IN RE SHAWN MICHAELS JONES MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SMJ, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 223785
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-024553-NA
THERESA JONES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JACKIE WILLOUGHBY,
Respondent.
AFTER REMAND
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right from the order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child, SMJ (dob 2/18/97), under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). After her rights
were terminated, this Court granted respondent-mother’s motion to remand to enable her to file
“a motion for an evidentiary hearing for development of a factual record regarding the minor
child’s diagnosis of autism.” The transcript of that hearing is before us, as are the parties’
supplemental briefs filed after remand. We affirm.
Respondent-mother (respondent)1 was in her late 20s when she had SMJ. Respondent
has cognitive disabilities. In April 1997, her full-scale IQ was tested at 68.2 She read at about a
ninth grade level, but her comprehension was around the third-grade level. SMJ was
1
Respondent-father voluntarily released his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.
2
There was testimony at the termination hearing that the first psychological evaluation
performed of respondent was in April 1997, and that the FIA performed a second evaluation in
May 1997.
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respondent’s first child. Shortly before SMJ’s birth on February 18, 1997, respondent moved in
with her mother, with whom respondent’s brother, and her mother’s boyfriend lived. SMJ was in
respondent’s care until March 3, 1997, when he was admitted to U-M Hospital for failure to
thrive and rehydration and kept overnight. The following day he was placed in foster care and
has remained there throughout the instant proceedings. Sometime before the termination hearing
began in December 1998, respondent moved out of her mother’s home into a place of her own,
and at the time of the instant hearing continued to hold a job.
I
Respondent first argues that the trial court improperly terminated her parental rights as a
matter of law under MCL 712A.19b(3), because the FIA did not make reasonable efforts to keep
respondent and SMJ together before placing SMJ in foster care, and did not make reasonable
efforts for reunification after he was in foster care. Respondent argues that since the “FIA did
not make reasonable efforts[,] conditions may be rectified in a reasonable time,” and that her
parental rights should be reinstated immediately.
Respondent and amicus curiae, the Association for Community Advocacy (the ACA),
argue that respondent was not offered appropriate services even though she could have learned to
parent, and that the FIA failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disabilities as
required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12191 et seq.
Where termination of parental rights is sought, the existence of statutory grounds for
termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(A), (F)(3); In re
Bedwell, 160 Mich App 168, 173; 408 NW2d 65 (1987); see also MCL 712A.19b(1). The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and may be set aside only if, although there
may be evidence to support them, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. MCR 5.974(I); In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 42; 549 NW2d
353 (1996). Due regard is to be given to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the
credibility of witnesses. MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161
(1989). Once grounds for termination are validly established, “the court shall order termination
of parental rights” and that additional reunification efforts not be made, “unless the court finds
that termination of parental rights to the child is clearly not in the child’s best interests.” MCL
712A.19b(5); MCR 5.974(E)(2). That determination is to be made upon the evidence on the
whole record, and is reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354, 356; 612
NW2d 407 (2000).
The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” In re Terry,
240 Mich App 14, 24; 610 NW2d 563 (2000), quoting 42 USC 12132. A person who is
developmentally delayed qualifies as a “disabled individual” under the ADA. Id.3
3
A parent must preserve the issue of reasonable accommodation under the ADA “either when a
service plan is adopted or soon afterward.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 563
(2000). “Where a disabled person fails to make a timely claim that the services provided are
(continued…)
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A
The family court’s opinion and order terminating respondent’s rights sets forth its factual
findings, including:
1. [SMJ] was born to Theresa Jones and Jackie Willoughby on 2/18/97; he
weighed 3.22 kilograms (7.0988 pounds or 7 pounds 1.58 ounces).
2.
[SMJ] lived with his mother, maternal grandmother (Lois Jones),
grandmother’s companion (Tom Robbins) at a home in Washtenaw County from
2/20/97 to the evening of 3/3/97 when he was hospitalized.
3. Prior to [SMJ]’s birth, the County Health Department assigned Public Health
Nurse (PHN) Karla Stoermer to work with Ms. Jones who had a cognitive
developmental delay and was identified as a person who would need support with
her child to eliminate risk to him. Ms. Jones voluntarily met with Ms. Stoermer.
4. Ms. Jones voluntarily participated with the following services after the child’s
delivery and while he was in her custody.
(a) Ms. Stoermer continued regular home visits and examinations of
[SMJ]; health and medical consultations in the home; training of Ms. Jones in
infant nutrition, safety and other needs; attended doctor’s appointments with the
child and mother and served as a liaison to the physician.
(b) Healthy Families Maternal-Infant Support service (contracted through
Catholic Social Services) for parenting education, coaching and modeling and
miscellaneous assistance.
(c) Parent Aide (Child and Family Services assistance with household
organization and parenting skills;
(d) WIC – milk, baby food and formula through federal program
(…continued)
inadequate to her particular needs, she may not argue that petitioner failed to comply with the
ADA at a dispositional hearing on whether to terminate her parental rights.” Id. at 26. If the
issue is not properly preserved a parent’s sole remedy is to file suit under the ADA. Id.
Petitioner does not argue that respondent did not preserve this issue, and amicus curiae ACA’s
appellate brief is the only one to address the preservation issue. It argues that the issue of what
constitutes reasonable accommodation under the ADA was officially raised by Marsha Katz of
the ACA at an October 16, 1997 review hearing. Although we address the ADA issue on the
merits, we note that the hearing referred to occurred seven months after SMJ was removed
from respondent’s care.
