IN RE STEWART MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MELVIN JALEN STEWART,
KVON NORELLE STEWART, KRON MORELLE
STEWART, and RAHEIM MACEO STEWART,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 227923
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 94-321337
MELVIN LEWIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BETTY JOYCE STEWART,
Respondent.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Cavanagh and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Melvin Lewis, appeals as of right the termination of his parental rights to the
minor child, Melvin Jalen Stewart (DOB 8/16/94), pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) [parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody
for the child], and (h) [incarceration for two or more years/inability to provide a normal home
life].1 We affirm.
Respondent argues that the family court erred in terminating his parental rights. A twoprong test applies to a family court’s decision to terminate parental rights. First, the court must
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s mother, Betty Joyce Stewart. She
has not appealed the court’s decision.
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find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b; MSA
27.3178(598.19b) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App
22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). This Court reviews the findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Jackson, supra.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence,
the court must terminate parental rights unless “there exists clear evidence, on the whole record,
that termination is not in the child’s best interest.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356, 364-365; 612
NW2d 407 (2000); see also MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5). The trial court’s
ultimate decision regarding termination is reviewed in its entirety for clear error. Trejo, supra at
356-357.
Respondent concedes that at least one statutory ground for termination, MCL
712A.19b(3)(h); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h),2 was met by clear and convincing evidence.3
However, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination was in
the best interest of the child as required by MCL 712A.19(b)(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5). We
disagree.
During the termination proceedings, the foster care worker for the Family Independence
Agency (FIA), Monica Hutchinson, testified that the minor child became a temporary ward of the
court in May 1999 after the child’s mother, Betty Joyce Stewart, was arrested for driving under
the influence of liquor while the child was an unrestrained, front seat passenger in her vehicle.
The child was placed in an FIA foster home and, in October 1999, was placed in the home of his
paternal grandmother, Daisy Lewis. Hutchinson’s first contact with respondent occurred after
respondent’s incarceration and after the child was placed with Daisy Lewis. Hutchinson testified
that, according to respondent, prior to his incarceration, respondent saw his son on a regular basis
and, after his imprisonment, respondent maintained telephone contact with the child and wrote
the child letters. Hutchinson further testified that both Stewart and respondent indicated that
respondent financially supported the child at one point but had no information regarding the
duration or amount of support. Hutchinson further testified that respondent wanted his son to
remain in the custody of Daisy Lewis.
During the termination proceedings, respondent testified by telephone that he was
incarcerated at Ryan Correctional Facility after a March 1995 conviction on a charge of criminal
sexual conduct for which he was sentenced to seventeen to thirty years’ imprisonment. We note
that the child was approximately seven months old when respondent began serving his prison
2
In his brief on appeal, respondent mistakenly cites to MCL 712A.19b(3)(n); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(n), as the statutory ground involving imprisonment for a period in excess of
two years. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(h).
3
Because only one statutory basis is required to terminate parental rights, we need not decide
whether termination was also proper under the additional ground cited by the court. See Trejo,
supra at 360.
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sentence. Respondent testified that he was present at the child’s birth and that the child lived
with him for a week. Respondent testified that he provided support for the child, had contact
with the child since his birth, and felt he and his son had a “very close bond” and “a beautiful
relationship.” Respondent further testified that he had no objection to Daisy Lewis adopting his
son.
Upon review of the record evidence, including but not limited to the age of the child,
respondent’s lengthy prison sentence, respondent’s inability to care and provide for the child, and
considering the child’s need for permanency, we cannot conclude that the court’s assessment of
the child’s best interest was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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