ALONZO AUSTIN V WAYNE STATE UNIV
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALONZO D. AUSTIN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 12, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, MICHAEL A.
ELLICOTT and ROBERT P. YOUNG,
No. 220169
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-806346-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). On appeal, plaintiff argues that summary disposition
was improper as to defendant, Robert P. Young and that the trial court improperly denied leave
to amend the complaint. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff was employed in the custodial services department at Wayne State University
(Wayne), beginning in 1973. Plaintiff was terminated on November 20, 1997. At the time of his
termination, plaintiff was an at-will employee. Plaintiff filed suit against Wayne, Young (his
supervisor), and Young’s superior, Michael A. Ellicott, alleging that he was fired because he had
refused to testify falsely in the arbitration hearing of a fellow employee. The trial court
dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of governmental immunity, and refused to allow him to
amend his complaint to add specific allegations that Young had directed him to lie at an
arbitration hearing in violation of the perjury statutes, that Young was subject to an exception to
governmental immunity pursuant to MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107), and to plead that he
was fired in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and 42 USC 1983. Plaintiff appeals the trial
court’s dismissal only as it applies to Young. According to the trial court, Young was neither
acting on his own behalf nor grossly negligent when he fired plaintiff. It therefore determined
that Young was immune from liability for plaintiff’s claims. The trial court denied plaintiff’s
motions to amend his complaint on the basis that the proposed additions were either futile or
moot due to Young’s immunity.
Plaintiff first argues that, because Young was not entitled to governmental immunity, the
trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in Young’s favor. The grant or denial of
summary disposition is a question of law that we review de novo on appeal. Spiek v Dep’t of
-1-
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Royce v Citizens Ins Co, 219 Mich
App 537, 540; 557 NW2d 144 (1996). When reviewing a summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7), we must consider the entire lower court record, including pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Dampier
v Wayne Co, 233 Mich App 714, 720; 592 NW2d 809 (1999). Summary disposition is
appropriate if the evidence shows that no exception to governmental immunity is applicable.
Dampier, supra at 720; Smith v Kowalski, 223 Mich App 610, 616; 567 NW2d 463 (1997).
Where there are no disputed material facts, whether plaintiff’s claims are barred by governmental
immunity is a question of law. Cain v Lansing Housing Comm, 235 Mich App 566, 568; 599
NW2d 516 (1999).
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that Young fired him “in retaliation for his refusal to
commit perjury,” thereby violating the public policy of the State of Michigan. The trial court
apparently agreed with defendants that because plaintiff’s claim is for the tort of retaliatory
discharge, Young was immune from liability pursuant to the governmental immunity act, MCL
691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq. The act provides for governmental immunity from tort
liability only when all of the following conditions are met: (1) “[t]he . . . employee . . . is acting
or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority,” (2) “[t]he
governmental agency is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function,” and (3) “[t]he . . .
employee’s . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the
injury or damage.” MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(197)(2). “Gross negligence” is conduct so
reckless it demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. Id.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff has not advanced a claim under
the gross negligence exception described in MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(197)(2). There are
no allegations or facts contrary to the conclusion that Young’s decision to terminate plaintiff was
deliberate and was within the scope of Young’s authority. Therefore, we conclude that the
circumstances of this case were legally insufficient to support a finding that Young acted with
gross negligence.
However, the governmental immunity act does not shield an individual employee from
liability for intentional torts. Sudul v Hamtramck, 221 Mich App 455, 458 (Corrigan, J.), 480481 (Murphy, J.); 562 NW2d 478 (1997). Where an intentional tort was not barred by
governmental immunity before July 7, 1986, the tortious act does not qualify for governmental
immunity under the statute. Id. at 480-481. Defendants concede in their brief on appeal that
plaintiff has advanced a claim for retaliatory discharge. Where there is no statutory prohibition
against retaliatory discharge, an at-will employee may still claim that his discharge violated
public policy. Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 566; 575 NW2d 31 (1997);
Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78; 503 NW2d 645 (1993). Such a public policybased retaliatory discharge claim by an at-will employee does not arise out of any term agreed
upon by the contracting parties, and therefore sounds not in contract but in intentional tort.