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5. These services collectively did not constitute 24 hour support for the mother.
However, she was living with her mother and Mr. Robbins who appeared to be
receptive to the services and to helping Theresa.
6. The textbook infant weight gain pattern is an initial loss of up to 5 ounces by
the fifth day of life, regain all birth weight by the 10th day after birth, then a gain
of 1 to 1.5 ounces per day.
7. Variations in this pattern are sometimes seen, usually based on illness, weak
suck, developmental delay, insufficient feeding but sometimes just because of the
biological differences between baby humans.
8. [SMJ]’s growth history was charted as follows:
02/18/97:
7 lb 1 oz
Birth weight on U/M Hospital scale
02-24-97:
6 lbs 14 oz
Dr. Ward’s scale
02-28-97
6 lbs 13 oz
PHN scale
02-28-97
6 lbs 14 oz
PHN scale
03-03-97
6lbs 14 oz
U/M Emergency
03-04-97:
7 lbs .99 oz
U/M scale
03-12-97
7 lbs .99 oz
PHN scale (foster home)
03-26-97
9 lbs
PHN scale (foster home)
9. Ms. Stoermer became concerned about weight on 2/24/97 and set up feeding
and elimination recording charts for the mother to complete with paste-on stars;
she told the mother it was necessary for the child to eat something every 2-4
hours.
10. [SMJ]’s physician was also concerned about weight stagnation during this
period and consulted with PHN about responses to it.
11. On 3/3/97, Ms. Stoermer was advised by Dr. Ward to contact him if there had
not been an improvement in weight.
12. Ms. Stoermer called the doctor because there was no improvement in weight
gain and [SMJ] was taken to emergency at the doctor’s direction to be examined
for dehydration and failure to thrive.
13. [SMJ] was admitted to the hospital, showed a three (3) ounce weight gain
overnight and continued uninterrupted growth in hospital and in foster care.
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14. The following significant incidents, among others, regarding nutrition were
noted by service providers during the time that [SMJ] was in his mother’s care:
the mother frequently removed the bottle from the baby’s mouth during feeding to
wipe his lips or tidy him; PHN observed mother give him calorie-less water for
claimed beneficial purpose; on 10th day of life, mother reported that baby is
sleeping through the night; she commented to Ms. Fair on how well he slept
through the night; Ms. Jones’s charts showed feedings of 1-2 ounces every 2-4
hours but SMJ had not gained weight.
15. After the child was placed in temporary custody and jurisdiction, all of the
previous programs continued except:
(a) the PHN worked with [SMJ] in the foster home
(b) following a psychological evaluation, therapeutic counseling services
were provided, first from Dr. Thomas Fournier, a psychologist [,] and then from
Ms. Grogan, a clinical social worker.
(c) on a very few occasions, [SMJ] was too sick to be present for the visits
or the hands-on parenting sessions with his mother, so a doll was used in his
place.
16. The Catholic Social Services sessions plus visits (which were also, quite
properly, used for skill-building and parenting modeling) totaled 8 hours per week
until the court halved the visitation time on 8/28/97 because of the effect on
[SMJ].
17. Ms. Jones had the services of Community Mental Health (CMH) since, at
least mid-1997; Marietta Smith was her case manager and payee; Washtenaw
Interventions worked with her on social and community skills.
18. The service providers met in August 1997 and agreed with the conclusion
reach[ed] by Ms. Stoermer and Ms. Fair that Ms. Jones had very little
understanding of (or ability to understand) child nutrition, needs and safety
and could not parent alone;
19. In 1997 CMH was contacted by service providers in this case about 24 hour
support for Ms. Jones and her son but CMH did not have an appropriate program
for the needs which were described for Ms. Jones by the service providers.
20. Between the time of removal until the setting aside of the release, Ms. Jones
displayed great affection for her son and enjoyed her time with him very much;
she sometimes read to him; she sometimes played with him; she never missed a
visit unless there was an extremely good reason; she prepared carefully for his
visits; she followed recommendations for his comfort at the time they were made
during the visits.
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21. There is ample evidence that, even with repetition and demonstration,
Ms. Jones was unable to learn basic infant parenting skills, or learn it
quickly enough for a growing child and/or retain the information. Despite
advice, recommendations and correction at several consecutive
visit/parenting sessions
(a) she held the baby’s bottle flat into his mouth so that sucking was
difficult
(b) she continued to hold the baby flat for feeding rather than cradling him
which made it difficult to achieve proper pace and air exchange.
(c) she frequently had to be told when to feed him although she was
advised at the beginning of the visit when he last ate.
(d) she (and her family members) had to be repeatedly reminded to wash
their hands before feeding the baby, even after changing him;
(e) she continued to remove the bottle from his mouth after he ate small
amounts, neaten or wipe him or the bottle and return it to his mouth, sometimes
extending the feeding for more than three hours;
(f) with prompting, she fed him correctly
(g) Ms. Jones continued to do things for [SMJ] that did not need to be
done: repeated diaper-changing, repeated feeding; picking him up when he was
sleeping or content.
(h) Although Ms. Jones did some tasks repeatedly, she often did not do
them at the right time and had to be reminded when to diaper or feed him.
22. Ms. Jones’ ability to see risk was not adequate for [SMJ]’s safety or she
assumed others were going to care for him.
