ORVILLE J HOLMES V JOHNATHON R ALTHOUSE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ORVILLE J. HOLMES and LEE ANN HOLMES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellants,
v
No. 222056
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000050-CH
JOHNATHON R. ALTHOUSE and LORI A.
ALTHOUSE,
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellees.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs/counterdefendants (hereinafter plaintiffs) appeal as of right from the trial
court’s order granting defendants/counterplaintiffs’ (hereinafter defendants) motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
In 1938, property was sold to the Holmes family. The deed of sale indicated that four
acres were expressly exempted from the sale. In 1968, the property transferred within the
family; a transaction established by a quitclaim deed. This deed continued to exempt the same
four acres. On March 4, 1992, a personal representatives’ deed transferred the property within
the family to plaintiffs. This deed also exempted the four acre property in dispute in this
litigation. A survey of the land occurred in anticipation of this transfer, and it did not include the
property in dispute. Plaintiffs did not object to the description contained in the language of the
deed or the results of the survey.
The disputed property was part of a three hundred acre farm owned by the Clough family
since 1935. Edward Clough purchased the four acre parcel in dispute in 1976 from his father,
Howard Clough. Edward Clough acknowledged that a fence had been placed on a portion of the
four acre parcel in the 1950s, but the fence did not represent a property line. Furthermore, the
fencing was not maintained and had been in a state of disrepair for at least thirty years. In 1991,
a survey of the property occurred, and the stakes placed on the property did not recognize the
fencing as the true boundary line. In 1992, in anticipation of the sale of the property, a second
survey occurred that corresponded to the 1991 survey. On May 15, 1992, a warranty deed
transferred the disputed property from Edward and Catherine Clough to defendants.
-1-
Shortly after defendants purchased their property, plaintiffs allegedly advised defendants
that the lane of travel needed to be blocked to prevent individuals from dumping trash in the
back area of the property. Plaintiffs did not assert a claim to the disputed property at that time.
In 1998, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking title to the disputed property through adverse
possession or acquiescence. Defendants alleged that they discovered the dilapidated fence after
tripping over it. Defendants alleged that after they began efforts to remove the fencing, plaintiffs
objected to their ownership and filed this litigation.
Defendants moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s complaint, alleging that
plaintiffs could not satisfy the elements of adverse possession or acquiescence and that estoppel
precluded plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs alleged that the boundary line had been established. They
acknowledged that the predecessors in title to the disputed property were unavailable to testify
regarding any acquiescence to the boundary line. However, plaintiffs presented affidavits of
individuals who allegedly were told that the predecessors in title recognized the boundary line as
the fence line. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The trial
court held that plaintiffs could not satisfy the elements of adverse possession or acquiescence.
The trial court also noted that an unjust result would occur when evidence of the understanding
by the original parties regarding the boundary line was unavailable.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of their
adverse possession claim. We disagree. Our review of a summary disposition decision is de
novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Irrespective
of whether plaintiffs can demonstrate all the elements of a claim of adverse possession, the
failure to include the disputed property in the deed of transfer precludes plaintiffs’ adverse
possession claim. In Sheldon v Michigan Central Railroad Co, 161 Mich 503, 510-511; 126 NW
1056 (1910), our Supreme Court held:
It seems to be undoubted that separate successive disseisins1 cannot be tacked so
as to constitute one and a single continuous possession, unless there is privity of
estate between the successive parties in possession, each coming in as the
transferee of the possessory rights of his predecessor.
It seems to us to be very clear that the complainant cannot rely upon his
deed to show privity of estate, because the disputed premises are not mentioned in
the deed. Where the grantee relies upon the deed to show privity of estate, he
cannot have the benefit of the grantor’s possession of lands which are not
mentioned in the deed. The general rule is that possession cannot be tacked to
make out title by prescription where the deed under which the last occupant
claims title does not include the land in dispute. It must clearly appear in the deed
that the particular premises were embraced in the deed, or transfer, in whatever
form it may have been made. [Citations omitted.]
