IN RE BOUTILIER/BUTZ/DROSTE/HURT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NICOLE LEE HURT, DALLAS
EDWARD HURT III, HEATHER LYNN BUTZ,
JACOB ANDREW DROSTE, and LUIS
ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ BOUTILIER III, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 225432
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 90-286251
TERRI HURT,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DANIEL BUTZ and LUIS BOUTILIER,
Respondents.
In the Matter of NICOLE LEE HURT, DALLAS
EDWARD HURT III, HEATHER LYNN BUTZ,
JACOB ANDREW DROSTE, and LUIS
ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ BOUTILIER III, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 225611
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 90-286251
LUIS ROBERTO BOUTILIER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
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TERRI HURT and DANIEL BUTZ,
Respondents.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Hurt appeals as of right from the family court order terminating her parental
rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). Respondent Boutilier appeals by delayed leave
granted the family court order terminating his parental rights to Luis Roberto Rodriguez Boutilier
III, pursuant to the same statutory grounds. We affirm.
Respondent Hurt argues that the family court abused its discretion by refusing to grant her
attorney’s requests to adjourn the termination hearing. We review the trial court’s decision for an
abuse of discretion. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
Respondent Hurt’s attorney made two requests to adjourn the termination hearing. In
denying the first request, made at the start of the termination hearing, the family court found that
respondent Hurt had been properly served with a summons and petition at the prior hearing, that
the court had advised Hurt that the proceedings would continue and of her duty to remain in
contact with her attorney and appear in court, and that Hurt was aware of the date of the hearing.
In light of the caseworker’s testimony regarding Hurt’s participation in a drug treatment program,
the attorney subsequently renewed his request for an adjournment, stating that he would like to
speak with the counselor at the program and possibly call her as a witness. The court denied the
request, finding that Hurt could have met with her attorney after the last hearing to prepare her
defense, but did not do so. The court stated that it would not adjourn the hearing so that a
witness could be obtained for Hurt, who, herself, was not present at the hearing. Considering
Hurt’s failure to attend court hearings and maintain contact with her attorney, the family court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the requests for an adjournment.
Respondent Boutilier argues that he was not provided with notice of the July 19, 1999,
permanency planning hearing for Luis. This claim is not supported by the record. The record
indicates that respondent Boutilier attended a permanency planning hearing for Luis on April 30,
1999. The family court informed him at that hearing that the child had been made a temporary
court ward. Because Boutilier claimed that he could not afford an attorney, the court appointed
House Counsel to represent him, and advised him that if he disappeared again, the court would
act swiftly to place the child in a safe, suitable home. The court stated that it would consider the
hearing as a review hearing rather than a permanency planning hearing because Boutilier had
appeared, but noted that a termination petition would have been ordered if he had not appeared at
the hearing. The court stated that a review hearing would be held on June 25, 1999.
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A summons for that hearing was subsequently issued. The summons stated that the
purpose of the hearing was to decide whether the court should exercise authority over the child
because of neglect or abuse, that Boutilier had the right to be represented by an attorney and the
right to a trial by jury or judge, that the hearing may result in a temporary or permanent loss of
rights to the child and that a petition was attached. However, an unsuccessful attempt was made
to serve Boutilier because the last known address was incorrect. The summons and petition were
also sent to Boutilier by certified mail, but the mail was returned unclaimed.
Notice of the hearing was then made by publication, but Boutilier failed to attend the
hearing. The family court found that there had been no contact by Boutilier, that he was not
invested in the treatment plan and that he had warrants pending for his arrest. Due to Boutilier’s
continued non-appearance and lack of involvement, the court excused his appointed counsel.
The court noted that a permanency planning hearing for Luis would be combined with the
adjudication hearing for the other children on July 19, 1999.
The record indicates that Boutilier was provided with notice of the July 19, 1999, hearing
by publication in the companion matter pending before the court. Boutilier did not attend that
hearing, but knew or should have known that the court would be conducting a permanency
planning hearing for Luis from his attendance in court on April 30, 1999. Boutilier’s argument
that he was not provided with notice of the hearing is without merit.
Boutilier also argues that the family court denied him his right to the assistance of an
attorney by discharging his court-appointed attorney prior to the permanency planning hearing.
In child protective proceedings, indigent respondents are afforded the right to court-appointed
counsel by statute, MCL 712A.17c(5); MSA 27.3178(598.17c)(5), and court rule, MCR
5.915(B)(1). This Court has stated that MCR 5.915(B)(1) mandates the appointment of counsel
for indigent parents at all hearings in a child protective proceeding. In re Osborne, 230 Mich
App 712, 716; 584 NW2d 649 (1998), vacated on other grounds 459 Mich 360 (1999).
However, this Court held in In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 220-222; 469 NW2d 56 (1991), that
the court rule requires affirmative action on the part of the respondent to trigger the appointment
and continuation of appointed counsel in all hearings which may affect the respondent’s parental
rights. We agree that Boutilier effectively terminated the attorney-client relationship by failing to
maintain contact with his attorney and attend court hearings, thereby “waiving” or relinquishing
his right to counsel under MCR 5.915(B)(1)(c). Therefore, the family court did not err in
discharging Boutilier’s attorney prior to the permanency planning hearing.
Finally, we conclude that the family court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both
respondents.1 MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further,
the evidence did not establish that termination of respondents’ parental rights was clearly not in
1
We agree that the trial court erred to the extent that it terminated respondent Hurt’s parental
rights to her four older children under § 19b(3)(c)(i), inasmuch as 182 days had not elapsed since
the initial disposition order was issued as to those children. However, the error does not warrant
reversal because the remaining statutory grounds for termination were sufficiently established. In
re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
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the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the family court did not err in terminating
respondent Hurt’s and respondent Boutilier’s parental rights to the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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