(a) When he was a newborn she abruptly walked out of the doctor’s office
without a warning to the doctor or PHN leaving [SMJ] lying on the examination
table;
(b) Later she abruptly and without notice, walked out of visits for
extended periods when her relatives were with him;
(c) At Judson Center visits she allowed him to crawl out of the visiting
room and into the hall and bathroom despite repeated instructions to prevent this
by closing the door;
(d) Although the foster parent had warned Ms. Jones about a danger
connected with handling the stroller a particular way, she did the same thing the
next time she was using the stroller, creating a hazard for [SMJ].
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***
26. Shortly after he came into foster care, [SMJ] began displaying signs of
developmental delays which included not holding his head up or standing on his
legs at the time expected and not initiating interaction with people or objects.
27. The Early On Social Worker was most concerned with the latter emotional
delays “His inability to initiate relationships is seriously impeding his progress
and will continue to do so at an alarming rate.” (HELP evaluation, June 1997)
“[SMJ] remains delayed in many areas of development. However, the severity of
the delays is diminishing . . . . [SMJ] is performing beyond what is age
appropriate in the areas of emotions/feelings and coping. At the time of his first
evaluation. . . these areas were of the most troubling and had the potential to
interfere with his progress the most. This is a baby who is having his emotional
needs met and is learning to respond in kind.”
(Infant-Toddler
Developmental Assessment Report, March 1998). Ms. Greer’s March 1999
report (with letter attached) is clear that a challenging, stimulating
environment reverses the dangerous emotional complacency she saw in the
infant [SMJ]. [Emphasis added.]
Respondent’s parental rights were terminated under the following statutory grounds:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial disposition
order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the
following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there
is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the age of the child.
***
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
age of the child.
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).]
B
The record does not support respondent’s argument that she was offered only generic
services that were not sufficiently tailored to her cognitive disabilities. It is true that there was
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testimony from two ACA representatives that the services respondent received were
insufficiently tailored or suited to her cognitive deficits and that reunification efforts were substandard. However, there was ample testimony to the contrary. See court’s factual findings,
quoted supra.4 The court clearly considered all the testimony, and concluded, as do we, that
4
For example, Latonya Fair of Catholic Social Services testified at the termination hearing that
she became involved with respondent on February 5, 1997, several weeks before SMJ’s birth.
Fair testified that her initial assessment of respondent was based on the assumption that
respondent would be living with her mother and brother. Fair testified that in March 1997,
respondent told her that she wanted an apartment for herself and SMJ and did not want to live
with her mother, and that this concerned Fair. Fair testified that
“with her mother there it was my hope that mom could sort of intervene. You
know. And say well not you can’t take the baby out on this cold night. You
know. Those kinds of things – or the baby looks sick. We need to take the baby
to the emergency room. You know. Just sort of intervene and that’s something
that she needs. She needs assistance and she needs direction and guidance.
Q. At this point, were you comfortable with Theresa being able to make those
kinds of assessments that she had to on her own?
A. No. No. I was not comfortable at all.
Fair testified that respondent’s mother had told her she would take several weeks off work when
SMJ was born, but that she did not do so, and that that raised Fair’s concerns. Fair testified that
CSS tried to compensate by having the worker visit respondent twice a week, instead of once.
She testified that she agreed with the removal of SMJ from respondent’s care because he was
losing weight and did not look well, and because respondent “simply did not understand the
seriousness of him losing weight and not really responding to stimulus.” However, Fair testified
that it was not until August 1997 that she came to the final decision that respondent could not
parent SMJ on her own, when she learned from the CSS worker that had been visiting
respondent twice a week that when respondent was asked how she knew when to feed SMJ and
how to care for SMJ, that respondent answered when the CSS worker tells her to. Fair testified
that at that point “[w]e had provided Theresa with the most comprehensive, extensive services
that Catholic Social Services could provide. . . I had transferred a lot of my cases to other fellow
workers and worked with Theresa’s case solely for a couple of months.” Fair testified that she
was able to get Social Security benefits in place for respondent, and that she sought the
assistance of Community Mental Health (CMH). Fair testified that in order for respondent to
qualify for DD services, CMH required documentation that the disability happened before age
21, and that she (Fair) did not have a lot of documentation as to respondent’s disability. She
testified that before getting an assessment of respondent, a psychological evaluation had to be
done, and that Fair took her to Michigan Rehabilitation Services, went through orientation with
her, and that was what led to the first psychological evaluation in April 1997. Fair testified that
home services by CSS stopped in August 1997 because respondent and respondent’s mother
asked that she, Fair, and the CSS worker not return to the home. The services continued at CSS.
(continued…)
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respondent was provided extensive services, including parental training and parent modeling,
that were individualized. The family court’s opinion and order is clear that it considered and
weighed the testimony of Ms. Katz and Ms. Carrellas of the ACA.5 In discussing the evidence
that supported its determination that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions that
led to termination would be rectified within a reasonable amount of time given SMJ’s age, and
that reasonable efforts were made toward reunification, the family court noted:
(…continued)
When asked at the termination hearing “In your opinion does Theresa have the ability to parent
[SMJ] properly?” Fair responded:
No she doesn’t. Not independently she does not.
Q. What do you foresee, if anything, some type of plan that may be available that
would assist her to bring [SMJ] back into the home?
A. Um—I really can’t think of one particular plan or agency that could really
fully assist Theresa and [SMJ] the way that they would both need to have
assistance. Theresa will certainly need close to 24-hour supervision, a lot of
direct guidance and support, prompting, as [SMJ] grows and develops.
***
And also the other issue at hand is that Theresa had verbally expressed to me that
she wanted to live independently. She did not want to live at home anymore.
