CYNTHIA EDWARDS V BEVERLY DUQUETTE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RODGER BARTLES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 223208
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-839423-NO
BEVERLY DUQUETTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
CYNTHIA EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 223209
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-839424-NO
BEVERLY DUQUETTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting summary disposition for defendant in
this defamation case. We affirm.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining that there was not a question of
fact as to whether a letter written by defendant, wherein defendant stated she believed plaintiffs
engaged in theft, constituted actionable defamation. We disagree. We review a trial court’s
grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation,
456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). A motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if there is no genuine issue of
material fact, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Morales, supra.
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All parties in this case have, at different times, been officers of the Dearborn Federation
of School Employees (DFSE) labor union. In December 1998, during an election campaign
period, defendant drafted a letter addressed to the members of the DFSE. The following portion
is at issue in the instant case:
When I became President, I was appalled to find that Rodger Bartles consistently
released the Recording Secretary, Cyndy Edwards, for her entire shift for every
meeting. Besides the monthly General Membership meetings, the Executive
Board meets twice a month. In fact, for the last election our dues paid Cyndy’s
wages for her to campaign for five hours. This to me, is blatant theft of our
dues monies. All the other candidates who campaigned took personal business
time to do so. This is not an allegation – this is fact – I have the release time bill
from the Administration to prove this. (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s accusation of theft constituted defamation per se and was a false
statement not subject to any privilege. Defendant claims that the letter was solely intended to
educate DFSE members prior to an election and was based on accurate information. According
to defendant, the phrase: “This to me, is blatant theft of our dues monies,” referred to the waste
of union resources and was not intended to allege that plaintiffs committed an actual crime.
“A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower an individual's reputation in the
community or deters third persons from associating or dealing with that individual.” Ireland v
Edwards, 230 Mich App 607, 614; 584 NW2d 632 (1998); see Kevorkian v American Medical
Ass’n, 237 Mich App 1, 5; 602 NW2d 233 (1999).
[A] plaintiff can establish a defamation claim by showing: (1) a false and
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication to a
third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher,
and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm
(defamation per se) or the existence of special harm (defamation per quod).
[Ireland, supra.]
When addressing a defamation claim, a court must examine the record to ensure against
forbidden intrusions into the right of free expression. Kevorkian, supra at 5. Not all defamatory
statements are actionable. Id.; Ireland, supra. To be actionable, a defamatory statement must be
provable as false, and must state actual facts about the plaintiff. Kevorkian, supra at 5-6;
Ireland, supra. Direct accusations or inferences of criminal conduct are actionable as
defamatory. Kevorkian, supra at 8. However, opinions are actionable only in the circumstance
that the statement asserts an objectively verifiable event. Id. at 6. Furthermore, those statements
that are capable of defamatory interpretation, but are merely rhetorical hyperbole, are not
actionable. Id. at 7-8.
In the present case, plaintiffs were former union officers who were again seeking election
to officer positions. Thus, we consider plaintiffs limited purpose public figures for purposes of
this controversy. Lins v Evening News Ass'n, 129 Mich App 419, 432; 342 NW2d 573 (1983).
As limited purpose public figures, plaintiffs are required to show by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant’s statement constituted a defamatory falsehood and that it was made
with “actual malice” through knowledge of its falsity or through reckless disregard for the truth.
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MCL 600.2911(6); Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 624; 617 NW2d 351 (2000).
“General allegations that privileged statements were false and malicious are insufficient to create
genuine issue of fact regarding whether a person published a statement with actual malice. Id.,
citing Reed v Michigan Metro Girl Scout Council, 201 Mich App 10, 13-14; 506 NW2d 231
(1993). A mere inference that a defendant acted with malice is insufficient to prove defamation.
Kefgen, supra at 631. “[I]ll will, spite or even hatred, standing alone, do not amount to actual
malice.” Id. at 632, quoting Ireland, supra at 622. “In determining whether a defendant acted
with actual malice, the question is not whether a prudent person would have published or would
have investigated before publishing, but instead is whether the publisher entertained serious
doubts regarding the truth of the statements published.” Kefgen, supra at 627.
We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition on the basis that
plaintiffs have not shown defendant acted with actual malice. It is undisputed that plaintiffs used
the release-time system that defendant referred to in her letter. Thus, the general basis of the
challenged paragraph of the letter was true. Moreover, defendant’s use of the phrase: “This to
me” prior to her reference to plaintiffs’ “blatant theft” indicates an expression of personal
opinion, rather than fact. When the challenged statement is read in context with the entire letter,
see Ireland, supra at 617, it is evident that defendant was expressing her subjective opinion that
plaintiff Edwards did not need to attend every union meeting or, at least, did not deserve to be
released from her shift during the meetings and, therefore, plaintiffs’ conduct constituted a waste
of union dues. Further, because reckless disregard cannot be shown through mere demonstration
of ill will, Kefgen, supra at 632, the evidence of the phone message defendant allegedly left with
plaintiff Edwards is of no consequence.
Plaintiffs last argue that the defamatory statement cannot be protected based on plaintiffs’
status as limited purpose public figures because defendant waived any privilege through
excessive publication of the letter. See Timmis v Bennett, 352 Mich 355, 371-372; 89 NW2d 748
(1958). We disagree. Plaintiffs’ evidence of a single instance of the letter being posted where
non-union members might see the letter is insufficient to establish a question of fact as to
whether the publication was excessive and operated to waive the qualified privilege.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
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