PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT EDWARD HINE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 207358
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000307-FC
ROBERT EDWARD HINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Hood and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case concerning the admissibility of other acts evidence1 under MRE 404(b)(1)
comes to us on remand from the Supreme Court. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
The first opinion in this case set out the pertinent facts:
This case involves the sudden death of two-and-a-half-year-old Caitlan
McLaughlin on November 7, 1996. Hine and Caitlan McLaughlin’s mother,
Meagan McLaughlin, were in a dating relationship and the three lived together in
Hine’s home. Hine, who was out of work at the time, cared for Caitlan
McLaughlin while Meagan McLaughlin was working.
Caitlan McLaughlin had a number of small accidents and illnesses in the
two or so weeks before she died. In late October, she attended a birthday party
and fell off a small bicycle or tricycle. At the party, Caitlan McLaughlin’s sixyear-old cousin also tried to scare her by jumping out of a closet, and while doing
so, inadvertently caused the doorknob to hit her head, leaving a “goose egg”
bruise on her forehead. The week preceding her death, while Hine was looking
after her, she had several episodes of vomiting and fainting. This was, evidently,
not unusual because she had a history of viral illnesses dating back to her birth
1
We use the terms other acts evidence, prior acts evidence, and prior bad acts evidence
interchangeably.
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that caused these symptoms to recur. Caitlan McLaughlin also had several
accidents, which she voluntarily described to family members, including incidents
when she fell against a bathtub and a wooden toy box, causing her to sustain
several bruises, a cut on her ear, as well as a swollen nose.
On November 7, Caitlan McLaughlin vomited after lunch and then fainted.
Hine shook her shoulders until she regained consciousness, and then he called
Meagan McLaughlin to report what had happened. Meagan McLaughlin came
home from work a short time later and Caitlan McLaughlin continued vomiting.
Caitlan McLaughlin finally was able to drink juice around 6:30 p.m. While
Meagan McLaughlin was assisting Caitlan McLaughlin in the bathroom, she
discovered that Caitlan McLaughlin had bruises on her buttocks, and confronted
Hine about them. Hine admitted that he had spanked Caitlan McLaughlin earlier
when she had defecated in her pants. They apparently resolved their tensions and
after dinner Meagan McLaughlin helped Caitlan McLaughlin get ready for bed, at
which time she discovered that Caitlan McLaughlin had some bruises on her arms
and stomach; Meagan McLaughlin did not ask Hine about these bruises.
At around 9:00 p.m., Hine, Meagan McLaughlin, and Caitlan McLaughlin
began watching a movie, with Meagan McLaughlin sitting on Hine’s lap and
Caitlan McLaughlin lying on a couch. About a half hour later, Meagan
McLaughlin went to make a telephone call and Hine checked on Caitlan
McLaughlin. He discovered that she was gagging and her eyes had rolled back.
Hine picked Caitlan McLaughlin up and took her to Meagan McLaughlin, who
was speaking on the phone. He handed Caitlan McLaughlin to Meagan
McLaughlin and called 911. While on the telephone with the 911 operator, he
attempted to follow the directions regarding how to resuscitate Caitlan
McLaughlin. Emergency services personnel arrived within five minutes but could
not revive her.
At trial, the medical evidence did not point to a single, conclusive cause of
Caitlan McLaughlin’s death. Postmortem photographs showed what appeared to
be significant bruising to her body, but a police officer who responded to the 911
call was not sure that the marks were bruises and a paramedic who tried to revive
Caitlan McLaughlin admitted that lividity, meaning discoloration, can occur
naturally after death. Indeed, Meagan McLaughlin later told the police that the
discoloration of Caitlan McLaughlin’s body in police photographs was much
worse than she had personally observed before her daughter died.