So—and given the fact that Theresa hasn’t really lived solely on her own, she
would need a lot of assistance and guidance in learning how to live independently
as well, in addition to parenting support.
Q. At this point, do you think it’s in [SMJ’s] best interest that the rights of
Theresa be terminated?
A. I think it is in [SMJ]’s best interest.
Q. And why is that?
A. Because I don’t think that [SMJ] would get the necessary needs that he needs
to have met to help him grow and develop and thrive into adulthood. I don’t
believe that Theresa would do anything intentionally to harm [SMJ], but there
certainly have been periods of time where she’s exercised poor judgment in
terms of his care or what she would do if he was in her care.
Fair also testified that respondent stopped attending parenting classes at CSS in October 1997.
5
Carrellas testified that she had never seen or examined SMJ, and had never seen respondent
with SMJ, although she had met respondent.
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[ ] The evidence shows that Ms. Jones has a cognitive disability; she has
significant difficulty with deductive reasoning, following through with
instructions, retaining information and staying focused on subjects. (Stoermer,
Fournier, Fair). She thinks literally and concretely. (Katz, Fourneier, Stoermer,
Carrellas) Learning is not from insight and her own deductions but from the
observation by others and the repeated correction or re-direction to Ms. Jones.
(Katz, Fair). So someone capable must be present with Shawn and Theresa to see
and analyze what is happening, to adapt the environment and responses for Shawn
and to train Theresa.
A cognitive developmental delay is not going to go away. Therefore, these
barriers to safe parenting will most likely exist during [SMJ’s] minority.
(b) Ms. Jones’ disability cannot be “trained away” to enable her to parent. Ms.
Katz testified that Ms. Jones would benefit from one-on-one, hands-on,
supervised parenting training with [SMJ] present . . . . and she would have to be
trained for the eventualities of parenting so she would know how to respond. Ms.
Carrellas testified that support providers would have to practice with Ms. Jones
over and over to get her to understand a parenting procedure and if she was not
doing it, she would need help in doing it. This is a very sensitive and
compassionate position to take on behalf of Ms. Jones but the risks to [SMJ] are
enormous. Neither one of these witnesses suggested that such training would ever
end or that, having had such training, Ms. Jones could ever be left on her own
with [SMJ]. Ms. Jones may be able to learn a job by patterns, repetition or rote;
learn to read, write, clean her house, prepare a setting for child visitation but there
is nothing rote or predictable about raising a child. The parent is constantly
presented with challenges from the lively, creative unpredictable child, from his
natural development and from his relationship with external factors. Ms. Jones
cannot be programmed for every eventuality . . . . If she cannot analyze, abstract
or deduce and thus select the safe option, then [SMJ] is at risk physically or
emotionally at any age at which a child cannot rely on himself for guidance and
protection.
(c) Reasonable efforts were made to try to rectify the conditions but without
success
(i) There was appropriate parent training provided to Ms. Jones. It
consisted of coaching, role-modeling; it was hands-on and one-on-one, just as her
advocates said it should be. Ms. Jones’s [sic] had four hours of parent training
per week plus another four hours of visitation per week until it became clear that
[SMJ] needed relief and not much progress was being made. Ms. Jones’
advocates recommended more parent skills time but it is clear from their
testimony that they believe, like the nurse, the FIA and Healthy Families that Ms.
Jones needed 24 hour parenting support.
All the parenting education in the world was not going to reunify this family
because it was not going to make Ms. Jones any more capable of understanding,
recognizing and properly adjusting for the next large or small parenting challenge.
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The parenting program may have been helpful to Ms. Jones in some ways but it
was ‘wheel-spinning’ as far as the goal of reunification was concerned.
The record supports that the FIA provided respondent in the instant case with the foster care
services it had available. The caseworkers were unable to access more services for respondent
through the FIA child services division and its contracting agencies.
In In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), this Court upheld the
termination of parental rights of a cognitively disabled mother:
The opinion reflects that the probate court carefully considered the testimony of
many witnesses regarding respondent’s potential to parent effectively if assisted
by someone. For example, the probate court found that several witnesses’
testimony established that to function effectively as a parent respondent would
require constant supervision. The probate court also found that several witnesses
had testified that despite the possibility of receiving parenting assistance, because
of her cognitive and emotional impairments respondent would unlikely ever
improve her skills sufficiently to undertake the complex responsibilities of
parenting. The court concluded that it had found “clear and convincing evidence
that [respondent] is an intellectually and emotionally limited teenager who,
because of her significant longstanding deficits, cannot be expected to develop the
intellectual and cognitive ability to be a safe and nurturing parent regardless of
how long or under what conditions she is assisted. [Id. at 452.]
Similarly, respondent in the instant case, although not a teenager, is cognitively disabled.
There was considerable testimony and evidence that respondent would not be able to parent SMJ
without virtually constant assistance and that respondent was unable to independently recognize
risks to SMJ’s safety. See note 4, supra; see also Terry, supra, in which this Court noted that
even if the issue of accommodation under the ADA had been timely raised, the record did not
support the claim that the agency’s provision of extensive services, albeit of less-than 24-hours
per day, would have violated the ADA:
It is undisputed that respondent was provided with extensive services, and
there is no evidence that she was denied any services that are available to parents
with greater cognitive abilities. The caseworkers were aware of respondent’s
intellectual limitations and would repeat instructions multiple times and remind
her when tasks had to be completed. Respondent received assistance through
GCCMH to address both personal and parenting problems in a program that was
tailored to developmentally disabled persons. An arrangement under which
respondent lived in the children’s foster home was attempted but proved
unsuccessful. Petitioner had no other services available that would address
respondent’s deficiencies while allowing her to keep her children. The ADA does
not require petitioner to provide respondent with full-time, live-in assistance with
her children.