1
“Disseisin occurs when the true owner is deprived of possession or displaced by someone
exercising the powers and privileges of ownership.” Kipka v Fountain, 198 Mich App 435, 439;
499 NW2d 363 (1993) citing Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.), pp 558-559.
-2-
In the present case, plaintiffs purchased their property in 1992. The plaintiffs received a deed
that excluded the property owned by defendants. Additionally, the survey that occurred at
plaintiffs’ request did not include the disputed property. Defendants’ purchase, also in 1992, did
not reveal any encumbrance or title claim by plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest.
Consequently, defendants were unaware of plaintiffs’ claim at the time of purchase. In fact,
plaintiffs waited until 1998 to file a complaint requesting title to the property based on adverse
possession and acquiescence. The doctrine of adverse possession will not occur in this instance
when the alleged entitlement to the property was not included in the deed of sale and plaintiffs
rely on their predecessors’ period of occupancy. Sheldon, supra. In Hanlon v Ten Hove, 235
Mich 227, 229-230; 209 NW 169 (1926), our Supreme Court acknowledged the rule set forth in
Sheldon:
While the members of this court have not always been in accord on the question, a
majority of the court has consistently held that where a grantor conveys a specific
piece of property, the grantee may not tack on to the period of his holding of an
additional piece of property the period of his grantor’s occupancy thereof to make
up the statutory period. His grantor has not conveyed such property or his interest
therein and there is no privity. Illustrative of such cases, see Sheldon v. Railroad
Co., 161 Mich. 503 [126 NW 1056 (1910)]; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Sterling,
189 Mich. 366 [155 NW 383 (1915)]; Wilhelm v. Herron, 211 Mich. 339 [178
NW 769 (1920)]; Robertson v. Boylan, 214 Mich. 27 [181 NW 989 (1921)];
Bunde v. Finley, 224 Mich. 634 [195 NW 425 (1923)]. The rule of these cases is
not a harsh rule. If “A” purchases and holds the record title to 40 acres of land
and by adverse possession obtains title to an adjoining 40 acres, it would hardly
be contended that a conveyance by him of the 40 acquired by deed would carry
with it title to the 40 acquired by adverse possession. So if “A” acquires by deed
a 40 acres and obtains an adjoining strip 2 rods wide or some interest in it, his
conveyance of the 40 acquired by deed does not carry with it his interest in the
adjoining strip.
Pursuant to Hanlon, supra, plaintiffs’ predecessors in title were obligated to quiet title and
include the property acquired by adverse possession in the deed of transfer. The statute of
frauds, MCL 566.108, provides that contracts for the sale of land, other than one year leases,
must be in writing. The purpose of this rule is to prevent fraud or the opportunity for fraud.
Hunter v Slater, 331 Mich 1, 7; 49 NW2d 33 (1951), quoting Cramer v Ballard, 315 Mich 496;
24 NW2d 80 (1946). In the present case, plaintiffs seek to enforce property rights not based on
the deed of sale, but based on acts and intentions of individuals who are unavailable to testify to
the occurrences in the 1940s and 1950s. Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the statute of frauds in this
manner. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition of the adverse possession claim.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of their
acquiescence claim. We disagree. Our review of this issue is de novo. Spiek, supra. Based on
the principle of equitable estoppel, plaintiffs are precluded from obtaining title to this property
through the doctrine of acquiescence. Pyne v Elliott, 53 Mich App 419, 430; 220 NW2d 54
(1974). In Pyne, a survey error occurred in the 1940s. The defendants were aware of the survey
error as early as 1950. Despite the knowledge of the error, the defendants failed to act for
-3-
twenty-two years to correct the error. The trial court divided the contested property between the
parties. On appeal, this Court reversed and stated:
If the Elliotts had any right to any part of the south one-half of
Government Lot 4, they slept on their rights and cannot equitably be allowed to
enforce them now. The defendant Elliott himself concedes that he knew about the
surveying error in 1950. This admission is confirmed by the testimony of a
disinterested witness. The defendants also make this concession in their brief and
it was so found by the trial court.
Although aware of the surveying error, the defendants did absolutely
nothing to protect innocent future purchasers, such as the plaintiffs in this case.
Having allowed this condition to arise and to continue, the defendants Elliott
should be barred from asserting any claim to the disputed property. McGee v
Eriksen, 51 Mich App 551; 215 NW2d 571 (1974).
