WILLIAM E KASBEN V BERYL W HOFFMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM E. KASBEN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellant,
v
No. 224551
Leelanau Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-003816-DO
BERYL W. HOFFMAN,
Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellee,
and
EDWIN J. KASBEN,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff William Kasben and third-party defendant Edwin Kasben (plaintiff’s father)
appeal as of right from the judgment of divorce awarding Fred Dery, the bankruptcy trustee,
certain real estate for the benefit of defendant Beryl Hoffman. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
Plaintiff and his father argue that plaintiff’s father was improperly added as a party to this
divorce action. We agree. Generally, the only proper parties to a divorce action are the husband
and the wife. Berg v Berg, 336 Mich 284, 288; 57 NW2d 889 (1953). Although a court may add
a third party to the action where that party has conspired with one spouse to deprive the other
spouse of a property interest, Donahue v Donahue, 134 Mich App 696, 704; 352 NW2d 705
(1984), there was no evidence that plaintiff’s father conspired with plaintiff to deprive defendant
of any property. However, the addition of plaintiff’s father to the action does not require
reversal. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the trial court did not award property to defendant
that was owned by plaintiff’s father. The trial court simply awarded plaintiff’s interest in the
marital farm to defendant, subject to plaintiff’s father’s security interest as the land-contract
vendor. Under the circumstances, plaintiff’s father need not be joined on remand.
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Plaintiff also argues his father owned the marital farm outright and that the land contract
to plaintiff and defendant was invalid because they never satisfied the condition of paying the
balance of the mortgage within ninety days. We agree with plaintiff that the trial court
improperly concluded that it was precluded from deciding this issue by the preliminary finding
of the bankruptcy court in defendant’s bankruptcy action. Collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion, only applies where there has been a valid final judgment. Dearborn Heights School
Dist No. 7 v Wayne Co MEA/NEA, 233 Mich App 120, 124; 592 NW2d 408 (1998). However,
there was no evidence to indicate that the land contract from plaintiff’s father to plaintiff and
defendant was invalid. Although the trial court referred to the “condition” attached to the land
contract, which was never satisfied by plaintiff or defendant, the land contract does not specify
that payment of the remaining mortgage balance is a “condition.” It was simply another
obligation under the contract. Simply because plaintiff and defendant had failed to satisfy that
obligation did not render the contract automatically invalid. Sparling v Bert, 1 Mich App 167,
170-171; 134 NW2d 840 (1965).
We also reject plaintiff’s contention that he was denied a fair trial by the lack of
discovery and the limitations in the presentation of the evidence. The trial court acted within its
discretion in controlling the conduct of the litigation.
However, we reverse the judgment of divorce and remand for further proceedings
because the trial court’s property division was founded on legal error. First, the trial court failed
to make any factual findings regarding which assets were marital assets and which were separate
assets. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 493-494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). Although the trial
court noted that such findings would be difficult in this factually complex case, it was incumbent
upon the trial court to make those findings. Without knowing which assets were marital and
which were separate, this Court cannot engage in any meaningful appellate review of the
property division. On remand, the trial court must determine which assets are marital and which
are separate.
Most troubling is the trial court’s attempt to restore the parties to the financial condition
they enjoyed at the time they met in 1989, three years before they were married. A restitution
approach to a divorce action is disfavored in Michigan. Bone v Bone, 148 Mich App 834, 837838; 385 NW2d 706 (1986). Rather, the court’s approach should be to equitably divide the
marital estate. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). Moreover,
the trial court essentially treated the parties as though they had married three years earlier than
they did. It is error for a trial court to consider the parties’ pre-marriage relationship as included
in the length of the marriage. Reeves, supra at 493, n 1. To do so would be to recognize
common-law marriage, which is against the public policy of this state. Featherston v Steinhoff,
226 Mich App 584, 588; 575 NW2d 6 (1997). On remand, the trial court must consider the
appropriate factors to divide the parties’ marital estate equitably. Separate assets may not be
invaded unless one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Reeves, supra at 494-495.
In light of our decision, we need not address the trial court’s award of attorney fees.
However, to provide guidance on remand, we note that the trial court erred by awarding attorney
fees to the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy trustee was not required to participate in the
divorce action; therefore, even if plaintiff’s litigation conduct was unreasonable, it could not
have caused the trustee to be forced to incur attorney fees. Hawkins v Murphy, 222 Mich App
664, 669-670; 565 NW2d 674 (1997).
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in
full.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
I concur in result only.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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