IN RE SILER/WILSON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DARNISHA SILER, DARIA
JANAY SILER, DWAYNE WILSON, and
MAXINE WILSON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 24 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 227992
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-376530
BARBARA ROCHELLE SILER,
Respondent-Appellant
and
DWAYNE EDWARD WILSON, SR.,
Respondent.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Markey and Collins, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant Barbara Rochelle Siler (respondent) appeals as of right from the
order terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii),
(c)(i), and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), and (g). We affirm.
The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that subsection 19b(3)(c)(i) was established
by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
The conditions that led to the adjudication were, among other things, respondent’s drug
dependency and the unsuitable and unsafe conditions in her home. Thus, the primary
requirements of respondent’s treatment plan were to complete substance abuse treatment,
establish and maintain safe and suitable housing for the children, and maintain contact with case
workers.
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The record shows that respondent failed to comply in any regard with her treatment plan
during the time that her children were in care. She admitted to using cocaine three weeks before
the trial and had not been evaluated for any sort of rehabilitation program. Although respondent
asserted at the termination hearing that she had suitable housing for the children, because she
failed to maintain contact with the case workers or respond to their inquiries, they were not able
to visit and evaluate the suitability of the home. Finally, respondent acknowledged that she had
temporarily lost custody of her children in Illinois due, at least in part, to her substance abuse,
and had not managed since that time to remain drug free, despite regaining custody of her
children. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the
conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i). Further, the circuit court did not clearly err
in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the minor child’s
best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); Trejo, supra at 354.
Because only one statutory ground for termination must be established in order to
terminate parental rights, we need not decide whether termination was also proper under
subsections 19b(3)(a)(ii) and (g). MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3); Trejo, supra at
360.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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