ANDERSONS INC V CHAD CROTSER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANDERSONS, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 226095
St. Joseph Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000646-CK
CHAD CROTSER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, a grain farmer, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting plaintiff
grain purchaser’s motion for summary disposition with respect to its complaint seeking an order
compelling defendant to arbitrate a dispute. We affirm.
This case involves two separate contracts between plaintiff and defendant that obligated
defendant to deliver a total of 14,000 bushels of corn. Plaintiff’s agent, William Beier,
negotiated the contracts’ essential terms via telephone with Robert Fisher, defendant’s agent.
Shortly after each contract’s telephone negotiation, plaintiff mailed defendant confirmations of
the parties’ agreements, which confirmations contained additional terms that the parties had not
discussed, including that any contract-related disputes must be arbitrated before the National
Grain and Feed Association. At plaintiff’s urging, Rex Crotser, defendant’s father, signed these
confirmations on defendant’s behalf.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the enforceability of the
arbitration provisions within plaintiffs’ confirmation forms. We review de novo the trial court’s
summary disposition ruling. In reviewing a motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10),1 we consider
the pleadings and all relevant documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant trial, or whether
1
We note that because the trial court apparently considered evidence beyond the parties’
pleadings, the trial court incorrectly cited subrule (C)(8), in addition to subrule (C)(10), in its
order granting plaintiff summary disposition. Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526
NW2d 879 (1994).
-1-
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456
Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Defendant argues that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether (1) Fisher
had authority to make representations to Beier that would bind defendant, (2) defendant’s father
had authority to sign the confirmations on defendant’s behalf, and (3) defendant’s father signed
the confirmations under duress.
Defendant suggests that neither Fisher nor his father had authority to act on his behalf
because he “never expressly or even impliedly communicated to [plaintiff] that anyone else had
authority to sign contracts for him,” and thus the purported agents’ acts alone could not have
established their apparent authority to act on defendant’s behalf. An agency relationship may
arise where there is a manifestation by the principal that the agent may act on the principal’s
behalf. Where no actual agency exists, a principal may be bound by the actions of an agent under
the doctrine of apparent authority. Apparent authority arises where the acts of the purported
agent lead a third party to reasonably believe that an agency relationship exists. However,
apparent authority must be traced to the principal and cannot be established only through the acts
of the agent. Stokes v Millen Roofing Co, 245 Mich App 44, 61; 627 NW2d 16 (2001).
After reviewing the record, we find that undisputed facts established that both Fisher and
defendant’s father had at least apparent authority to contract on defendant’s behalf. Regarding
Fisher’s authority to act for defendant, both defendant and his father testified that at the time the
instant contracts were entered Fisher routinely negotiated with plaintiff for both of them.
Defendant’s father paid Fisher for his services, and neither defendant nor his father ever disputed
Fisher’s authority to negotiate contracts for the sale of their crops. Fisher’s authority is further
evidenced by the facts that his name appears on the confirmations as the individual who
negotiated with Beier, and by Beier’s recollection that he regularly dealt with Fisher when
negotiating contracts involving defendant and his father. We simply find no evidence
whatsoever tending to establish that Fisher lacked the actual, or at least apparent, authority to
negotiate with Beier on defendant’s behalf.
Regarding defendant’s father’s authority to act for defendant, in addition to the two
confirmations at issue in this case, defendant’s father signed a third confirmation of a separate
contract between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant fully performed under this third contract,
the confirmation of which was dated only three days after the confirmation of the second contract
involved in the instant dispute. Defendant also made a partial delivery of corn pursuant to one of
the instant contracts, never questioning its enforceability on the basis of his father’s confirmation
signature, only indicating to Beier that defendant had insufficient production. Even after his
father signed the confirmations of the two instant contracts, defendant obtained plaintiff’s
agreement to certain amendments of the contracts, but never took this opportunity to object to his
father having signed the confirmations for him. Furthermore, Beier understood that defendant
and his father had a marketing partnership.2 Defendant and his father confirmed that they both
2
Beier averred in his affidavit that “[d]uring the crop year in question, Rex Crotser’s grain
represented 90%, and Chad Crotser’s grain represented 10%, of the total amount marketed by
Robert Fisher for the Crotsers.” The instant disputed contracts between plaintiff and defendant
(continued…)
-2-
discussed with Fisher the marketing of their crops, and that Fisher negotiated crop sales for both
of them. Defendant’s father paid Fisher for his services, while defendant in exchange performed
various farm-related tasks for his father. Defendant and his father shared machinery and a
business address, and at the time the parties entered the instant contracts defendant lived at home
with his father. While defendant’s father now asserts that he lacked authority to sign the
confirmations, the record indicates that at no time did defendant’s father notify plaintiff that he
lacked this authority. Given these undisputed facts, we conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff
reasonably believed that an agency relationship existed between defendant and his father.
Defendant next argues that his father’s confirmation signatures were obtained by duress
because plaintiff threatened to cease conducting business with defendant and his family unless
someone signed the confirmations.3 Even accepting defendant’s characterization of plaintiff’s
threats, defendant’s claim of duress fails as a matter of law because absolutely no indication
exists that plaintiff acted illegally in urging defendant’s father to sign the confirmations. Farm
Credit Services of Michigan’s Heartland, PCA v Weldon, 232 Mich App 662, 681-682; 591
NW2d 438 (1998) (holding that “[b]ecause defendants have not alleged that plaintiff acted
illegally, their claim of duress is meritless,” and explaining that “[f]ear of financial ruin alone is
insufficient to establish economic duress”).
We conclude that because unrebutted evidence demonstrated that defendant’s father’s
confirmation signatures manifested defendant’s acceptance of the additional arbitration terms
contained therein, the trial court properly granted plaintiff summary disposition pursuant to
subrule (C)(10) regarding plaintiff’s demand for arbitration.4
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
(…continued)
reflected this arrangement; defendant pledged to deliver quantities of corn representing ten
percent of the total amounts involved in the contracts between plaintiff and defendant and
contemporaneously executed agreements between plaintiff and defendant’s father.
3
To the extent that defendant repeatedly claims in his brief on appeal that plaintiff threatened to
breach its existing contracts with defendant absent signatures on the confirmations, we note that
this argument has absolutely no support in the trial court record.
4
In light of our conclusion, we need not address defendant’s improperly presented arguments
challenging the alternate basis for the trial court’s decision, MCL 440.2207. See Hilliard v
Schmidt, 231 Mich App 316, 318; 586 NW2d 263 (1998) (finding review of an issue
inappropriate because the plaintiff failed to raise the issue in her statement of questions
presented), overruled in part on other grounds in Molloy v Molloy, ___ Mich App ___; ___
NW2d ___ (Docket No. 224179, issued September 4, 2001).
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.