JUDITH SABLES V SENTRY LIFE INSUR COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDITH SABLES, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of RONALD J.
SABLES, M.D., Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross Appellant,
v
No. 227039
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000577-CK
SENTRY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
and AMA INSURANCE AGENCY,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross
Appellees.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and R. S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right an order granting plaintiff summary disposition of her
breach of contract claim. Plaintiff cross-appeals an order granting summary disposition of her
misrepresentation claim in favor of defendants. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
At the time the decedent was diagnosed with pseudomyxoma peritonea in June 1996, he
was a practicing physician insured by and through defendants under a policy that provided
monthly disability income. The decedent applied for monthly disability benefits in July 1996,
which he received from September 1996 until his death on January 1, 1997. The policy also
contained an accelerated benefit amendatory rider that provided for one payment of an amount
equal to twelve times the monthly payment upon receipt of proof that the insured suffered a
terminal condition. In March 1997, plaintiff filed a claim for accelerated benefits under this
rider. Along with her claim, plaintiff provided one letter stating that the decedent had suffered
from a terminal condition. Defendants denied her claim because it was untimely and because
two physicians’ statements of terminal condition did not accompany the claim. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in plaintiff’s
favor on her breach of contract claim because the policy was unambiguous and plaintiff did not
comply with the policy requirements. We agree. The trial court’s ruling on a motion for
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446,
454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Construction and interpretation of an insurance contract are issues of
law reviewed de novo on appeal. Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460 Mich 348,
353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999).
Defendants primarily argue that the disability policy terminated upon the decedent’s
death; therefore, the accelerated benefit rider was not in force at the time proof of the decedent’s
terminal condition was submitted. We agree. An insurance policy is a contract that should be
read as a whole to determine what the parties’ intended to agree on. Auto-Owners Ins Co v
Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 566; 489 NW2d 431 (1992). We examine the language of the
applicable insurance policy and interpret its terms in accordance with well-established principles
of construction. See Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 111; 595 NW2d 832
(1999). If there is a conflict between the terms of a rider and the form provisions of an insurance
contract, the language of the rider controls. See Royce v Citizens Ins Co, 219 Mich App 537,
544; 557 NW2d 144 (1996); Morbark Industries, Inc v Western Employers Ins Co, 170 Mich
App 603, 613; 429 NW2d 213 (1988).
The accelerated benefit amendatory rider was the operative provision under which
plaintiff submitted her claim and provided, in pertinent part:
Sentry will pay an Accelerated Benefit subject to the terms of this rider when we
receive Proof of the Terminal Condition of the Insured. The Insured does not
have to satisfy the Elimination Period to receive an Accelerated Benefit.
The Accelerated Benefit amount is equal to twelve (12) times the Monthly
Indemnity amount applicable to the Insured at the time we receive Proof of the
Terminal Condition.
No other benefit provided by the policy will accrue or be payable during this
twelve (12) month period if the Insured elects this benefit.
Definitions
A Terminal Condition is a sickness and/or injury which, in the opinion of
two Physicians, will result in death within twelve (12) months and for
which there is no treatment available that will extend life. This rider must
be in force on the date Proof of Terminal Condition is certified.
Proof of the Terminal Condition is satisfactory written certification by two
Physicians that the Insured will not live more than twelve (12) months.
Proof of the Terminal Condition must be based on all clinical,
radiological, histological and laboratory evidence of the diagnosed
condition. We may require additional tests and that the Insured be
examined by a Physician of our choice, at our expense.
The rider provision clearly required the claim for accelerated benefits to be submitted
while the insured was alive. First, this was a rider to a disability policy, not a life insurance
policy. See Parrish v Paul Revere Life Ins Co, 103 Mich App 95; 302 NW2d 332 (1981).
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Second, the plain language, including the use of present and future tense terms, reveals the
intention that the insured be alive when a claim is filed. Third, with regard to the proof of
terminal condition definition, Sentry reserved the right to require additional testing and
examination of the insured. Fourth, the benefit amount was to be twelve times the “amount
applicable to the Insured at the time we receive Proof of the Terminal Condition.” Plaintiff
submitted proof of the terminal condition after the decedent died, consequently, the “amount
applicable to the Insured” was zero. Fifth, included under the definition of “terminal condition”
was a requirement that the rider be in force on the date the proof of terminal condition was
certified. Because of decedent’s death, neither the rider nor the policy were in force when
plaintiff submitted the claim. An insurance contract is not ambiguous if it fairly admits of only
one interpretation. Matakas v Citizens Mut Ins Co, 202 Mich App 642, 650; 509 NW2d 898
(1993). This amendatory rider is unambiguous and reveals the clear intent to provide for benefits
during the insured’s life, not after his death. Consequently, plaintiff could not have been led to a
reasonable expectation of receiving accelerated benefits after the decedent’s death, unless the
claim had been filed prior to his death. See Vanguard Ins Co v Clarke, 438 Mich 463, 472; 475
NW2d 48 (1991).
The trial court’s reliance on the “payment of claims” and “proofs of loss” provisions of
the general policy was misplaced, as discussed above. Further, there were no “accrued
indemnities unpaid at the Insured’s death” as referenced by the payment provision because a
claim for accelerated benefits had not been made prior to the insured’s death. Additionally,
plaintiff’s claim was not a “claim for loss for which the policy provides any periodic payment”
as required by the loss provision. Rather, plaintiff filed a claim for a single payment under the
accelerated benefits rider. In sum, plaintiff’s claim for accelerated benefits was properly denied
and the trial court erred in granting plaintiff summary disposition on her breach of contract
claim.
On cross-appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her
misrepresentation claim. We disagree. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud,
innocent misrepresentation, or silent fraud because she failed to submit proof of any false or
misleading representation. See, generally, M & D, Inc v W B McConkey, 231 Mich App 22; 585
NW2d 33 (1998). Plaintiff primarily argues that defendants’ failure to disclose the accelerated
benefit claim procedure constituted silent fraud because defendants were allegedly aware of the
decedent’s terminal condition. However, plaintiff did not prove that some form of representation
was made under circumstances that gave rise to a legal duty of disclosure. See Hord v
Environmental Research Institute of Michigan (After Remand), 463 Mich 399, 412-413; 617
NW2d 543 (2000); M & D, Inc, supra at 29. Similarly, plaintiff did not prove that defendants
knew that the decedent had a terminal condition that would result in death within twelve months
of his claim for disability benefits. Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s
misrepresentation claim.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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