The medical examiner identified numerous minor bruises on Caitlan
McLaughlin’s body and two major injuries, one to her head that caused her brain
to swell, and one to her liver that caused hemorrhaging. The head injury was
likely from a forceful blow, not shaking, within the three days before Caitlan
McLaughlin died, but there was no external mark demonstrating such a blow. In
his opinion, the liver injury probably occurred three to seven days before Caitlan
McLaughlin died and would have caused Caitlan McLaughlin to become weak,
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her blood pressure would have fallen, and it was possible that she could have been
clumsy as a result. Although there was no evidence that anyone used a weapon or
instrument against Caitlan McLaughlin, he thought that some of the bruising
could have come from mild blows with a fist. He agreed that not all the marks on
her body were actually bruises, but a lay person might reach that conclusion. He
did not observe any mouth injuries or evidence that someone had “head-butted”
Caitlan McLaughlin. The medical examiner could not conclude that any single
injury caused her death, but concluded that Caitlan McLaughlin’s death was a
homicide because of the number of injuries and because they did not appear to be
self-inflicted.
Caitlan McLaughlin’s family doctor testified that she did not recall seeing
evidence of abuse during her office visits. She agreed that a liver injury could
have caused Caitlan McLaughlin’s symptoms the week before she died, but that
an accident two weeks before death was unlikely to cause her injuries. She did
believe, however, that Caitlan McLaughlin’s abdominal injuries should have been
investigated further.
The prosecutor’s expert in pediatric critical care, who specialized in child
abuse cases, concluded that some of Caitlan McLaughlin’s injuries, such as the
injuries to her nose, were probably from an accident. He hypothesized on the
basis of the police report, photographs, and autopsy report that the injuries to her
chin and jaw were caused by someone grabbing her face and lifting or throwing
her, and not during an effort to resuscitate her. He also suggested that the
superficial injuries to Caitlan McLaughlin’s cheek could have resulted from
someone “raking” his or her fingers on the inside of her mouth, and that her
abdominal injuries resulted from punches with a knuckle or fist. He believed that
the head injury was what killed Caitlan McLaughlin. However, he did not
examine Caitlan McLaughlin’s body and admitted on cross-examination that he
reached these conclusions only after being told that Meagan McLaughlin had lied
about an accident occurring before Caitlan McLaughlin’s death; he assumed that
there was no accident. He also conceded that an impalement injury from a fall off
a bicycle could cause a liver injury that would have produced vomiting, lethargy,
and weak coordination, but not all the injuries Caitlan McLaughlin sustained.
Hine’s theory was that Caitlan McLaughlin died from the injuries she
sustained in the accidents in the weeks preceding November 7, 1996 and not from
any action on his part. He presented numerous witnesses who testified that they
never saw Hine act inappropriately and that Caitlan McLaughlin was always
comfortable around him. Meagan McLaughlin also testified that she thought Hine
had tried his best to care for Caitlan McLaughlin and that she had never seen any
indication that he would hurt her. There was no direct evidence that Hine abused
or killed Caitlan McLaughlin.
The trial court, over defense objection,1 permitted Meagan McLaughlin
and two of Hine’s former girlfriends, Sherri Overbeck and Laura Diehl, to testify
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to instances when he allegedly assaulted them or exhibited violent tendencies
toward them.2 Meagan McLaughlin claimed that she and Hine had a history of
fighting. When she would not talk to him, he would pin her down until she
responded. He also “head-butted” her on the forehead two or three times, once hit
her on the lip with his knee, and he once “fish-hooked” her mouth. She also said
that Hine had poked or pushed her frequently, but they had been getting along
very well for some time before Caitlan McLaughlin died.
Overbeck, the mother of Hine’s son Kalija, testified that he assaulted her
several times. For instance, she said, he would grab her arms, pin her down,
threaten her, and grab her neck, pressing her necklace into her skin. He allegedly
“head-butted” her, bloodying her nose, and he raped her while she was pregnant
with their son. Yet, she never saw Hine even discipline Kalija, much less abuse
him.
Diehl stated that one time when she and Hine were drunk he used his
fingers to spread her mouth as wide as it would go. The next morning, she
claimed, Hine threatened to “bust” a chair over her head, but did not actually do
so. Several weeks later he threatened to blacken her eyes, but again, did not fulfill
the threat. Diehl also recalled two other incidents where Hine harmed her, but
which she concluded were accidents: one time she fell against his knee injuring
her nose, and the second time he dropped her while carrying her. Diehl never saw
Hine abuse her two children, who lived with them, or Kalija.
