JOHN H TODD V SAGINAW POLICE OFFICERS & FIRE FIGHTERS RETIRE SYS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN H. TODD and JEANNINE L. TODD,
UNPUBLISHED
November 9, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V
SAGINAW POLICE OFFICERS AND FIRE
FIGHTERS RETIREMENT SYSTEMS and CITY
OF SAGINAW,
No. 223021
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-024018-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the circuit court’s order granting defendants summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
This case arises out of plaintiff John Todd’s retirement election of a regular service
retirement; a straight life pension to the retiree that includes a pension equal to 60% of the
retiree’s pension payable to the retiree’s surviving spouse upon the retiree’s death. John Todd
worked for defendants from 1970 until his retirement in 1996. He completed the requisite form
electing a regular service retirement, and retired, in January 1996. John and Jeannine Todd
divorced in June 1998, and Jeannine Todd’s potential survivorship rights were extinguished
under the terms of the pertinent pension ordinance. Before divorcing, plaintiffs requested to
change the pension election, defendants refused, and plaintiffs brought this lawsuit. John Todd
died in December 1998.1
A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim
and is subject to de novo review. Harts v Farmers Ins Exchange, 461 Mich 1, 5; 597 NW2d 47
(1999). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court
considers the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence filed in the action or
submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. “The motion is
properly granted if the documentary evidence presented shows that there is no genuine issue with
1
We thus consider plaintiff Jeannine Todd to be the only plaintiff-appellant.
-1-
respect to any material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id.
Plaintiffs first argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition because
the retirement election, which ultimately deprived the former spouse of any potential
survivorship rights, was void as against public policy. We disagree.
Plaintiffs claim the pension ordinance violated public policy because the retiree’s spouse
was given no notice of the election and no opportunity to consent thereto. Plaintiffs further claim
that public policy requires protection of pension rights for ex-spouses, both through the pension
itself and through equitable division of the marital estate during divorce.
Statutory analysis begins by examining the general purpose of a statute and then
determining if public policy concerns support application of the statute in particular factual
situations. People v Childs, 243 Mich App 360, 367; 622 NW2d 90 (2000). If the statute is
unambiguous, we must apply it as written. Id. “The rules governing the construction of statutes
apply with equal force to the interpretation of municipal ordinances.” Gora v Ferndale, 456
Mich 704, 711; 576 NW2d 141 (1998).
The municipal ordinance at issue permits three pension options, including the option
selected by plaintiff John Todd: a regular service retirement with a potential benefit for the
retiree’s spouse. Saginaw Administrative Code, Chap 5, Art I, § 120. A spouse is defined by the
ordinance as “the person to whom the retirant was legally married on both the effective date of
his/her retirement and the date of his/her death.” Id. at § 102.1(w). The ordinance requires the
pension election to be made before retirement. Id. at § 120.1.
The ordinance is clear on its face. A divorce after retirement necessarily removes an exspouse from the definition of “spouse” under the ordinance because the couple will not be legally
married when the retiree dies. Therefore, for the pension option John Todd selected, the
ordinance’s terms extinguish an ex-spouse’s potential survivorship rights in the event of a
divorce after retirement. The ordinance forbids a change to the election after retirement.
Moreover, the ordinance grants no notice of an election to a spouse or consent thereto.
Because the ordinance is unambiguous, we must apply it as written. This result does not
violate public policy. See, e.g., OAG, 1989-1990, No. 6604, p 255 (October 30, 1989).
Michigan law recognizes pension plans similar to the plan at issue with survivorship rights for
spouses, rather than ex-spouses. For example, the firefighters and police officers retirement act,
MCL 38.551 et seq., includes the same pension options for a retiree. MCL 38.556(h). The
retirement act mirrors the Saginaw ordinance, providing survivorship benefits only to a “spouse”
to whom the retirant was legally married on both the date of retirement and the date of death.
MCL 38.556(h). The act also provides no opportunity for notice to a spouse before election or
consent to an election. The cases plaintiffs cite construing the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 USC 1001 et seq., are inapplicable because ERISA does not
apply to governmental pension plans, including the plan at issue here. 29 USC 1002(32),
1003(b)(1); In re Pensions of 19th Dist Judges Under Dearborn Employees Retirement System,
213 Mich App 701, 706-707; 540 NW2d 784 (1995).
-2-
We agree with plaintiffs that the pension was a marital asset. MCL 552.18; Hutchins v
Hutchins, 71 Mich App 361, 371; 248 NW2d 272 (1976). However, we find no support for
plaintiffs’ conclusion that the existence of the asset gives rise to an action against the pension
plan or the city. The value of the pension should have been taken into account and equitably
distributed as part of plaintiffs’ divorce. Sommerville v Sommerville, 164 Mich App 681, 685;
417 NW2d 574 (1987); see also OAG 1989-1990, No. 6604, p 255 (October 30, 1989). Plaintiffs
submitted no evidence regarding how the pension was handled in the divorce.
Plaintiffs also argue the complaint states a cause of action for a number of legal theories,
including both tort and contract claims. Although we agree that several claims were stated, the
circuit court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material
fact), not MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim). The circuit court determined that no
genuine material factual dispute existed whether the ordinance was clear on its face that only a
surviving spouse is entitled to a continuation of a retirant’s regular pension and that no factual
misrepresentations were made to John Todd regarding his pension options. We agree with that
conclusion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.