Respondent’s contention that she needed even more assistance from petitioner to
properly care for her children merely provides additional support for the family
court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. After her children have come
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within the jurisdiction of the family court, a parent, whether disabled or not, must
demonstrate that she can meet their basic needs before they will be returned to her
care. “If a parent cannot or will not meet her irreducible minimum parental
responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the needs of the parent.”
[Terry, supra at 27-28 (citations omitted).]
The ACA points to testimony from its representatives that, had it been asked, it could
have been able to pull together services comprising up to twenty-four hour assistance to
respondent, if such were needed. However, that testimony was first given at a review hearing in
October 1997, well after SMJ had been removed from respondent’s care. The family court at
that time was well familiar with respondent’s case and her failure to benefit from the services
provided her to the extent that she would not need constant assistance in caring for SMJ. See
court’s factual findings, quoted supra. The family court justifiably concluded that no matter how
extensive the services, respondent would not be rendered a competent parent that could
adequately care, and provide a safe environment, for SMJ.
We agree with petitioner that this “is a very difficult and sensitive case, and the People
are and the Court was sympathetic to Ms. Jones’ situation. It is uncontested that she never
harmed [SMJ] and she loved her child tremendously.” However, as petitioner notes, once an
element of MCL 712A.19b has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the court may
terminate parental rights if in the best interests of the child. MCR 5.974(F)(3). As discussed in
section II, infra, we conclude that the existence of statutory grounds for termination were proven
by clear and convincing evidence.
Under the circumstances present here, the family court did not clearly err in finding that
the agency had made reasonable efforts toward reunification. The ADA does not require that the
agency provide twenty-four hour assistance to a disabled parent. See Bartell v Lohiser, 12 F
Supp 2d 640, 650 (ED MI, 1998), aff’d 215 F3d 550 (CA 6, 2000). Under the ADA, regardless
of the parent’s disability, the parent must be able to provide basic needs for his or her child.
Terry, supra at 27-28.6
II
Respondent next argues that the family court abused its discretion in finding that the
evidence was clear and convincing, because the agency failed to accommodate her disabilities,
and never gave her a real opportunity to rectify the conditions that brought the child into care.
6
We reject respondent’s argument that the FIA violated MCL 712A.18f(6)(a), which requires
the agency to communicate with the child’s doctor in failure to thrive cases, because subsections
(6) and (7) did not become effective until March 1, 1999 -- at which time the termination hearing
was already under way. See MCL 712A.18f (historical and statutory notes). The case service
plan was written before these subsections were enacted, and no proceedings were conducted after
the effective date to determine whether to send the child home. Rather, the issue in subsequent
hearings was whether to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Therefore, these provisions do
not apply to this case.
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Petitioner responds that respondent was given services before and after the baby was
born, but his weight loss became critical and he had to be removed. Petitioner notes that SMJ
gained weight after he was removed. It further notes that conditions have not changed because
respondent has been unable to learn the skills necessary to care for her child, and that respondent
was also unable to recognize risks and provide for SMJ’s safety. Petitioner asserts that although
respondent loves SMJ, she would need around-the-clock support in order to safely and properly
parent him, and there was no evidence that she was ever going to improve. Termination was
therefore in the child’s best interests.
Regarding failure to rectify conditions, it is clear that, despite the services provided,
respondent’s parental skills did not improve significantly, and certainly not to the extent
necessary to permit her to care for SMJ without assistance. Although respondent’s mother and
respondent’s mother’s boyfriend testified positively about respondent’s parenting skills, the court
found their testimony lacking in credibility and that determination is entitled to deference on
appeal. Further, as noted by the court, respondent’s cognitive deficits cannot be removed by
training. There is no reasonable possibility that respondent’s parental skills can be rectified
within a reasonable time considering the age of the child. Thus, the court correctly found that
the ground for termination under subsection (c)(i) was established.
With regard to providing proper care, respondent was and remains unable to parent her
child without assistance. There is no reasonable possibility that she will become able to provide
proper care and custody without assistance within a reasonable time, considering the age of the
child. Thus, the court correctly found that termination under subsection (g) was established.
Regarding the likelihood that the child would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care,
the evidence showed that her feeding skills were still poor, that she walked out on the baby at the
doctor’s office, and that she failed to appreciate the danger of not using a stroller properly, in
allowing the child to play with small objects or electrical outlets, and the like. Given the deficits
in her parental skills, especially in the area of child safety, there was clear and convincing
evidence that the child would be harmed if returned to her care. The court therefore correctly
found that the ground for termination under subsection (j) was also established.
The family court did not clearly err in finding that there was clear and convincing
evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Respondent does not argue that termination of
her parental rights was clearly contrary to the child’s best interests.
III
Respondent next argues that her counsel was ineffective and there was serial
representation. She notes that she was represented by four different court-appointed attorneys
and a guardian ad litem. Respondent notes that the “FIA and Ms. Jones’ court appointed
attorneys were told to come up with a plan from the beginning. A viable plan for reunification
was not discovered until the last attorney was appointed, and the termination hearings were in
progress.” She further notes that her last lawyer failed to properly cross-examine witnesses and
did not address the agency’s failure to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Respondent
notes that she was prejudiced by having been represented by several different attorneys, most of
whom did not have time to become familiar with the file, let alone zealously advocate on her
behalf.
