PEOPLE OF MI V DARIN JEROME BASS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 29, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220567
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003481
DARIN JEROME BASS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and O’Connell and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3); MSA 28.305(a)(3), and was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense,
MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to a term of four-and-a-half to twenty-two-and-a-half years’
imprisonment. He appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that he was denied due process where the trial court’s
determination of defendant’s guilt was based, in part, on a clearly erroneous factual finding. In a
bench trial, the trial court must make specific factual findings. MCR 6.403. We review those
factual findings for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 271; 591
NW2d 267 (1998).
Defendant argues that one of the court’s findings was contrary to the evidence. The
evidence presented at trial indicated that the victim’s home had a broken window with blood on
the window sill. Two white towels with blood on them were found near the home, and police
officers saw a suspect flee the area carrying a towel. When defendant was found by police
officers, he had blood on his hands. The victim testified that the towels were similar to ones that
he had recently purchased. Defendant testified that he cut his hand changing a tire outside an
acquaintance’s house, which was across the street from the victim’s home. Defendant claimed
that his acquaintance, Melvin Nappier, gave him a towel or two to wrap around his hand.
Nappier testified that he gave defendant a white towel for his hand, which defendant took with
him when he left. The trial court’s findings included the following statement:
I want to comment further about Melvin Nappier’s testimony. I find Mr.
Nappier [sic] testimony to be less than credible, although it is somewhat revealing
in certain respects. Mr. Nappier gave an account of giving Mr. Bass a towel, and
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coincidentally it was a white towel that matched the description of the towel that
was taken from [the victim’s] house. He related giving Mr. Bass the towel to tend
to his wound. But there are two circumstances here that don’t fit the situation
that’s found from the evidence. He relates one towel being given to Mr. Bass in
his house, and Mr. Bass depositing the towel in Mr. Nappier’s bathroom. The
facts are that there were two white towels and the towels were left on the trail of
the flight.
Defendant complains that the trial court erred by finding that Nappier testified that
defendant left the towel in the bathroom. Defendant is correct. Nappier’s testimony was that
defendant took the towel with him. However, this erroneous factual finding does not require
reversal. Defendant insists that he was denied due process because the trial court’s determination
of guilt was based, in part, on this erroneous factual finding. However, our review of the record
reveals that the trial court’s verdict did not depend on this erroneous finding. The trial court, in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, stated as follows:
Defendant was convicted upon strong circumstantial evidence. First, the
police saw Defendant run from the scene of the crime. He then fled from the
police. The police found Defendant hiding in a garage in a roll of carpet.
Defendant also had a camera on his person. When the film was devoloped [sic] it
showed pictures of the family that lived in the house from which the police chased
Defendant. . . . Further, the argument that the Court incorrectly discounted one of
the defense witnesses is without merit in face of other compelling circumstantial
evidence.
Thus, the trial court’s verdict did not depend on the erroneous factual finding. Due
process requires that the prosecutor prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). The trial court’s verdict must
be supported by evidence sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the essential
elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nunez, 242 Mich App
610, 615; 619 NW2d 550 (2000). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court’s verdict. Due process was satisfied. Therefore, the trial
court’s single factual error in its extensive factual findings was harmless.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered prior, dismissed
criminal charges when sentencing defendant. At sentencing, the trial court made the following
remarks:
Mr. Bass, it’s my duty to inform your of the reasons for the Court’s
sentence.
I shared the same sentiment that the prosecutor has expressed when I read
this report. I read the first couple of paragraphs and I saw it leading to a prison
term. And then it recommends probation. Frankly, I don’t see, Mr. Bass, that
you’re—that probation is appropriate under the circumstances.
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And the reason I say that is that I, first of all, begin with your history. You
were previously on a probationary sentence in 1989. You violated probation in
1990. And you were sentenced to a term of 40 to 60 months in prison. You were
subsequently paroled on that charge in 1994 and—excuse me, you were paroled in
1992. You were discharged from parole in ’94, and in ’94 you were again placed
on a probationary term. You have several Assault and Battery charges that I see
were dismissed. However, in April of ’96 you had an Assault and Battery for
which a jail term of 40 days was imposed. You’ve got a Possession of Marijuana
conviction, Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer, and now Home Invasion in
the Second Degree.
It seems to me that you’ve been on probation; that hadn’t worked. I don’t
see any point in repeating what has been a failed effort in the past.
According to defendant, the italicized remark illustrates that the trial court improperly
considered dismissed charges when fashioning a sentence. However, taken in context, it is clear
that the court did not rely on those dismissed charges. The court stated that defendant had been
placed on probation, violated probation, and after being discharged from parole for the probation
violation, was convicted of assault and battery, drug possession, and resisting a police officer.
Thus, the court concluded that past efforts to rehabilitate defendant through probation had failed.
The court specifically recognized that several assault and battery charges had been dismissed.
Moreover, at defendant’s motion for resentencing, the trial court denied relying on the dismissed
charges when fashioning defendant’s sentence.
Where there was ample support for the trial court’s conclusion that probationary efforts
had failed, and where the trial court specifically denied relying on the dismissed charges,
defendant has not affirmatively shown that the trial court relied on improper information. Absent
such an affirmative showing, we will not presume that the trial court considered improper
information simply because the information was before the court. People v Alexander, 234 Mich
App 665, 672; 599 NW2d 749 (1999).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court should have stricken reference to the
dismissed charges from the presentence investigation report. However, the trial court granted
defendant’s post-trial motion for correction of the presentence report. Although the trial court’s
opinion only referred to uncounseled convictions, its order simply granted defendant’s motion,
which sought removal of uncounseled convictions and dismissed charges from the presentence
report. “A court speaks through written judgments and orders rather than oral statements or
written opinions.” People v Jones, 203 Mich App 74, 82; 512 NW2d 26 (1993). Thus, by its
order, the trial court granted defendant the relief he sought. This issue is therefore moot. See B
P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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