RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATION INC V WILLIAM BEIER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATION, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 224936
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 98-001373-CZ
WILLIAM BEIER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment for plaintiff entered after a bench trial.
We affirm.
Defendant operates a law practice from a building he owns, which abuts a corner of a
parking lot owned by plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action to prevent defendant, his office
personnel, and his clients from using its parking lot without paying for such use. Plaintiff also
sought an injunction, requiring defendant to remove or maintain dilapidated signs affixed to his
building.1 The trial court issued an opinion and order, following a bench trial, permanently
enjoining defendant from using plaintiff’s parking lot. The order also required defendant to
remove or adequately maintain the signs within ninety days.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding the subject parking lot
was not a public parking lot. Defendant provided no citation to legal authority in his brief on
appeal to support this argument. A statement of position without supporting citation is
insufficient to bring an issue before this Court. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d
100 (1998); Silver Creek Twp v Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 99; 631 NW2d 346 (2001); see MCR
7.212(C)(7). A party may not leave it to this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject its
position. Wilson, supra. Therefore, defendant has failed to properly present this issue for our
review and we decline to consider it. Id.
The record does not support defendant’s further argument that he acquired an easement
over the parking lot. “Prescriptive easements arise where a person uses, but does not possess, the
1
Defendant brought a cross-claim; however, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s
dismissal of the cross-claim in this appeal.
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land of another for a particular purpose without permission for 15 years.” Tolkdorf v Griffith,
464 Mich 1, 4 n 2; 626 NW2d 163 (2001). The record in the present case establishes that
defendant used the property, at most, for eleven years prior to plaintiff’s filing of its complaint.
There is no support for “tacking” defendant’s predecessor’s period of use, see Killips v Mannisto,
244 Mich App 256, 259; 624 NW2d 224 (2001), because the record indicates defendant’s
predecessor used plaintiff’s lot with permission. Permissive use of property, regardless of the
length of the use, will not result in an easement by prescription. West Michigan Dock & Market
Corp v Lakeland Investments, 210 Mich App 505, 511; 534 NW2d 212 (1995). Defendant’s
argument that he acquired an implied easement by necessity fails because defendant’s parcel is
not landlocked. See Tolksdorf, supra at 10, and Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 211 n 38; 580
NW2d 876 (1998).
Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it did not allow him to testify as his
own witness also lacks merit. Defendant has not presented legal support for this issue in his brief
on appeal. Wilson, supra; see MCR 7.212(C)(7). Regardless, the record indicates that defendant
stipulated to the evidence he intended to testify to and such evidence was introduced at trial in
lieu of defendant’s testimony. Under these circumstances, we do not find error. See Weiss v
Hodge (After Remand), 223 Mich App 620, 636; 567 NW2d 468 (1997).
We further reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in ordering him to
remove or repair the signs. Defendant has again failed to provide citation to legal authority to
support his argument on appeal. Wilson, supra; see MCR 7.212(C)(7). Nevertheless, the
uncontroverted evidence at trial suggested the signs adversely impacted surrounding landowners.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s equitable decision to order
defendant to remove or maintain the signs was erroneous.
Last, we find no merit to defendant’s argument regarding his obligation to pay $100 per
month to use the parking lot. The trial court did not order defendant to pay any such sum. With
respect to defendant’s use of the parking lot, the trial court ordered, in total:
That Defendant’s title to the property commonly known as 211 Vine Street does
not include any rights of any kind to use the Association parking lot, and
Defendant, his guests, invitees, licensees, employees, lessees, successors and/or
assigns in title, are permanently enjoined and prohibited from such use and from
going onto, over, under or across the land which currently serves as the
Association’s parking lot and is described as follows:
The East 30 feet of Lot 14 and all of Lot 15, except the North 45 feet the
West 60 feet, lying South of lot 14 thereof, St. Clair Urban Renewal
Replat No. 1 of part of P.C. 305.
Nowhere in the order did the trial court require payment of a monthly fee. A trial court speaks
through its written orders. People v Davie, 225 Mich App 592, 600; 571 NW2d 229 (1997);
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Mitchell v Cole, 196 Mich App 675, 683; 493 NW2d 427 (1992).2 Therefore, defendant’s
argument in this regard fails.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
2
We recognize that the trial court’s opinion made reference to defendant’s obligation to pay
plaintiff for future use of the parking lot. The court’s opinion, states, in part:
[I]n the Real Estate Sales Agreement under which defendant’s predecessors
acquired Lot 14, the purchasers were obligated to make a monthly contribution of
$100 to the Association as a share of the costs of the common areas. The terms
and conditions of the Real Estate Sales Agreement are also binding upon
defendant as a successor in interest . . . . Thus, the defendant is likewise obligated
to make a monthly contribution to the Association as a share of the costs of the
common areas.
However, the court’s written order is silent with respect to any obligation to pay a monthly fee
and, therefore, defendant has not been ordered to pay a fee. See Davie, supra, and Mitchell,
supra.
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