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury to consider Meagan
McLaughlin, Overbeck, and Diehl’s testimony regarding the abuse only to the
extent that it demonstrated Hine’s intent to act, his pattern in doing an act, or the
absence of a mistake.[2][3]
1
The trial court ruled the testimony admissible before trial commenced.
2
The trial court barred Kim Bailey, a waitress in a bar who claimed to have seen
Hine acting rude[ly] and aggressive[ly], from testifying.
2
People v Hine, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals (Docket No. 207358, issued
February 25, 2000), slip op at 1-4 (“Hine”).
3
We note that in the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and in the
supplemental brief on remand to this Court, the prosecutor disputes certain of these facts. None
of the disputed facts are, however, relevant to the issue on remand: whether the trial court
abused its discretion in concluding that the alleged similarities between the peculiarities in the
assaultive conduct of Hine against three adult witnesses and the injuries suffered by Caitlan
McLaughlin justified admission of the evidence in question under a “scheme, plan, or system”
theory. We have not, therefore, changed our description of the facts.
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The jury convicted Robert Hine of first-degree felony-murder4 and first-degree child
abuse, but acquitted him of open murder.6
5
Hine then appealed as of right to this Court. This Court reversed his convictions and
remanded for a new trial, reasoning that the other acts evidence was not admissible under any of
the theories the prosecutor advanced and that it should have been excluded under MRE 403.7
This Court also noted briefly that, if it did not have other grounds to reverse, it would have
vacated Hine’s conviction of first-agree child abuse, the predicate felony for his felony-murder
conviction, on double jeopardy grounds.8
The prosecutor subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.9 The Supreme Court held
the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal in abeyance while it considered People v Sabin.
Several months later, the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion in Hine and remanded the
case to this Court for reconsideration in light of the opinion it had just issued in Sabin (After
Remand)10 with the following instructions:
On remand, the Court of Appeals is specifically directed to address, among the
issues raised, whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that
alleged similarities between the peculiarities in the assaultive conduct of
defendant against the three adult witnesses and the injuries suffered by the victim
justified admission of the evidence in question under a “scheme, plan, or system”
theory. The Court of Appeals shall allow the parties to file supplemental briefs.
If the Court of Appeals rejects defendant’s arguments regarding the admission of
the prior acts evidence, then it shall consider the remaining issues raised in
defendant’s appeal.[11]
II. Sabin (After Remand)
In Sabin the defendant was charged with committing criminal sexual conduct against his
thirteen-year-old daughter.12 At trial, the prosecutor moved to introduce evidence that the
defendant had sexually assaulted his former stepdaughter for approximately eight years and that
he was under a parole order not to have contact with anyone under age seventeen.13 The
4
MCL 750.316(b).
5
MCL 750.136b.
6
MCL 750.316.
7
Hine, supra at 7-9.
8
Id. at 9.
9
People v Hine, 620 NW2d 308 (2000) (“Hine Order”).
10
People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
11
Hine Order, supra.
12
Sabin (After Remand), supra at 47.
13
Id. at 47-49.
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prosecutor claimed that the stepdaughter’s testimony would prove the defendant’s motive and
intent, absence of mistake, and that it was relevant “to support the complainant’s credibility, and
to aid the jurors in their evaluation of the evidence by demonstrating that an adult can be sexually
attracted to and actually accomplish a sex act with, a child.”14 The trial court ruled the evidence
admissible and cautioned the jury in a preliminary instruction only to consider the stepdaughter’s
testimony as evidence of a scheme, plan, or system.15 Concerning the no-contact parole order,
the prosecutor argued that the evidence was relevant to explain the complainant’s actions
following the sexual assault and the trial court ruled that evidence admissible.16 This Court
reversed,17 the prosecutor appealed, and the Supreme Court held the case in abeyance until it
issued its decision in People v Starr.18 After its decision in Starr, the Supreme Court remanded
for reconsideration in light of Starr and People v Crawford.19 On remand,20 this Court again
reversed,21 the prosecutor again appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings by examining
the text of MRE 404(b)(1). It then explained the analytical framework it had created for
evidentiary issues arising under MRE 404(b)(1) in People v VanderVliet.22 The Supreme Court
outlined the three prerequisites to determining whether to admit or exclude prior bad acts
evidence. First, a “prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something other than a
character to conduct or propensity theory.”23 Second, the evidence must be logically relevant to a
matter at trial.24 Third, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is substantially more
prejudicial than probative, meriting exclusion under MRE 403.25 Though not part of the
admissibility analysis itself, once a trial court determines that prior bad acts evidence is
admissible, it may instruct the jury on the limited purpose of the evidence.26 In commenting on
this analysis, the Supreme Court emphasized that, though inadmissible for one reason, a piece of
evidence may nevertheless be admissible under other theories.27
14
Id. at 49, 50.
