HOLLIS POOLE V DR FERNANDO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOLLIS POOLE and JANET POOLE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
DR. FERNANDO, DR. GASSAN BACHUWA,
and HURLEY MEDICAL CENTER,
No. 226457
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-066572-NH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: White, P.J., and Talbot and E.R. Post*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff1 appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff was treated by defendants in June 1997 and discovered his cause of action in
July 1997. He served defendants with notice of an intent to sue on June 1, 1999 and filed suit on
November 2, 1999. The complaint was not accompanied by the requisite affidavit of merit,
which was filed, apparently without leave of the court, in mid-January 2000. Defendants
Fernando and Hurley moved for judgment, asserting that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. The trial court agreed.
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo on
appeal. Gibson v Neelis, 227 Mich App 187, 189; 575 NW2d 313 (1997).
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7), a court must accept as true the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. The court must look to the
pleadings, affidavits, or other documentary evidence to determine whether there is
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
1
Because this claim arises out of defendants’ allegedly negligent treatment of Hollis Poole and
Janet Poole’s claim is solely a derivative one for loss of consortium, we shall refer to Hollis
Poole as plaintiff.
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a genuine issue of material fact. If no facts are in dispute, and reasonable minds
could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, whether the plaintiff’s
claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question for the court as a matter
of law. However, if a material factual dispute exists such that factual
development could provide a basis for recovery, summary disposition is
inappropriate. [Baker v DEC Int’l, 218 Mich App 248, 252-253; 553 NW2d 667
(1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds 458 Mich 247 (1998)
(citations omitted).]
The limitations period for a malpractice claim is two years from the time the claim
accrues. MCL 600.5805(1), (5). A medical malpractice claim accrues at the time of the act or
omission that gave rise to the claim “regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise
has legal knowledge of the claim.” MCL 600.5838a(1). A medical malpractice claim may be
filed within the two-year period or within six months after the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered the claim, whichever is later. MCL 600.5838a(2). According to the complaint,
defendants treated plaintiff in June 1997 and he discovered the alleged malpractice in July 1997.
Therefore, he had two years from the time defendants treated him in which to file this action.
Assuming defendants last treated plaintiff on June 30, 1997, that meant he had until June 30,
1999 in which to file his complaint.2
As noted above, it is assumed that plaintiff had until June 30, 1999 to file suit. Unlike
other claims, a medical malpractice complaint cannot be filed at any time during the limitations
period. Pursuant to statute, the plaintiff “shall not” file a medical malpractice complaint unless
he has first given the defendant “written notice . . . not less than 182 days before the action is
commenced.” MCL 600.2912b(1). Plaintiff served defendants with the requisite notice of intent
on June 1, 1999. Because the limitations period would have expired during the time plaintiff was
precluded from filing suit, the limitations period was tolled. MCL 600.5856(d); Omelenchuk v
City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 574; 609 NW2d 177 (2000). When plaintiff filed suit on
November 2, 1999, after the 154-day “no suit” period, MCL 600.2912b(8), twenty-nine days
remained in the limitations period.
Normally, a lawsuit is commenced upon the filing of a complaint, MCR 2.101(B), and a
complaint filed at any time before the limitations period expires is timely. Buscaino v Rhodes,
385 Mich 474, 481, 484; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), overruled in part on other grounds by
McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15; 597 NW2d 148 (1999). In a medical malpractice action,
however, the filing of a complaint without the requisite affidavit of merit is insufficient to
commence the lawsuit and thus the filing of a complaint without the affidavit does not toll the
limitations period, which continues to run. Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547, 549-550, 553; 607
NW2d 711 (2000). Because plaintiff wholly omitted to file the affidavit with his complaint, the
limitations period continued to run and expired on December 1, 1999. Id.; Holmes v Michigan
Capital Med Ctr, 242 Mich App 703, 709; 620 NW2d 319 (2000). Although plaintiff could have
2
Although plaintiff contends that his cause of action accrued on July 2, 1997, the complaint
alleged that Fernando’s alleged negligence occurred in June 1997 and plaintiff never sought
leave to amend his complaint to allege otherwise. However, the addition of an extra two days to
any of the relevant dates would not affect the outcome of the case.
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obtained a twenty-eight-day extension of time in which to file the affidavit, he never sought or
was granted that extension of time. Even if such an extension had been granted, plaintiff should
have filed the affidavit no later than December 29, 1999 (twenty-eight days from the day the
limitations period expired). Id. at 707-708.
Plaintiff contends that because he had timely obtained the requisite affidavit of merit but
simply forgot to file it with the complaint due to clerical error, that mistake should not warrant
dismissal. First, this argument overlooks the fact that the filing of a complaint without the
affidavit was insufficient to commence the lawsuit and thus the action was time-barred by the
time plaintiff filed the missing affidavit. Scarsella, supra at 549-550. Plaintiff has not explained
how, nor cited any authority to show that, an expired cause of action can be revived after the fact
and thus has failed to preserve the issue. Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602
NW2d 834 (1999). Second, amendment of the complaint to supply the missing affidavit does
not relate back and make the new complaint timely. Scarsella, supra at 550, 552. Accordingly,
we find that the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Edward R. Post
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