RICHARD W PARRY V CHARLES W CAIRNS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD W. PARRY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 12, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CHARLES W. CAIRNS and VILICAN-LEHMAN
& ASSOCIATES, INC.,
No. 220160
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009182-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Griffin and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
Plaintiff submitted an application to the Groveland Township Planning Commission
(planning commission) seeking approval to divide his property into four smaller parcels. The
planning commission approved plaintiff’s land division request, with the condition that a pole
barn, which would have remained on one of the four parcels, be removed within ninety days.
Plaintiff believed the condition to be in violation of township ordinances.
Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against defendants alleging (1) professional
malpractice; (2) fraud and deceit; (3) breach of contract; (4) willful, wanton, reckless, and
outrageous conduct; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff alleged that he had contracted
with defendants to assist him in obtaining permission to divide the property, that defendants
failed to properly advise the planning commission with regard to plaintiff’s application and
misrepresented to the planning commission the nature of the pole barn on plaintiff’s property,
and that because of these errors and misrepresentations, the planning commission imposed an
illegal condition on the division of his land.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that as township planners
acting under contract with Groveland Township (the township), they had no ability to approve
plaintiff’s land division request, and that no relationship existed between plaintiff and defendants
from which liability could be imposed. The trial court granted defendants’ motion regarding all
counts contained in plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of all the counts, except
for the dismissal of count IV alleging willful, wanton, reckless, and outrageous conduct.
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We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Defendants
brought their motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Because
the circuit court considered documents beyond the pleadings in making its decision, we will treat
the motions as having been granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and examine the pleadings and
documents. Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). A trial court
“‘may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits or other
documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich
446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999), quoting Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547
NW2d 314 (1996). All affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary
evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties is viewed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. Id.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition regarding the breach of contract and professional malpractice claims
because, according to plaintiff, a contractual relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff
argues that the trial court improperly focused on the absence of a written contract without
acknowledging that an oral contract is equally enforceable.
If the subject matter does not require a contract to be written, an oral agreement is as
effective as a written agreement. Strom-Johnson Construction Co v Riverview Furniture Store,
227 Mich 55, 67; 198 NW 714 (1924). However, there must be a meeting of the minds on all
material facts in order to form a valid contract, and whether such mutual assent occurred is
judged by an objective standard, looking to the express words of the parties and their acts.
Groulx v Carlson, 176 Mich App 484, 491; 440 NW2d 644 (1989).
We conclude that the documentary evidence submitted to the lower court failed to
establish a factual issue regarding whether a contract existed between the plaintiff and
defendants. The documentary evidence shows that defendants were performing their duties
pursuant to their relationship with the township by assisting with overall township planning,
which included dealings with plaintiff and other township property owners. Plaintiff did not
submit any affidavits, depositions, or other documentary evidence that established mutuality of
agreement and obligation or a meeting of minds to assent to a contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendants. Groulx, supra. If anything, the documentary evidence presented by
plaintiff established a contractual relationship between defendants and the township. For
example, the invoices submitted by plaintiff reference an agreement between the township and
defendants and show charges to the township by defendants for consulting services regarding a
number of properties, including plaintiff’s. Also, plaintiff submitted a letter from the township to
him requesting reimbursement for costs incurred in reviewing his earlier rezoning request,
pursuant to the requirements of a township ordinance. Because there was no evidence raising a
question of fact regarding whether there existed a contractual relationship between plaintiff and
defendant, the circuit court properly granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim. Likewise, because professional relationships are established by
contract, see Hill v Kokosky, 186 Mich App 300, 302-303; 463 NW2d 265 (1990), the court
properly granted summary disposition on plaintiff’s professional malpractice claim as well.
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Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition regarding his breach of fiduciary duty claim.
[A] fiduciary relationship arises from the reposing of faith, confidence, and trust
and the reliance of one upon the judgment and advice of another. Relief is
granted when such position of influence has been acquired and abused, or when
confidence has been reposed and betrayed. [Vicencio v Jaime Ramirez, MD, PC,
211 Mich App 501, 508; 536 NW2d 280 (1995); citations omitted.]
Plaintiff contends that he placed his faith in defendants to advocate for his proposed land division
before the planning commission, and that defendants betrayed plaintiff’s trust. However, in the
context of a claim that an attorney breached a fiduciary duty to a nonclient, the Supreme Court
has stated as follows:
To claim breach of fiduciary duty, there must be a situation in which the nonclient
reasonably reposed faith, confidence, and trust in the attorney’s advice. As is
apparent, it is unreasonable for a nonclient to repose confidence and trust in an
attorney when any of the interests of the client and the nonclient are adverse.
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a fiduciary obligation
running to a potentially adverse party because such a duty would necessarily
“permeate all facets of the litigation” and have a significantly deleterious effect on
the attorney’s ability to make decisions for the benefit of his client. [Beaty v
Hertzberg & Golden, 456 Mich 247, 260-261; 571 NW2d 716 (1997); emphasis
added; citations omitted.]
Similarly, given the relationship between defendants and the township in this case, as shown by
the documents submitted, plaintiff, a nonclient, could not reasonably repose faith, confidence,
and trust in the defendants’ advice because plaintiff’s interests would be potentially adverse to
the township’s. Indeed, the potential for such a conflict of interest is raised in one of the
documents submitted by plaintiff. Because the documentary evidence does not establish that
defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the circuit court properly granted defendants summary
disposition with regard to plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Finally, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition regarding his fraud claim. In order to succeed in an action for fraud or
misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that the defendant made a material representation, (2) that the representation
was false, (3) that when the defendant made the representation, it was known to be
false, or was made recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and was made as
a positive assertion, (4) that the defendant made the representation with the
intention that it should be acted on by the plaintiff, (5) that the plaintiff acted in
reliance on it, and (6) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result. [H J Tucker
& Associates, Inc v Allied Chucker & Engineering Co, 234 Mich App 550, 572;
595 NW2d 176 (1999).]
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“An action for fraudulent misrepresentation must be predicated on a statement relating to a past
or existing fact.” Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 366; 573 NW2d 329 (1997). “Future
promises are contractual in nature and cannot constitute actionable fraud.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Charles W. Cairns falsely represented that he would
fairly and accurately present plaintiff’s application to the planning commission and use his
influence to gain the commission’s approval. However, even if plaintiff could show that the
alleged statements were made and that they were false, such statements constitute future
promises and thus cannot serve as the basis for a claim of fraud. Because plaintiff failed to
provide any documentary evidence showing misrepresentation by defendants to plaintiff of past
or existing facts, plaintiff’s claim fails. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendants’
motion for summary disposition as to plaintiff’s fraud claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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