15
Id. at 50-51.
16
Id. at 51.
17
18
People v Sabin, 223 Mich App 530; 566 NW2d 677 (1997).
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
19
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
20
People v Sabin (On Remand), 236 Mich App 1; 600 NW2d 98 (1999).
21
Judge Whitbeck dissented, id. at 9, et. seq.
22
People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).
23
Sabin (After Remand), supra at 55; see id. at 56-57.
24
Id. at 55.
25
Id. at 55; see id. at 57-58.
26
Id. at 56.
27
Id.
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The Supreme Court then explained a variety of theories of relevance under which prior
bad acts evidence may be admissible.28 The explanation of the first such theory, scheme, plan, or
system, is directly applicable here. In discussing scheme, plan, or system, the Supreme Court
first examined People v Engelman.29 The Court commented that Engelman focused on a
situation in which the charged and uncharged acts are constituent parts of a plan in which each
act is a piece of a larger plan. The Court concluded that such a situation was not present in
Sabin. Rather, the Court30 stated that the situation in Sabin was one where the defendant
allegedly “devis(ed) a plan and us(ed) it repeatedly to perpetrate separate but very similar
crimes.”31 The Court then
clarif[ied] that evidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that
the charged act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense
are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are manifestations of a
common plan, scheme, or system.[32]
The Court noted that general similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does not, by
itself, establish a plan, scheme, or system used to commit the acts.33 The Court cited to the
emphasized language from Wigmore:
The added element, then, must be, not merely a similarity in the results,
but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are natural to be
explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual
manifestations. [34]
In illustrating the common features between the uncharged and charged act necessary to support
an inference of a plan, scheme, or system, the Court again cited to Wigmore:
[T]he difference between requiring similarity, for acts negativing innocent
intent, and requiring common features indicating common design, for acts
showing design, is a difference of degree rather than of kind; for to be similar
involves having common features, and to have common features is merely to have
a high degree of similarity . . . .
The clue to the difference is best gained by remembering that in the one
class of cases the act charged is assumed as done, and the mind asks only for
28
Id. at 61.
29
People v Engelman, 434 Mich 204; 453 NW2d 656 (1990).
30
Citing to State v Lough, 125 Wash 2d 847, 855; 889 P2d 487 (1995).
31
Sabin (After Remand), supra at 63.
32
Id. citing to People v Ewoldt, 7 Cal 4th 380; 867 P2d 757 (1994).
33
Id. at 64-65.
34
2 Wigmore (Chadbourn rev), Evidence, § 304, p 249; emphasis in the original.
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something that will negative innocent intent; and the mere prior occurrence of an
act similar to its gross features – i.e., the same doer, and the same sort of act, but
not necessarily the same mode of acting nor the same sufferer – may suffice for
that purpose. But where the very act is the object of proof, and is desired to be
inferred from a plan or system, the combination of common features that will
suggest a common plan as their explanation involves so much a higher grade of
similarity as to constitute a substantially new and distinct test. [35]
While noting that the uncharged and the charged acts in Sabin were dissimilar in many respects,
the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
defendant’s alleged assault of the complainant and alleged abuse of his stepdaughter shared
sufficient common features to infer a plan, scheme, or system to do the acts. The Court
concluded:
This case is one in which reasonable persons could disagree on whether
the charged and uncharged acts contained sufficient common features to infer the
existence of a common system used by defendant in committing the acts. As we
have often observed, the trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary question such
as this one ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion . . . . We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining, under the
circumstances of this case, that the evidence was admissible under this theory of
logical relevance.[36]
III. Application of Sabin (After Remand)
A. The VanderVliet Framework
The Court in Sabin (After Remand) based it decision – as do most of the post-1994
decisions in this much-litigated area – on the seminal VanderVliet case. VanderVliet set out a
four-legged test for the consideration of other acts evidence under MRE 404(b):
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b);
second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third,
that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting
instruction to the jury.[37]
Here, we are concerned with the second leg, relevance. Relevant evidence is evidence that has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
35
Wigmore, id. at 250-251.
