PEOPLE OF MI V WAYNE MORRIS WALLACE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222159
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007791
WAYNE MORRIS WALLACE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wilder and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction for second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender,
MCL 769.10, to eight to seventeen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing defense
counsel’s request to re-question a prospective juror during voir dire whose wife had been
sexually abused as a child. Defendant claims that this limitation in the scope of voir dire denied
him due process and a fair trial because defendant was being tried for sexually assaulting a child
of similar age. We disagree. The scope of voir dire examination is within the discretion of the
trial court and will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. People v
Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 666; 482 NW2d 176 (1992).
During jury selection, defendant’s counsel questioned a prospective juror and passed him
for cause. Subsequently, the prosecution examined the same juror, who revealed that his wife
had been the victim of a sexual assault when she was between the ages of ten and twelve.
Thereafter, the prosecutor also passed for cause. Before defense counsel began questioning the
next group of jurors, defendant requested to re-visit the previous juror based on his answer to the
prosecutor’s question. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request because he had already
passed on the juror. Defense counsel ultimately used the remainder of his peremptory challenges
on other jurors. The juror in question remained on the panel.
A defendant has the right to a fair and impartial jury. The purpose of voir dire is “to elicit
sufficient information from prospective jurors to enable the trial court and counsel to determine
who should be disqualified from service on the basis of an inability to render decisions
impartially.” People v Sawyer, 215 Mich App 183, 186; 545 NW2d 6 (1996). However, there
are no hard and fast rules regarding what constitutes acceptable voir dire; rather, the trial court is
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granted wide discretion in both the scope and conduct of voir dire. Id. at 186-187. When
reviewing the scope and conduct of voir dire, “this Court must determine whether the trial court
conducted a voir dire ‘sufficiently probing . . . to uncover potential juror bias.’” Id. at 187
(citations omitted). Furthermore, the “trial court may not restrict voir dire in a manner that
prevents the development of a factual basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges.” People v
Tyburski, 196 Mich App 576, 581; 494 NW2d 20 (1992) (citations omitted).
The instant voir dire was sufficient to serve its constitutional purpose. The scope of the
voir dire was not so limited as to prevent defense counsel from determining whether the juror
should be excused due to an inability to render an impartial decision. The juror, in fact, stated
that nothing in his experience or the nature of the charges against defendant would prevent him
giving defendant a fair trial. The trial court’s restriction on additional voir dire of the juror did
not deny defendant a fair trial.
Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that the trial court improperly called and
questioned a witness, thereby bolstering the credibility of the prosecution’s DNA evidence and
violating defendant’s right to a fair and impartial judge. We agree but find that the error was
harmless. “A trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion and power in the matter of trial
conduct.” People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
A trial court may call and question witnesses in order to clarify or elicit additional
relevant information. MRE 614 (a) and (b); People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1
(1996) (citations omitted). However, “[t]he principle limitation on a court’s discretion over
matters of trial conduct is that its actions not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality.” Id. A trial
court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality when its conduct unduly influences the
jury and deprives the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. Paquette, supra at 340. When
questioning witnesses, the trial court must use caution and restraint to ensure that its questions
are not prejudicial or partial. Davis, supra at 50.
In this case, after the prosecution rested its case, the trial court called Paula Lytle, the
senior and supervising serologist with the Detroit Police Department Forensic Services Division,
to the witness stand. The trial court called Ms. Lytle to provide additional background
information regarding the forensic evidence presented and to demonstrate the accuracy of her
department’s work. We believe such questions by the trial judge, in the presence of the jury,
could only be interpreted as bolstering the plaintiff’s evidence. Thus, we find that the trial court
crossed the line of judicial impartiality.
When a trial court’s questions exhibit partiality, this Court applies the harmless error
analysis. Davis, supra at 51. In the instant case, defendant did not contest the presence of his
semen in the victim’s clothing. Rather, defendant claimed that it was from a “wet dream” that
defendant had while he was sleeping next to the victim. Consequently, any error on the part of
the trial judge in questioning Ms. Lytle about the accuracy of her department’s DNA reports was
harmless.
Lastly, defendant purports that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his
trial counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s cross-examination of defendant regarding
privileged statements defendant allegedly made to his wife. We disagree.
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To fully preserve the issue of effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must move for
an evidentiary hearing or a new trial before the trial court. People v Sabin, 242 Mich App 656,
658; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). In this case, defendant’s motion for a new trial before the lower
court was denied. Therefore, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the
existing record. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 507; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove: (1) that his
counsel’s performance was so deficient that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and he must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was not sound trial
strategy; and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced him to the extent that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v Carbin, 463
Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Defense counsel's performance must be measured
against an objective standard of reasonableness. People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 331;
614 NW2d 647 (2000). Moreover, “[t]his Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel's competence with the
benefit of hindsight.” People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001).
Defendant argues that the statements were privileged and that defense counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to their admission. The marital communication
privilege “bars one spouse from testifying ‘as to any communications made by one to the other
during the marriage’ without the consent of the other.” People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 682;
625 NW2d 46 (2000), quoting People v Hamacher, 432 Mich 157, 162; 438 NW2d 43 (1989).
This privilege extends to cross-examination of a defendant regarding statements he may have
made to a spouse. People v Salisbury, 218 Mich 529, 535; 188 NW 340 (1922). Thus,
defendant’s statements to his wife during their marriage were privileged and improper questions
on cross-examination.
Nonetheless, a review of the record convinces this Court that defense counsel’s failure to
object to this line of questioning did not deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel’s conduct so prejudiced him that, but for
counsel’s error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. In fact, defendant testified
that he could not recall the communication with his wife. Moreover, the evidence against
defendant was overwhelming. Consequently, we find that the prosecution’s improper questions
had no affect on the trial’s outcome.
Furthermore, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s
conduct was sound trial strategy. This Court will not second guess counsel regarding trial
strategy. Accordingly, defendant failed to overcome the presumption that he received effective
assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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