, which violations occurred after
the layoff and after March 31, 1995, thereby providing an exception to the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs’ argument is that, because defendant continued to deny plaintiff’s requests to
return to work after March 31, 1995, defendant’s discriminatory actions were continuous and the
limitations period was extended past March 31, 1998, when they filed the complaint. In Sumner
v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 528; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), our Supreme
Court recognized an exception to the statute of limitations under a continuing violations doctrine.
Under the continuing violations doctrine, “an alleged timely actionable event will allow
consideration of and damages for connected conduct that would be otherwise barred.” Id. at 510.
In Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 546-547; 564 NW2d 532 (1997), this Court, citing
Sumner and addressing the continuing violations doctrine, concisely stated:
In Sumner, the Court noted that there were three distinct subtheories under the
continuing violations doctrine. The “policy of discrimination” subtheory involves
“allegations that an employer has engaged in a continuous policy of
discrimination.” The “continuing course of conduct” subtheory involves a
situation “where an employee challenges a series of allegedly discriminatory acts
which are sufficiently related so as to constitute a pattern, only one of which
occurred within the limitation period.” Finally, the “present effects of past
discrimination” subtheory involved the situation where “a party suffered timely
effects or injury from a past untimely act of discrimination.” This subtheory
ceased to be actionable following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
United Air Lines, Inc v Evans, 431 US 553; 97 S Ct 1885; 52 L Ed 2d 571 (1977).
[Citations omitted.]
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Here, plaintiffs argue that the “policy of discrimination” and “continuing course of
conduct” subtheories support their position. The “policy of discrimination” exception exists
where the plaintiff alleges that he is challenging not only the discriminatory conduct which has
affected him, but also, or alternatively, the underlying employment system which has harmed or
which threatens to harm him and other members of his class. Sumner, supra at 528. The
“continuing course of conduct” exception exists where an employee challenges a series of
allegedly discriminatory acts so sufficiently related as to constitute a pattern. Id. Under this
exception, only one of the allegedly discriminatory acts needs to have occurred within the
limitations period. Id.
As to the “policy of discrimination” exception, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s code
discriminated against employees with minor limitations by labeling them as being more severely
disabled than they really were. A “policy of discrimination” violation can be established based
on company rules or guidelines. Phinney, supra at 547. The continued existence of a
discriminatory policy can constitute a present violation each moment it is in effect and is a basis
for a continuing violation. Sumner, supra at 536. A continuously maintained illegal
employment policy implemented by an employer may be the subject of a valid complaint until a
specified number of days after the last occurrence of an instance of that policy. Id. at 534.
We find that there is not sufficient evidence in the present case to support plaintiffs’
“policy of discrimination” theory. Defendant’s code did not constitute a discriminatory policy.
An independent doctor (not employed by defendant) recommended that plaintiff could return to
work, but that he should avoid heavy lifting and repetitive bending. A doctor in defendant’s
medical department signed a medical form stating that plaintiff was qualified for work with
physical limitations. Defendant’s personnel then made an individual assessment that plaintiff
could not perform his former job or another similar job with his physical restrictions. There is no
evidence that the code was implemented to discriminate against injured employees by preventing
them from returning to work by labeling them as more injured than they really were. Plaintiffs’
argument lacks merit because a review of the various classifications under the code indicates that
several different categories as to weight, movement, and other restrictions existed. Therefore,
plaintiffs’ argument, in essence, is that he was improperly placed into particular classifications
under the code or policy. Accordingly, we find that the code was not discriminatory and did not
extend the limitation period under the “policy of discrimination” exception to the statute of
limitations.
Plaintiffs also argue that the “continuing course of conduct” exception to the statute of
limitations applies to this case. Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s continuous refusals to return
him to work amounted to a continuing violation that occurred within the limitation period. In
Sumner, supra at 538, our Supreme Court, quoting with approval Berry v LSU Bd of Supervisors,
715 F2d 971, 981 (CA 5, 1983), noted the three factors traditionally analyzed in determining
whether a continuing course of discriminatory conduct exists:
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts involve the same type of
discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation? The second is
frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly paycheck) or more in
the nature of an isolated work assignment or employment decision? The third
factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of permanence. Does the act have
the degree of permanence that should trigger an employee’s awareness of and
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duty to assert his or her rights, or which should indicate to the employee that the
continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is to be expected
without being dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate?