36
Sabin (After Remand), supra at 67, citations omitted.
37
VanderVliet, supra at 55.
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actions more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”38 Only relevant
evidence is admissible at trial.39
B. Scheme, Plan, or System
(1) MRE 404(b)(1)
MRE 404(b)(1) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.[40]
(2) System
The prosecutor here argues that the testimony of the other witnesses was material to
“showing [Hine’s] plan or pattern of abusing Caitlan McLaughlin.” The prosecutor goes on to
argue that the “other acts testimony was admitted, not to distinguish ages or gender or to show
similarity of victims, but to display a similarity of the injuries themselves, which displayed
[Hine’s] ‘plan, scheme or system.’”
The prosecutor’s use of the rubric of “plan, scheme or system” somewhat obscures, we
observe, the basic thrust of the argument. Insofar as we are able to ascertain, the prosecutor does
not argue that Hine had a “plan” or “scheme” to injure or kill Caitlan McLaughlin. Rather, the
prosecutor argues that the testimony of the other acts testimony of the three witnesses,
McLaughlin, Overbeck and Diehl, showed a pattern, a method of acting, a system in which Hine
would become violent when he was frustrated, annoyed, or upset. Specifically, the prosecutor
argues that Hine would violently abuse his victims by threatening them, poking them, grabbing
them, “fish-hooking” them in the mouth, and head-butting them. The prosecutor then points to
the injuries that such abuse would cause and describes them as “strikingly similar” to Caitlan
McLaughlin’s injuries.
Thus, as in Sabin, the prosecutor does not argue that the situation is similar to that in
Engelman, where the charged and uncharged acts were constituent parts of a plan in which each
act is a piece of a larger plan. Rather, the prosecutor argues that Hine employed a system to
perpetrate separate but very similar crimes. The prosecutor also does not argue, to use
Wigmore’s distinction, for similarity as negativing innocent intent. Hine did not defend on the
38
MRE 401.
39
MRE 402.
40
Emphasis supplied.
-9-
basis that he accidentally or innocently injured Caitlan McLaughlin; rather, he claimed that he
did not injure her at all. Here, then, the “very act is the object of proof” and that act is the injury
itself. The prosecutor, again to use Wigmore’s distinction, desires that Hine’s commission of
that act be inferred from his system of inflicting other but similar injuries on other victims.
Wigmore comments that such an explanation “involves so much a higher grade of
similarity as to constitute a substantially new and distinct test.” The Supreme Court used a
somewhat different formulation when41 it stated that “the necessary degree of similarity is greater
than that needed to prove intent, but less than that needed to prove identity.”42 To paraphrase
People v Ewoldt, the system need not be unusual or distinctive; it need only exist to support the
inference that Hine employed that system in committing the charged offense.
Here, it is unfortunate but true that there is nothing, within the universe of violent
assaults, particularly unusual or distinctive in threatening a person, poking that person, grabbing
that person, “fish-hooking” that person in the mouth, or head-butting that person. The focus
must, therefore, be on the similarities of the uncharged acts involving McLaughlin, Overbeck and
Diehl and the charged act involving Caitlan McLaughlin. We observe that the degree of
similarity is, at least roughly, inversely related to the degree of specificity by which one describes
the acts. At a low level of specificity of description there will be a high level of similarity; at a
high level of specificity of description there is a lower level of similarity.
We illustrate this inverse relationship through the use of the facts here. At a low level of
specificity of description, the testimony of McLaughlin, Overbeck and Diehl demonstrated that
Hine would become violently abusive when he was frustrated, annoyed, or upset. The
prosecutor’s theory is that Hine became similarly frustrated, annoyed, or upset with Caitlan
McLaughlin and that he therefore similarly become violently abusive toward her to the point that
he fatally injured her. At this low level of specificity of description, the uncharged misconduct
and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference that they are
manifestations of a common system.
