PEOPLE OF MI V JENNIFER ANN ALTMAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 231799
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-402472-FH
JENNIFER ANN ALTMAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s pretrial
motion to admit evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). We reverse and remand for further
proceedings in the trial court.
Defendant, a schoolteacher, is charged with having sexual contact with a thirteen-year-old
junior high school student contrary to MCL 750.520e. The prosecution filed a motion in the trial
court to admit pursuant to MRE 404(b), testimony from nine witnesses, including complainant,
about alleged other acts of various levels of sexual intimacy between defendant and complainant.
The prosecutor alleged the other acts evidence was relevant to show “scheme, plan, and/or
system in doing an act, as well as the absence of mistake or accident so as to demonstrate that it
is not unlikely as it might seem that the Defendant would molest a minor when other people were
in the area.” On appeal, the prosecutor is only arguing that the trial court erred with respect to
the proffered testimony of the complainant regarding allegations of past interaction with
defendant. Our holding today is limited to this specific testimony.
The trial court ruled that it was not persuaded that the evidence of other acts was properly
admissible, although it believed that it was a close question. The trial court cautioned the
attorneys that if the defense opened the door to the admission of the evidence, its ruling could be
reversed. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude other acts evidence for an abuse
of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998); People v Starr,
457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Under MRE 404(b), other acts evidence may be admitted where: (1) the evidence is
offered for some purpose other than propensity; (2) the evidence is relevant and material; and (3)
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
-1-
prejudice. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). “[T]he trial court,
upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105.” Id. at 75. Accord, People v
Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-59; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
The prosecution asserts that complainant will testify that defendant previously hugged,
kissed, and massaged him, groped him to the point of an erection, allowed him to fondle her
breasts and vaginal area, and engaged in explicit sexual banter with complainant. The
prosecution argues that this testimony should be admitted to put “otherwise incredible
accusations” in context and to show defendant was willing to engage in the charged conduct on
school property with other students around. We agree.
Evidence of further acts of sexual intimacy occurring before the behavior that serves as
the basis of the pending charge “constitute a necessary part of [the] . . . principal transaction,”
People v Jenness, 5 Mich 305, 324 (1858), and thus tend to make more probable the truth of the
complainant’s assertions regarding the act charged. People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 414415; 213 NW2d 97 (1973). This is a proper purpose for the admission of this testimony.
“Limiting [complainant’s] . . . testimony to the specific act charged and not allowing
[complainant] . . . to mention acts leading up to the” act charged could undermine complainant’s
credibility. Id. Conversely, allowing such testimony tends to rebut the seemingly improbable
assertion, raised by defendant at the preliminary examination, that defendant “was overwhelmed
and overcome by seduction in a . . . 3 minute period. That, in literally, one minute, they’re
spilling hot chocolate and the next minute, she’s underneath feeling [complainant’s] leg.” This
scenario, defendant argued, “simply is not credible.” As the Jenness Court observed:
In any case, where a witness has testified to a fact or transaction which,
standing alone and entirely unconnected with anything which led to or brought it
about, would appear in any degree unnatural or improbable in itself, without
reference to the facts preceding and inducing the principal transaction, and which,
if proved, would render it more natural and probable; such previous facts are not
only admissible and relevant, they constitute a necessary part of such principal
transaction—a link in the chain of testimony, without which it would be
impossible for the jury to appreciate the testimony in reference to such principal
transaction. . . .
In the order of nature, facts do not occur single and independent—isolated
from all others—but each is connected with some antecedent fact, or combination
of facts, from which the fact in question follows . . . . Torn from this necessary
connection, and exhibited alone, many real occurrences would appear under the
guise of falsehood, and truth itself would be made to lie. [Jenness, supra at 323342 (emphasis in original).]
We also do not believe that danger of unfair prejudice presented by this evidence
substantially outweighs its significant probative value. DeMartzex, supra at 413. The test for
admission of other acts evidence requires a trial court to consider not the danger of prejudice, but
the danger of unfair prejudice. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that
marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v
Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). As we have just discussed, the evidence
-2-
of prior contact between defendant and complainant is not marginally probative. Further, we do
not believe that if properly instructed, the jury will make the forbidden character inference from
this evidence. We are keenly aware that in the context of prior other acts evidence, the danger of
unfair prejudice is significant. However, given the nature of the alleged prior incidents, we do
not believe that a properly instructed jury will conclude from this testimony that defendant had a
propensity to commit the charged act and thus should be convicted on that basis alone.
Crawford, supra at 385.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