We find it unnecessary to address the first two factors cited above, because plaintiffs’
argument does not withstand scrutiny under the third factor, i.e., degree of permanence. We
find that defendant’s alleged discriminatory act in laying plaintiff off had such a degree of
permanence that plaintiff should have asserted his rights earlier. Although defendant’s decision
to lay plaintiff off was not permanent, as he was recalled to work in August or September 1997,
defendant’s decision to lay him off should have triggered his awareness of his duty to assert his
rights. Defendant’s decision to lay plaintiff off, allegedly because his physical limitations would
not allow him to perform his former job, should have indicated to plaintiff that defendant would
not recall him to work as a pipefitter as long as the physical limitations could be asserted to
defend defendant’s actions. This should have indicated to plaintiff that the continued existence
of the adverse consequences of the act was to be expected without being dependent on a
continuing intent to discriminate. Sumner, supra at 538. Defendant’s decision was permanent to
the extent that it would not allow plaintiff to return to work at the pipefitter position until he
brought a letter from a doctor stating that he no longer had the physical limitations that would
prevent him from performing a pipefitter’s work and that he could return to work on a specified
date. When plaintiff did fulfill these conditions, he was returned to work almost immediately.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint itself indicates the importance plaintiffs placed on the factual
circumstances existing in February 1995, when plaintiff was laid off, which circumstances
allegedly supported their causes of action. The allegations contained in the amended complaint
at paragraph nine alleged that “[i]n February 1995, all doctors cleared plaintiff to return to work,
yet he was not returned to work,” and in paragraph fifteen alleged that “[p]laintiff did have some
physical limitations in his file, but as of February 1995, no doctors supported those limitations
and/or the limitations were not such that they would have precluded him from working at his old
job.” We can only conclude that plaintiff was aware that the layoff had such a degree of
permanence, that plaintiff should have asserted his rights to seek legal redress earlier.
Therefore, the “continuing course of conduct” exception to the statute of limitations is not
applicable.
Outside the context of the continuing violations doctrine, plaintiffs finally argue that
defendant’s actions in failing to recall plaintiff, subsequent to the layoff, were independent
actions giving rise to a cause of action each time plaintiff’s requests to be returned to work were
rejected. We disagree.
We find particularly instructive the following passage from Sumner, supra at 529, in
which our Supreme Court stated:
Even where no continuing violation is claimed, if the alleged independent act was
in fact only an effect of a prior discriminatory act, there is no cause of action. An
“independent violation” is no different in its make-up than an ordinary timely
violation. It is termed “independent” only in response to an argument that the
alleged violation is merely an inactionable effect of an untimely violation. A true
independent violation would, of course, trigger the running of a new period of
limitation for that violation and that one only.
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The Sumner Court referenced a footnote directly after the above-cited passage, wherein
the Court added:
We also note that plaintiff maintains that the timely refusals to reinstate and the
doctors’ reaffirmations of his lack of qualifications in and of themselves
constitute sufficient allegations of handicap discrimination act violations to
provide jurisdiction. Defendant is correct in pointing out that mere requests for
reconsideration do not revive an untimely cause of action. [Id. at 537 n 11.]
Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s acts of hiring other people as pipefitters to fill openings
in plaintiff’s former position when plaintiff was physically able to work at his former position
constituted a discriminatory act giving rise to a cause of action. Plaintiffs argue that additional
post-layoff actions also constituted independent discriminatory acts, including defendant’s
rejection of a grievance, in which the union urged defendant to place plaintiff in a position, and
defendant’s rejection to recall plaintiff after he made medical visits to the plant and presented
letters from family doctors.
The grievance action, the claim concerning the hiring of other pipefitters, the medical
visits, and the doctor’s letters were, at their core, efforts to change defendant’s position, held at
the time of the layoff, that plaintiff had physical limitations, and that those limitations prevented
plaintiff from working for defendant. Therefore, because plaintiff’s actions were merely
attempts to have defendant reconsider its earlier decision made in February 1995, plaintiffs’
action was not revived by subsequent rejections by defendant to recall plaintiff. The trial court
did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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