PEOPLE OF MI V SEAN DEDRIC RODEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226145
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 99-002448-FC
SEAN DEDRIC RODEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration with a person under the age of thirteen). The trial court
sentenced him as a second felony offender, MCL 769.10, to two concurrent 30 to 60 year prison
terms. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the testimony of a
forensic scientist, who had conducted a DNA analysis and found that defendant’s DNA matched
the DNA of the sperm cells taken from the victim’s body, that a statistical analysis revealed that
the likelihood of another Caucasian having the same DNA profile as defendant was one in two
hundred trillion. More specifically, defendant contends that DNA identification “is nothing more
than speculation when the numbers used to support an ostensible statistical analysis are not only
without context but, quite literally, out of this world.” Reviewing this unpreserved issue for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, we disagree. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763;
597 NW2d 130 (1999).
When a party presents DNA evidence at trial, that party is required to supplement that
evidence with a statistical analysis indicating the significance of a DNA match. People v Coy,
243 Mich App 283, 301-302; 620 NW2d 888 (2000). In Coy, this Court explained the need for
statistical analysis, quoting with approval the language in Nelson v State, 628 A2d 69, 75-76
(Del, 1993) (citations omitted):
“DNA typing produces two distinct, but interrelated, items of information: 1)
whether a match exists between the samples; and 2) if a match exists, the ratio
expressing the statistical likelihood that ‘the crime scene samples came from a
third party who had the same DNA pattern as the suspect.’ The latter correlation
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is necessary because, even though two human genomes may vary at approximately
three million sites, the DNA typing analysis currently employed examines only a
few sites for variation in the DNA sequence. The theory is that, besides identical
twins, no two individuals will have entire DNA sequences which are identical.
The DNA prints which result from the current FBI procedure may not be unique
since the entire DNA molecule is not analyzed. Since two unrelated individuals
may have identical DNA patterns from the fragments examined in a particular
analysis, the potential exists for a match to be mistakenly found. For this reason,
statistical interpretation regarding the probability of a coincidental match or the
likelihood that two unrelated individuals have the same DNA type is necessary.”
[Coy, supra at 295.]
Thus, because a match found using a polymerase chain reaction test1 might not necessarily
narrow the perpetrator down to the defendant where that particular DNA pattern is common,
statistical analysis is necessary to determine how likely it is that an individual other than the
defendant has the same DNA pattern.
Here, plaintiff complied with the requirement set forth in Coy by having an expert witness
testify concerning the uniqueness of defendant’s DNA pattern according to the statistical analysis
she performed. Although defendant questions the scientific validity of an analysis that would
produce such a large number that is “out of this world”, defendant correctly concedes in his
appellate brief that questions going to the accuracy or validity of the statistical method employed
do not affect the admissibility of the DNA evidence but rather the weight a jury may place on that
evidence. People v Adams, 195 Mich App 267, 279; 489 NW2d 192 (1992), modified on other
grounds 441 Mich 916 (1993); see also People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 591; 569 NW2d
663 (1997) (any challenge to the statistical evidence is relevant to the weight of the evidence and
not to its admissibility). Thus, even if the method by which the forensic scientist arrived at this
number were somehow improper, this factor would not render the resulting number of “200.8
trillion” inadmissible.
Defendant also argues that the statistical evidence resulted in unfair prejudice because it
caused the jury to convict defendant based on his extremely rare DNA pattern. Generally,
relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995),
modified on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
“Unfair prejudice” does not mean “damaging.” Any relevant testimony
will be damaging to some extent. We believe that the notion of “unfair prejudice”
encompasses two concepts. First, the idea of prejudice denotes a situation in
which there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given
undue or pre-emptive weight by the jury. In other words, where a probability
exists that evidence which is minimally damaging in logic will be weighed by the
1
This Court has recognized that the polymerase chain reaction testing method is generally
accepted within the scientific community. Coy, supra at 291-292.
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jurors substantially out of proportion to its logically damaging effect, a situation
arises in which the danger of “prejudice” exists. Second, the idea of unfairness
embodies the further proposition that it would be inequitable to allow the
proponent of the evidence to use it. [Mills, supra at 75-76, quoting Sclafani v
Peter S Cusimano, Inc, 130 Mich App 728, 735-736; 344 NW2d 347 (1983)
(citation omitted).]
Here, the evidence presented at trial was not merely “marginally probative.” To the
contrary, the evidence is highly probative of defendant’s guilt because it revealed the significance
of the match between the DNA in defendant’s blood sample and the DNA in the sperm cells
taken from the victim’s body. The evidence tends to establish that the sperm cells found on the
victim’s body could have come only from defendant.
Furthermore, we find nothing inequitable or unfair in allowing plaintiff to use this
evidence at trial. As noted above, we require DNA identification testing to be accompanied by a
statistical analysis explaining the significance of the match. Coy, supra at 301-302. Thus,
defendant should have expected testimony concerning the statistical significance of the DNA
match at trial. Moreover, defendant has provided no authority for the proposition that where a
statistical analysis reveals a very high number like that revealed in the present case, the evidence
is no longer admissible. We will not search for authority to support defendant’s position.
Leonard, supra at 588. Given the fact that we require the use of statistical evidence to explain
DNA evidence, its use in the present case can hardly be said to be unfair. Defendant has not
established outcome-determinative plain error. Carines, supra.
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed
to object to the introduction of this statistical evidence. However, because the evidence was
properly admitted, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to its admission. People
v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 424-425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (“Trial counsel is not required to
advocate a meritless position.”).
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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