-13-
Because respondent failed to move for a Ginther7 hearing or for a new trial, our review is
limited to mistakes apparent on the record. See People v Hurst, 205 Mich App 634, 641; 517
NW2d 858 (1994). The right to effective assistance of counsel applies by analogy in termination
proceedings. In re Trowbridge, 155 Mich App 785, 786; 401 NW2d 65 (1986). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent must show that counsel’s performance was deficient
and that, under an objective standard of reasonableness, counsel made an error so serious that she
was not performing as the attorney guaranteed by the constitution. People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d
315 (1991). Respondent must also overcome the presumption that the challenged conduct might
be considered sound trial strategy and must further show that she has been prejudiced by the
error in question. Pickens, supra at 312, 314; Tommolino, supra at 17. To establish prejudice,
respondent must show that the error might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.
People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995); Pickens, supra at 312, 314.
Where counsel’s conduct involves a choice of strategies, it is not deficient. LaVearn, supra at
216.
We first note that there was no “serial representation” as defined by respondent, as none
of the attorneys who represented her “switche[d] sides to represent the other party . . . .” It is
true that Ms. Schikora served as referee at the hearing in which the mother attempted to release
her parental rights. However, she was initially a prosecutor, not the mother’s attorney.
Respondent’s serial representation argument fails.
On the merits, respondent fails to point to any specific mistakes apparent on the record,
thereby leaving this Court with nothing to review. See Hurst, supra at 641. Her attorneys’
failure to come up with a reunification plan is not plain error apparent on the record. The alleged
deficiencies in her last attorney’s cross-examination of various witnesses is a matter of trial
strategy, and cannot be the basis for finding ineffective assistance. Further, given the evidence
of respondent’s deficits in parenting skills, she has not shown that any of these alleged errors
might have made a difference in the outcome of the termination hearing.
IV
This Court granted respondent’s motion to remand to provide her with an opportunity to
file “a motion for an evidentiary hearing for development of a factual record regarding the minor
child’s diagnosis of autism,” by order dated February 7, 2001, and retained jurisdiction.
Proceedings on remand were limited to the issue raised in the motion. The motion to remand
indicates that respondent gave birth to a second child on December 28, 2000, and that, as of
January 25, 2001, she and the father (who is not a respondent in these proceedings) have been
provided around-the-clock services by various agencies, enabling them to maintain custody of
their new child. In the motion, counsel argued that had such services been provided in this case,
respondent would have been able to keep custody of SMJ. Further, counsel argued that SMJ’s
recent diagnosis of autism called into question the accuracy of the earlier diagnosis of failure to
thrive, because autism may have been the cause of his early feeding problems. Thus, reasonable
7
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-14-
efforts toward reunification had not been made, and termination of respondent’s parental rights
was improper because it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Counsel sought to
have the case remanded for expansion of the record by “physicians[’] testimony, an explanation
of the conflicting record, and a ruling by the lower court.”
At the March 27, 2001 hearing on remand,8 there was no mention of respondent’s second
child, nor of whether she still had custody of him. Petitioner conceded that SMJ was autistic,
thus eliminating the need to take testimony on that issue. The court declined to hear testimony
on whether respondent would be able to care for an autistic child with accommodations, finding
that that issue was not properly before the court.
Dr. Daniel Kessler, director of developmental and behavioral pediatrics at St. Joseph’s
Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, testified by telephone as an expert in that field. Dr. Kessler
testified that autistic infants are commonly “very quiet and undemanding” -- what many parents
would describe as a “good infant,” and that “[t]his may result in their not demonstrating the signs
of hunger, the same way another more typically developing child might do.” “So where as a
more typically developing child may indicate hunger through signs of irritability or fussiness or
crying every two to five hours, this child may sleep for an extended period of time and not
receive feeding of a sufficient volume of formula or breast feeding to gain adequate weight.”
They may therefore lose a “significant” amount of weight as compared to the normal initial ten
percent. This pattern might continue for the first six months. Dr. Kessler did not examine the
child in this case.
Dr. Kessler did not believe that the child’s behavior would depend on the caregiver.
Autistic infants “are much more oblivious of the care taking environment than would be more
typically developing children.” “They would generally be expected to have the same behavior in
a wide range of care taking environments.”
Dr. Susan Burton-Hoyle, executive director for the Autism Society of Michigan, testified
as an expert in autism. She reviewed SMJ’s educational developmental records, but not his early
medical records. She was aware that respondent was developmentally delayed, and that her IQ
was in the 60s, but she was not intimately familiar with her disabilities. Dr. Burton-Hoyle
agreed that parents of autistic children commonly look back and remember “that [the children]
were passive, that they didn’t seem to want to eat, that they slept a lot.” She testified that autistic
children often do not tolerate certain foods or certain textures. She testified that parents and
caregivers had reported that an autistic child might reject a certain food, but “if a new person just
started feeding [him] with a different bottle or a different type of formula that the child could
respond differently.”
Dr. Burton-Hoyle testified that “[t]here are extensive supports” available for parents of
autistic children, and that parents need those supports regardless of their educational or economic
8
Petitioner opposed respondent’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. The court overruled the
objection, finding that the remand order contemplated that evidence would be taken concerning
SMJ’s condition, and that findings would be made concerning whether SMJ’s autism would have
had any impact on the court’s earlier decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
-15-
backgrounds. There are “respite funds available from the Department of Community Mental
Health”; there is also a means-tested assistance such as the “children’s Medicaid waiver which is
extensive supports in speech services -- OT services, psychological services and direct care
support in the home.” There is also a “Family Support Subsidy” that the parents can use to
purchase whatever services they need, for example, speech therapy, occupational therapy, or
special assistance in the home. Support groups are also available throughout the state.