Phillips v Butterball Farms, Inc, 448 Mich 239, 245-249; 531 NW2d 144 (1995). In Watassek v
Dept of Mental Health, 143 Mich App 556, 565; 372 NW2d 617 (1985), this Court held that a
retaliatory discharge claim was not barred by governmental immunity. Although the claim in
that case was contractual in nature, the Court specifically noted that it would still not be subject
-2-
to governmental immunity if it were characterized as an intentional tort. Id. at 564-565.
Subsequently, our Supreme Court questioned the Watassek decision to the extent that it
characterized a wrongful discharge claim as contractual, and clearly established that a claim for
wrongful discharge sounds in tort. Phillips, supra at 245-249. Finally, we note that long before
the enactment of the governmental immunity act, immunity was not a defense to a claim of
wrongful discharge; it therefore is not a defense today. Sudul, supra at 480-481; MCL
691.1407(3); MSA 3.996(197)(3). See Powell v Battle Creek, 169 Mich 19; 135 NW 79 (1912);
Paxson v Cass Co Rd Comm, 325 Mich 276; 38 NW2d 315 (1949); Lenz v Detroit, 361 Mich
166; 105 NW2d 156 (1960).
In its opinion granting summary disposition to defendants Wayne and Ellicott, issued on
March 16, 1999, the trial court found that if plaintiff were to amend his claim to set forth a theory
under Suchodolski v Michigan Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692; 316 NW2d 710 (1982), plaintiff’s
claims for wrongful termination would survive summary disposition. On May 27, 1999, the trial
court found that Young was immune from liability because he was not grossly negligent, he did
not act outside the scope of his employment, and that a theory of tortious interference with an
employment relationship was inapplicable to the instant case because there was no allegation that
Young acted for his own personal benefit. The court made no distinction between wrongful
discharge and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, even though Young was not
acting on his own behalf as a third party (required for tortious interference). See Dzierwa v
Michigan Oil Co, 152 Mich App 281; 393 NW2d 610 (1986); Kocenda v Archdiocese of Detroit,
204 Mich App 659; 516 NW2d 132 (1994). The trial court then determined, without further
explanation, that an amendment consistent with a claim for wrongful termination would be moot
because such a claim would be barred by its finding of governmental immunity. It did not discuss
the intentional tort exception to governmental immunity and failed to recognize that, to the extent
that plaintiff established a claim of retaliatory discharge, Young did not enjoy governmental
immunity. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition in favor of
Young on the ground of governmental immunity.
Because Young was not immune from liability for plaintiff’s allegations that he
terminated plaintiff for his refusal to lie in the Hudgins arbitration, we next consider whether
plaintiff set forth a claim for wrongful termination that should have survived summary
disposition. An at-will employee can be discharged at any time without reason and generally has
no recourse if the employer acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Rood v General
Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 116; 507 NW2d 591 (1993); Bracco v Michigan Technological
Univ, 231 Mich App 578, 598; 588 NW2d 467 (1998). However, an at-will employee may have
an action for wrongful discharge if the discharge was contrary to public policy. Suchodolski,
supra at 694-696; Vagts v Perry Drug Stores, Inc, 204 Mich App 481, 484; 516 NW2d 102
(1994). Suchodolski identifies three examples of this exception; contrary to defendants’
argument, nothing in Suchodolski limits the exception to those three situations exclusively.
These three examples include when (1) the employee is discharged in violation of an explicit
legislative statement prohibiting discharge of employees who act in accordance with a statutory
right or duty, (2) the employee is discharged for the failure or refusal to violate the law in the
course of employment, and (3) the employee is discharged for exercising a right conferred by a
well-established legislative enactment. Suchodolski, supra at 695-696; Vagts, supra.