We believe, however, that Sabin (On Remand) requires a higher level of specificity. The
prosecutor attempts to provide that higher level of specificity by pointing to the collective
testimony of McLaughlin, Overbeck and Diehl that Hine would violently abuse them by
threatening them, poking them, grabbing them, “fish-hooking” them in the mouth, and headbutting them. We observe the specifics of these attacks – again, the uncharged misconduct – in
terms of time, place, method, or purpose, cannot be related to the specifics of any attack on
Caitlan McLaughlin – again, the charged offense – for the simple reason that we have no
specifics of any such attack on Caitlan McLaughlin, by Hine or anyone else. Indeed, but for the
inference from the uncharged misconduct, there is precious little evidence that there was a
criminal act involving Caitlan McLaughlin at all. Conversely, there is evidence from which a
reasonable person could infer that Caitlan McLaughlin’s injuries resulted from accidents that did
not involve Hine. Perhaps recognizing this, the prosecutor urges us to compare the injuries
41
Citing to People v Ewoldt, supra.
42
Sabin (After Remand), supra at 65.
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Caitlan McLaughlin suffered to the injuries McLaughlin, Overbeck and Diehl suffered as a result
of Hine’s attacks on them.
Here, we have an evidentiary mismatch. According to the prosecutor, Diehl testified that
Hine put his hand in her mouth “bruising her gums.” According to the prosecutor, Overbeck
testified that Hine head-butted her once, “causing her nose to bleed.” According to the
prosecutor, McLaughlin testified that Hine “bruised [her] arms frequently.” Thus, we have only
the most general testimony as to the injuries of McLaughlin, Overbeck, and Diehl as a result of
Hine’s attacks on them. By contrast, we have extensive, credible, and specific testimony and
evidence of Caitlan McLaughlin’s injuries.
We have a similar evidentiary mismatch with respect to Hine’s system of abuse. We have
extensive, credible, and specific testimony from McLaughlin, Overbeck, and Diehl as to Hine’s
propensity for, and method of carrying out, violent abuse when he was frustrated, annoyed, or
upset. By contrast, we have no evidence of Hine’s violent abuse of Caitlan McLaughlin. Indeed,
we have the testimony by McLaughlin, Overbeck, and Diehl that they never saw Hine threaten or
assault their children or his son.
Thus, we remain convinced that the prior bad acts evidence was inadmissible. That
evidence did not, even under the prosecutor’s theory of similar injuries, demonstrate a common
scheme, plan, or system. The prosecutor, in essence, asks us to make two inferences. The first
inference is that Hine had a system whereby he abused mature women when he was frustrated,
annoyed, or upset. The evidence supports this inference but, standing alone, it has no probative
value whatever. The second inference is that, using this system, Hine inflicted injuries on
Caitlan McLaughlin, a two-year old female child, that were “strikingly similar” to those he
inflicted on McLaughlin, Overbeck, and Diehl. The evidence does not support this inference but
it is at the heart of the prosecutor’s case. We conclude that the lack of specificity of the
description of the injuries suffered by McLaughlin, Overbeck, and Diehl simply does not allow
for a rational comparison with the injuries suffered by Caitlan McLaughlin.
We observe, however, that the prior bad acts evidence did, clearly, demonstrate that Hine
was a “bad man,” with a propensity for abusive, violent assault. Indeed, we note that the trial
court came very close to saying that it was admitting the evidence on a propensity theory:
On the other hand, certainly it is strongly probative to the prosecution’s case when
you are talking about any evidence of someone’s propensity for engaging in
assaultive conduct and certainly arguments about similarities between other
incidents and perhaps what happened to the victim based upon the evidence the
prosecution has.[43]
In short, the evidence proved Hine’s bad character – his “propensity for engaging in assaultive
conduct” – in order “to show action in conformity therewith.” We therefore again conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such propensity evidence.
43
Emphasis supplied.
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Reversed and remanded for new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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