Dr. Burton-Hoyle knew of low IQ parents who received supports and successfully were
raising an autistic child. She believed that “with support [respondent] could successfully parent
a child with autism.” She agreed that raising an autistic child could cause a lot of stress, and that
parents needed flexibility and support. She believed that SMJ’s early feeding problems and
weight loss were consistent with autism.
Sandy Glovac, occupational therapist and director of a clinic for developmentally
disabled children, testified as an expert in those areas. Autistic children comprised about forty
percent of her practice. She reviewed SMJ’s medical and school evaluation records; she had not
reviewed respondent’s records. She had experience with developmentally disabled parents
raising developmentally disabled children, but not autistic children. Ms. Glovac agreed that
autistic children often have feeding problems, and that an autistic child who is refusing to eat
may respond to a change in the brand of formula, or even to a different type of bottle.
Ann Carrellas, director of the family resource center for the Association for Community
Advocacy (“ACA”), testified that respondent suffered from a mild impairment, and that her IQ
was in the 60s. Ms. Carrellas had helped developmentally disabled parents to raise children, but
did not recall any whose children were autistic. Ms. Carrellas had “frequently” seen respondent
“parent a child,” and believed that she was capable of raising SMJ with appropriate supports.
The ACA could assist by ensuring access to all the appropriate resources available to her, in
collaboration with other agencies. Ms. Carrellas believed that even non-disabled parents would
need support to raise an autistic child.
The child’s foster mother, Sandra Agge, testified that SMJ was four years old and had
lived with her since he was thirteen days old. When she picked him up from the hospital, they
told her to wake him up every hour and a half to feed him. After being in her care for about a
week, he started waking up and crying to be fed like any other child. He “was a good baby” and
“only cried when he was hungry or when he was wet.” He gained weight immediately. Agge
testified that SMJ did not eat at school because he was only there for an hour or two a day and
she was “right there with him.”9 He often disrupted family meals. She believed that he acted
like a two-year-old even though he was four. Agge testified that SMJ’s pediatrician was still not
convinced that he was autistic, although she knew that he was developmentally delayed. He was
“highly functional” and aware of his surroundings, but did not adapt well to change. He would
interact with other children, although slowly, and had imaginary play. He also had good verbal
skills. She believed that the autism diagnosis was based on his background, sleep patterns, and
9
Apparently, SMJ had tantrums if she attempted to leave him alone at pre-school.
-16-
his lack of interaction with adults. He communicated and interacted better at home than he did
during testing.
For purposes of the hearing on remand, the family court found that SMJ was autistic.
The court conceded that Dr. Kessler, Dr. Burton-Hoyle and Ms. Glovac were “experts in dealing
with autistic children and their families,” but gave their testimony little weight because none of
them had examined the mother or the child. Further, Ms. Glovac had never worked with a
developmentally disabled parent trying to raise an autistic child. The court found that, despite
the autism diagnosis, Ms. Carrellas’ testimony was the same as it had been at the termination
hearing -- that respondent could raise the child with appropriate supports. The court noted that
Ms. Carrellas’ position had been rejected at the termination hearing. Quoting from its prior
findings, the court found that termination was based on respondent’s lack of parenting ability
rather than the child’s condition. The court concluded that the earlier finding that respondent
was unable to learn basic parenting skills had not been altered by the autism diagnosis. Further,
although the child’s diagnosis had changed, the child’s behavior and the mother’s abilities
remained the same as they had been all along. The court therefore reiterated its prior holding
that respondent’s parental rights should be terminated.
We find no error. We note that it was apparent in 1997, years before SMJ’s diagnosis of
autism in 2000, that he suffered from significant developmental delays in a number of areas.
That SMJ’s eating may have been affected by autism does not change the sad reality that
respondent could not parent him safely either at the time he was removed or subsequently.
Respondent’s cognitive deficits could not be trained away and there was no evidence that she
could ever parent SMJ adequately. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s
parental rights, or in subsequently concluding on remand that its initial decision was unaffected
by the new evidence that SMJ is autistic.
V
Respondent’s brief after remand also argues that the family court’s exercise of
jurisdiction was improper because there was insufficient evidence presented at the adjudicative
hearing to support asserting jurisdiction over SMJ. She notes that SMJ’s weight loss and alleged
failure to thrive were caused by his autism, not by her neglect, and therefore there was no basis
to assert jurisdiction. We disagree.
A party may attack the family court’s subject matter jurisdiction at any time. In re
Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 438; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). In contrast, “the exercise of that
jurisdiction can be challenged only on direct appeal,” not by collateral attack. Id. at 439. The
only exception to that rule is where jurisdiction is exercised without any legal evidence being
received to support it. Id. at 440-441. “[T]he [family] court’s subject matter jurisdiction is
established when the action is of a class that the court is authorized to adjudicate, and the claim
stated in the complaint is not clearly frivolous.” Hatcher, supra at 437; In re SR, 229 Mich App
310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998). On the other hand, “[t]he valid exercise of the court’s statutory
jurisdiction is established by the contents of the petition after the judge or referee has found
probable cause to believe that the allegations contained within the petition are true.” Hatcher,
supra at 437, 444 (emphasis added). “Culpable neglect need not be shown for the court properly
to exercise jurisdiction.” In re Middleton, 198 Mich App 197, 199; 497 NW2d 214 (1993).