Under the general principle of equitable estoppel, the defendants should be
allowed to achieve no advantage. The defendants knew that the Tackaberrys were
buying this land for commercial development, since it was surveyed for all the
land owners under a joint agreement when they had the land platted. The
defendants did nothing to correct the erroneous boundary lines and should be
estopped from establishing any different boundary lines now. Cleveland-Cliffs
Iron Company v Gauthier, 143 Mich 296, 298, 299; 106 NW 862 (1906). Also
see Snider v Schaffer, 276 Mich 92, 100; 267 NW 791 (1936), and Burrell v
Brugger, 1 Mich App 486, 488; 136 NW2d 730 (1965).
The defendants knew about the erroneous surveys from at least 1950; they
did nothing to correct the error or to assert any claim to the disputed land until
July 11, 1969. This is longer than the 15-year limitation fixed by law, and laches
can be applied. Lowry v Lyle, 226 Mich 676, 684; 198 NW 245 (1924). [Id. at
430-431.]
Likewise, in the present case, plaintiffs are estopped from claiming the property in dispute.
Plaintiffs allege that the boundary line was established in the late 1930s and ran for the fifteen
year statutory period. See MCL 600.5801(4). However, following the completion of the
statutory period, plaintiffs’ predecessors in title failed to file an action to quiet title to the land.
Additionally, the acts that allegedly led to the acquisition of the property were not maintained.
Specifically, plaintiffs and their predecessors in title failed to maintain the land or the fence such
that defendants would have been on notice of any claim to the disputed property. Based on
estoppel, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Pyne,
supra.
The Pyne decision may not be “on all fours” with the facts presented in this case.
However, if parties could only obtain relief based on precedent involving exactly the same
factual scenario, the appellate process would not serve the public interest or needs. “If relief had
been granted only where precedent could be found for it, this great system would never have
been developed; and, if such a narrow view of equitable powers is adopted now, the result will
be the return of the rigid and unyielding system which equity jurisprudence was designed to
-4-
remedy.” Spoon-Shacket Co, Inc v Oakland Co, 356 Mich 151, 163; 97 NW2d 25 (1959), citing
Bowen v Hockley, 71 F2d 781, 786; 94 ALR 856 (CA 4, 1934). Furthermore, where relief is
equitable in nature and not of legal cognizance, the remedy is of a purely equitable nature that
follows its own rules. Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 170; 324 NW2d 9 (1982).
In the present case, a survey prepared at plaintiffs’ request did not include the disputed
property. Defendants, in preparing for the purchase, also had a survey prepared that did not
reveal any encumbrance. Defendants purchased the property, and plaintiffs remained silent
regarding any interest in the property. Thus, traditional protections such as a writing to reflect a
land purchase, a survey, and a title search did not reveal any encumbrance on the property for
defendants, innocent purchasers. The dissent, however, would seem to impose an additional
requirement upon all real estate purchases. That is, to protect an interest in land from a belated
claim of adverse possession or acquiescence, a real estate purchaser must also canvas the
prospective neighborhood and interview current occupants to determine any prior unrecorded
interest in the land. It would be insufficient to interview current neighboring occupants of the
surrounding properties. Rather, predecessors in title must also be tracked and interviewed to
determine if a claim of acquiescence can be raised based on a period of time that extends back to,
in this case, approximately sixty years. Yet, this litigation might have been avoided if plaintiffs
had examined the language of their own survey, filed an action to quiet title prior to defendants’
purchase, or asserted their interest in the property immediately rather than years after defendants’
purchase.
We impose time limitations on the filing of a complaint to compel a plaintiff to exercise a
right of action within a reasonable time to give the opposing party a fair opportunity to defend,
relieve the court system from dealing with stale claims, and protect potential defendants from
protracted fear of litigation. Chase v Sabin, 445 Mich 190, 194-201; 516 NW2d 60 (1994). The
same considerations apply here. A plaintiff who alleges a property interest acquired through
adverse possession or acquiescence, but fails to timely raise its interest in the property or move
to quiet title to the property must be barred by equity from obtaining title from an innocent
purchaser.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
2
Additionally, we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that we have engaged in improper fact
finding. Principles of equity bar the acquiescence claim because of the lack of notice of the
claim to defendants. Plaintiffs do not dispute that they did not advise defendants of their claim at
the time of the purchase. However, the photographs submitted of the area in dispute indicates
that an identifiable property line through fencing was not established.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.