IN RE DEANNA VANSICKLE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DEANNA VANSICKLE, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 232262
Midland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-000120-NA
YVONNE VANSICKLE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JOSEPH RANDOLPH,
Respondent.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J. and Wilder and C. C. Schmucker*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j) and (m). We affirm. This case
is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The family court did not clearly err in determining that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). While respondent made great progress in controlling her alcoholism and
overcoming depression, she was mentally impaired and evidence was presented indicating that
respondent mother would not be able to care for the child. Moreover, the evidence indicated that
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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the child would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. Thus, the family court did not clearly
err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence.1 Id.
We note that the family court did not improperly consider the alternative home available
to the minor child in determining whether the statutory subsections had been established by clear
and convincing evidence. When comparison was being made by respondent’s counsel at the
termination hearing, the impropriety of such a consideration was noted. Additionally, the court
did not place undue weight on the report of Dr. Syed, which was quoted in the lower court record
and which indicated that respondent would never be able to safely parent the child. Ms. Meno’s
testimony based on her personal knowledge of respondent for thirty years conveyed a similar
conclusion.
Lastly, the family court did not clearly err in determining that termination was in the
minor child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d
407 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Chad C. Schmucker
1
Because the family court properly terminated respondent’s parental rights under subsections
19b(3)(g) and (j) and only one statutory ground for termination must be established in order to
terminate parental rights, we need not decide whether termination was also proper under
subsection 19b(3)(m). In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
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