Further, errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, no matter how grave, do not defeat the court’s
-17-
subject matter jurisdiction so as to render the judgment void; “[j]urisdiction to make a
determination is not dependent on the correctness of the determination made.” Hatcher, supra at
439 (quoting Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 545-546; 260 NW 908
[1935]).
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, and findings of fact for clear
error. SR, supra at 314-315. The initial petition alleged that SMJ was born on February 18,
1997, weighing seven pounds; that by March 3, 1997, he weighed only six pounds and fourteen
ounces; that he should have been gaining between six and eight ounces a week; that he had no
medical problems that would cause him to lose weight; and that Dr. Randy Ward, respondent’s
doctor, believed that respondent was unable to care for the child. The petition also alleged that
respondent fed SMJ water, contrary to the public health nurse’s advice; that respondent was
developmentally delayed, and rigidly followed instructions even if not in the child’s best
interests; and that she left the baby unattended at the doctor’s examining table while she went to
the restroom.
At a March 5, 1997 preliminary hearing,10 respondent waived her right to a probable
cause hearing and the petition was authorized. However, she denied the allegations of the
petition. At respondent’s pretrial hearing, the petition was amended to add that SMJ had lived in
her care continuously until the petition was filed; and that he had no known medical problems
that would cause him to lose weight. Several paragraphs were stricken and respondent then
pleaded to amended paragraphs. Respondent testified that she fed the child every two hours, but
that he would go to sleep after consuming a couple ounces of formula. She admitted that he had
lost weight while in her care, and that he had no known medical problems.
Considering only those allegations respondent admitted--that she was developmentally
delayed, and that SMJ had lost weight since birth while in her care, even though he had no
known medical problems, the allegations were sufficient to place the child within the provisions
of subsection (b)(1). Hatcher, supra at 433, 434-435. Under Hatcher, the family court had
subject matter jurisdiction because the case was “of a class that the court is authorized to
adjudicate, and the claim stated in the complaint is not clearly frivolous.” Id. at 444.
Whether SMJ’s weight loss was due to autism rather than respondent’s neglect goes to
the family court’s exercise of jurisdiction, not its subject matter jurisdiction. Under Hatcher,
respondent cannot collaterally attack the court’s exercise of jurisdiction by showing that the facts
are not as the parties then believed. Hatcher, supra at 439; see also Altman v Nelson, 197 Mich
App 467, 472-473; 495 NW2d 826 (1992) (subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the
truth of the allegations). Further, this case does not fall within Hatcher’s exception for collateral
attacks (“where jurisdiction is exercised without any legal evidence being received to support
it”), because respondent’s plea provided legal evidence to support the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. Hatcher, supra at 440-441. Reversal on this basis is not warranted.
10
Although the transcript is labeled preliminary inquiry, the petition requested placement of the
child and therefore the proceeding was a preliminary hearing.
-18-
VI
Respondent’s final argument is that a physician’s report was improperly excluded on
remand. We disagree.
We review the family court’s decision to exclude evidence at a termination proceeding
for abuse of discretion. In re Caldwell, 228 Mich App 116, 123; 576 NW2d 724 (1998). An
erroneous ruling will not merit reversal unless the ruling affects a party’s substantial rights. Id.;
see also MCL 710.51(6), MCR 2.613(A), MRE 103(a).
At the hearing on remand, respondent offered a letter from Dr. Richard Alper into
evidence. Petitioner and the child’s attorney objected on the basis of hearsay and lack of
foundation. The court rejected respondent’s argument that the rules of evidence did not apply at
this hearing and also excluded the letter because the doctor was not present to be crossexamined. Respondent offered to attempt to reach Dr. Alper by telephone, but the record does
not reflect the outcome of that call.
Because this case was remanded for a hearing on issues relating to the termination of
respondent’s parental rights, we apply the rule governing termination hearings. See MCR
5.974(F)(2).11 There was no finding that the doctor was reasonably available to be crossexamined. However, we conclude that even assuming that the family court erroneously excluded
Dr. Alper’s letter, the ruling did not affect respondent’s substantial rights.
Dr. Alper’s letter states that he is a pediatrician whose knowledge of the case was
provided by respondent’s attorney, and that he was aware of SMJ’s early failure to thrive, and
the later autism diagnosis. He did not know “if the feeding (formula)” “was inadequate because
of autism,” but he “suspect[ed]” that the child’s bond with the mother was “poorly established”
due to the child’s autism. He would have urged the mother to breast feed as a way to establish
bonding and prevent weight loss. He would have also urged close follow up of the mother,
supporting services, and home visits. He believed that the weight loss should have been noticed
and addressed earlier, which might have prevented the child’s failure to thrive.
Although the family court did not expressly address the issue, the letter was marginally
relevant or material to the issues on remand and the letter’s content could not have affected the
outcome of that proceeding. Respondent’s substantial rights were not affected, thus reversal on
this basis is not appropriate.
11
MCR 5.974(F)(2) provides that, at termination hearings:
all relevant and material evidence, including oral and written reports, may be
received by the court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value,
even though such evidence may not be admissible at trial. The respondent and the
petitioner shall be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert written
reports so received and shall be allowed to cross-examine individuals who made
the reports when those individuals are reasonably available.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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