-3-
The trial court determined that plaintiff failed to set forth a claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy under Suchodolski, supra, because, although plaintiff argued
throughout the proceedings that being fired for refusing to lie at the arbitration hearing violated
public policy, he failed to properly allege in his complaint that Young violated any law, or to
otherwise set forth a claim actionable under Suchodolski. However, the trial court noted that this
Court has established that a violation of “law” as intended by Suchodolski may include “public
policy . . . based on principles derived from authoritative sources other than statutes.” Vagts,
supra at 485-486. We emphasize that the language defining the exception in Suchodolski
permits a claim “if the discharge was contrary to public policy,” not “if the discharge arose from
the violation of a statute.” We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there is a clear public
policy against testifying falsely, even in a quasi-judicial proceeding. See Cunningham v Citizens
Ins Co of America, 133 Mich App 471; 350 NW2d 283 (1984). Therefore, plaintiff need not
prove that what Young asked him to do fit the statutory definition of “perjury.” The trial court
encouraged plaintiff to amend his complaint to state the relevant perjury statute and to set forth a
theory under the broader meaning of “law” used in Suchodolski. Plaintiff need not name a
specific statute embodying public policy, and we believe his first amended complaint
successfully pleaded a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, namely that
plaintiff was fired for refusing to lie at an arbitration hearing. Whether defendant’s acts
amounted to a violation of public policy remains a question of fact. The trial court therefore
should not have dismissed plaintiff’s claim against Young, or at least should have granted leave
to amend, as it originally indicated it would do.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motions for leave to
amend his complaint. Because the trial court erroneously determined that Young was immune, it
incorrectly held that any amendment concerning his liability for wrongful discharge would be
moot. Plaintiff should have been granted leave to file a second amended complaint if he wanted
to tailor his allegations to Suchodolski as encouraged by the trial court.
However, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s amendments proposing to plead
that he was fired in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and 42 USC 1983. We will not disturb
the trial court’s decision to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint absent an abuse of
discretion that resulted in an injustice. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 654; 563 NW2d 647
(1997); Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 393; 541 NW2d 566 (1995). An abuse of
discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts upon which the trial court
acted, would conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling. Detroit/Wayne
County Stadium Authority v 7631 Lewiston, 237 Mich App 43, 47; 601 NW2d 879 (1999).
Although a trial court should freely grant leave to amend a complaint when justice so requires, a
motion may be denied for reasons of undue delay or prejudice, bad faith, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies, or for futility. MCR 2.118(A)(2); Weymers, supra at 658; Phillips, supra.
It is well settled that an at-will employee has no right to due process under Const 1963,
art 1, § 17. Bracco, supra at 586 n 3; James v City of Burton, 221 Mich App 130, 134; 560
NW2d 668 (1997). The cases on which plaintiff relies are distinguishable in that the employees
had due process rights based on their employers’ rules or ordinances. See Casad v City of
Jackson, 79 Mich App 573, 578; 263 NW2d 19 (1977); Milford v People’s Community Hospital
Auth, 380 Mich 49; 155 NW2d 835 (1968). In contrast, Wayne had no policy conferring the
-4-
right to a hearing before termination for at-will employees such as plaintiff. We therefore
conclude that plaintiff’s constitutional claim was futile, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.
Plaintiff’s efforts to amend his complaint to plead a violation of 42 USC 1983 were
likewise futile. To establish a valid § 1983 claim, that defendants deprived plaintiff of the
“rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,”
plaintiff must demonstrate that a government actor deprived him of clearly established
constitutional or statutory rights. Thomas v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 644-645; 609 NW2d
222 (2000); Dowerk v Charter Twp of Oxford, 233 Mich App 62, 74; 592 NW2d 724 (1998).
Plaintiff is unable to maintain a claim under § 1983 for the same reason that his constitutional
claim is futile: an at-will employee has no property interest in his or her job for due process
purposes. Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341, 345-347; 96 S Ct 2071; 48 L Ed 2d 684 (1976),
overruled on other grounds by Cleveland Bd of Educ v Loudermill, 470 US 532, 540-541; 105 S
Ct 1487; 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985) (holding that once a property right is conferred, the due process
guarantees cannot be limited); see also Perry v Sniderman, 408 US 593, 597-598; 92 S Ct 2694;
33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972). To the extent that plaintiff argues that Haddle v Garrison, 525 US 121;
119 S Ct 489; 142 L Ed 2d 502 (1998), confers on an at-will employee the right to advance a
claim under 42 USC 1983, plaintiff has waived the issue on appeal by failing to provide any
authority for the proposition that the Supreme Court’s analysis of § 1985(2) in Haddle has any
bearing on the instant case. Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834
(1999); Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 116; 593 NW2d 595
(1999). For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend his complaint to plead that he was fired in violation
of Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and 42 USC 1983.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.