IN RE EVANS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MCE and TCE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 231344
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-635327-NA
DAVID EVANS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and Gribbs,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the order terminating his parental rights to the minor
children MCE (d/o/b 8/22/1996) and TCE (d/o/b 11/23/1998) pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
(likelihood of harm to children if returned to parent). Respondent argues on appeal that the trial
court erroneously admitted into evidence hearsay testimony of statements his three-year-old
daughter, MCE, made regarding respondent’s alleged sexual abuse of her. He also argues that
there was not clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for termination, and that
termination was not in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
I
Respondent first argues that MCE’s out of court statements should not have been
admitted: specifically, that the family court made erroneous findings of fact in determining that
MCE’s statements were admissible under MCR 5.972(C)(2) and that the court made an error of
law by allowing hearsay testimony of statements made by a child who was not competent to
testify. In child protective proceedings, this Court reviews a family court’s findings of fact for
clear error. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Questions of
law are reviewed de novo on appeal. Jones v Slick, 242 Mich App 715, 719; 619 NW2d 733
(2000).
In general, the Michigan Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay rules, apply at a trial to
determine if the family court has jurisdiction over a child. MCR 5.972(C)(1); MRE 802, 803,
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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804. However, MRE 803A, which provides a “tender years” hearsay exception for a child’s
statements about sexual abuse, by its own terms applies only to criminal and delinquency
proceedings. MCR 5.972(C)(2) provides a tender years exception for protective proceedings,
stating:
A statement made by a child under ten years of age describing an act of
child abuse as defined in section 2(c) of the child protection law, MCL
722.622(c); MSA 25.248(2)(c), performed with or on the child, not otherwise
admissible under and exception to the hearsay rule, may be admitted into
evidence at the trial if the trial court has found, in a hearing held prior to trial, that
the nature and circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement provide
adequate indicia of trustworthiness, and that there is sufficient corroborative
evidence of the act.
In this case, the family court made specific findings of trustworthiness, stating that MCE
“knew the difference between right and wrong in the sense that she knew when something was
true or not true ….” The record reveals no proof to the contrary. MCE was able to describe and
demonstrate sexual behavior that a three-year-old would not normally know about, and the
evidence showed she made the statements spontaneously and gave the same account to two
different witnesses. The trial court properly considered factors such as spontaneity and
consistency, and determined from the totality of the circumstances that MCE’s statements were
trustworthy. In re Brimer, 191 Mich App 401, 405; 478 NW2d 689 (1992).
Respondent also contends that the court erred in finding “sufficient corroborative
evidence of the act” as required by MCR 5.972(C)(2). The court found MCE’s statements to
different persons on different occasions to be sufficient corroboration. Respondent does not cite
any authority to the effect that the corroborative evidence required by MCR 5.972(C)(2) must be
“independent” evidence rather than evidence that the child’s statements on different occasions
corroborated each other. This issue is consequently waived for failure to cite supporting
authority. Caldwell v Chapman, 240 Mich App 124, 132; 610 NW2d 264 (2000).
Respondent further argues that the statements should not have been admitted because
MCE was not a competent witness. MRE 601 provides:
Unless the court finds after questioning a person that the person does not
have sufficient physical or mental capacity or sense of obligation to testify
truthfully and understandably, every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
The court rule establishes a presumption of competency, and sets forth the circumstances where
that presumption is rebutted. The family court never made any finding regarding MCE’s
competency as a witness and, indeed, never questioned her to make such a determination. There
is no evidence that MCE would be found incompetent under MRE 601. Furthermore, respondent
does not cite any legal authority in support of his erroneous legal assumption that MRE 601
applies not only to witnesses who testify at trial, but also to a non-testifying child declarant
whose statements are offered into evidence under MCR 5.972(C)(2). The issue is thus waived
for failure to cite supporting authority. Caldwell, supra at 132.
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Respondent raises a number of other arguments against the admission of MCE’s
statements, but none of these arguments is fully developed. Accordingly, they are waived for
respondent’s failure to adequately brief them. Caldwell, supra at 132. In sum, the family court
did not err in admitting MCE’s statements under MCR 5.972(C)(2). Respondent is not entitled
to relief on this basis.
II
We turn next to respondent’s argument that petitioner did not establish by clear and
convincing evidence a statutory basis for terminating his parental rights. We disagree.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). This Court reviews the
family court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); Trejo, supra
at 356-357.
We first note that, although the family court may have mistakenly applied the less
stringent preponderance of the evidence standard, respondent does not argue that issue on appeal
and the evidence presented easily established the more stringent clear and convincing standard.
MCL 712A.19b(3) sets forth the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights.
Here, the family court found grounds for termination under section 19b(3)(j), which provides:
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3).]
Here, there was ample evidence to support termination under this statutory provision.
The evidence established that respondent sexually abused MCE and revealed a broader
view of respondent’s tendency for pedophilia and his propensity to seek satisfaction for his
urges. From this evidence, the family court could reasonably conclude that respondent was an
unreformed pedophile, that his pedophilia went beyond fantasy and into actual practice, that he
had already preyed on his own daughter, and that the probability for self-reform was poor.
Because the evidence of how a parent treats one child − including a child who is not his offspring
− is probative of how the parent will treat other children, the family court did not err in finding
TCE at risk of harm as well. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 588-589; 528 NW2d 799 (1995).
We also note that once respondent’s rights to MCE were terminated, petitioner could promptly
request the family court to take jurisdiction over TCE under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (parental
rights to a sibling of the child have been terminated due to sexual abuse).
III
Finally, respondent argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the children’s
best interests because the evidence established that he is a good father who has strongly bonded
to his children and who provides financial support for them. We disagree.
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When the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory basis or
bases for termination exists, the court must order termination of parental rights unless it finds
from evidence on the record that termination is not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 353. This Court reviews the best interests decision for clear error.
Id., 356-357.
The family court concluded that termination was not against the children’s best interest.
Respondent had already begun to sexualize his relationship with his daughter. Furthermore,
whatever financial advantages respondent could offer did not outweigh the risk of abuse. We
find no clear error in this conclusion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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