PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES H ERVIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 3, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215192
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-001604
CHARLES H. ERVIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of unlawfully driving away an
automobile (UDAA), MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). We affirm.
First, defendant argues that the court erred by instructing the jury as to the crime of
UDAA because it is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Defendant contends that the
instruction constituted an improper amendment of the information, denying defendant proper
notice and depriving him of his right to a preliminary examination. We disagree.
We have thoroughly reviewed the entire record of the proceedings below, and we
conclude that defendant expressly acquiesced in the UDAA instruction on more than one
occasion and has therefore waived the issue for review. A defendant may not waive objection to
an issue before the trial court and then raise it as an error before this Court. People v Carter, 462
Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). “To hold otherwise would allow defendant to harbor
error as an appellate parachute.” People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520; 583 NW2d 199
(1998).
As a part of his first issue, defendant asserts without argument that the manner in which
the jury was instructed on the felony-firearm charge was improper and that conviction should be
vacated as well. Because defendant has provided no argument, we will not address this
contention. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 588; 569 NW2d 663 (1997) (“A party may
not merely announce a position and leave it to us to discover and rationale the basis for the
claim.”).
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Second, defendant argues that the court erroneously refused to give the prosecutorrequested cautionary instruction regarding defendant’s testimony involving other bad acts. The
prosecutor counters that because defendant did not request the instruction, this issue has not been
preserved for appeal. Even assuming that the trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction,
we find such error to be harmless in light of ample evidence supporting defendant’s UDAA and
felony-firearm convictions. See People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607
(1999).
Third, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the
UDAA instruction because, given defendant’s habitual offender status, the shorter underlying
sentence for UDAA would necessarily be vacated and an enhanced sentence imposed, which is
potentially the same penalty as for armed robbery; consequently, there was no sound trial strategy
in allowing the jury to consider the less serious offense. Defendant also argues that counsel was
ineffective by failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding defendant’s testimony
concerning his prior drug activity, given the obvious potential prejudice.
Allegations pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel must first be heard by the trial
court to establish a record of the facts pertaining to such allegations. People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). In cases such as this, where a Ginther hearing has not been
held, review by this Court is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Price, 214
Mich App 538, 547; 543 NW2d 49 (1995). Furthermore, under Strickland v Washington, 466
US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), and People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521
NW2d 797 (1994), in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
also that the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. Id. at
309. Prejudice exists where a court can conclude that there is a “reasonable probability that,
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland,
supra at 695. To prevail, “defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the assistance of
his counsel was sound trial strategy.” People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444; 597
NW2d 843 (1999).
Defendant argues that the mere fact that he was found guilty of UDAA demonstrates that
he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object to the new charge. The assumption
underlying this argument is that without the new charge, he may have been acquitted. However,
defendant can only speculate that he received a more severe penalty than he would have had the
UDAA instruction not been given because the jury could have found him guilty of armed robbery
or of unarmed robbery. A similar argument was rejected in People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359; 501
NW2d 151 (1993). Thus, defendant cannot claim that he was prejudiced merely on the basis that
he was convicted of the added charge.
Defendant does not argue that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the
UDAA charge; rather, he asks this Court to assume that he would been acquitted of all charges if
the court had not instructed the jury on the UDAA charge. However, this Court should not
interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses,
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992),
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quoting People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 375-376; 220 NW2d 393 (1974). Here, the jury was
properly permitted to consider and convict defendant of the less serious crime of UDAA.
Other than defendant’s mere conclusion that the fact alone that he was convicted
demonstrates prejudice, he has not shown that counsel’s decision to acquiesce in the UDAA
instruction prejudiced him. It appears from the record that defense counsel either requested the
UDAA instruction or else did not object to it because, as a matter of trial strategy, he feared that
defendant might be found guilty of armed robbery or unarmed robbery. There is a strong
presumption that this was counsel’s sound trial strategy.
Because of defendant’s status as a fourth habitual offender, a felony conviction for
UDAA triggered sentence enhancement the same way that a felony conviction for armed robbery
would have. Thus, defendant argues that he had nothing to gain from the UDAA instruction
because a conviction for UDAA could carry “potentially the same penalty” as armed robbery.
Nonetheless, common sense compels the conclusion that, short of complete acquittal, the goal for
which counsel clearly strived, it is better to be convicted of UDAA, which is a non-assaultive
property crime that alone carries a maximum sentence of five years, than it is to be convicted of
armed robbery, a serious, assaultive crime that alone carries a maximum sentence of life.
Defendant cites People v Lloyd, 459 Mich 433; 590 NW2d 738 (1999), and states that
“Lloyd is helpful here,” but fails to give any explanation for this conclusion. We can only
speculate that defendant cites Lloyd because in that case, our Supreme Court found that a defense
counsel’s failure to advocate a guilty but mentally ill defense could not be said to have prejudiced
the defendant, in part because the defendant would have been subjected to incarceration for life
whether he was found guilty but mentally ill or guilty of first-degree murder. Id. at 451.
Lloyd is distinguishable from this case. In Lloyd, both potential underlying offenses
(first-degree murder or first-degree murder but mentally ill, MCL 768.36(3); MSA 28.1059(3),
MCL 750.316(1); MSA 28.548 (1), MCL 791.234(6); MSA 28.2304(6)), mandated life in prison.
In this case, the underlying offenses of armed robbery and UDAA carried substantially different
penalties in and of themselves. Obviously, defendant cannot argue that both underlying offenses
carried the same penalty. Accordingly, defendant will not be allowed to use his fourth habitual
offender status to his advantage now by arguing that, because under a conviction for either armed
robbery or UDAA, his habitual offender status rendered the potential sentence for his crime life
in prison, there was no tactical advantage to acquiescing in the UDAA instruction.
Furthermore, in Lloyd, supra at 438, the defense counsel actually conceded that the
defendant had killed the victim, but argued that the defendant lacked the state of mind necessary
for a premeditated murder conviction. Conceding to a lesser included offense can sometimes be
sound trial strategy. However, there is an important distinction between conceding to a lesser
offense as a matter of trial strategy and simply failing to object to, or agreeing to, an instruction
on the lesser offense. Although defendant strongly implies it throughout his brief, our review of
the record evidences that defense counsel by no means conceded anything to the jury relating to
the UDAA charge. To the contrary, defense counsel specifically argued throughout trial that the
victim authorized defendant to drive the truck home. Thus, this is not a situation where counsel
chose to concede guilt on one charge in order to avoid another.
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For these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that defense counsel failed to object to the
UDAA instruction because, as a matter of trial strategy, he feared that defendant would be found
guilty of armed robbery, a capital crime, and concluded that, short of complete acquittal, a
conviction for a non-assaultive property crime would be less harmful to defendant’s record than a
conviction for armed robbery. Sentencing courts are permitted to consider the severity of a crime
in sentencing, as well as a defendant’s criminal history. People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 98;
617 NW2d 721 (2000). Thus, if not during sentencing for this particular crime, if defendant were
ever again faced with sentencing for a criminal conviction, it would be better for him to have a
UDAA conviction, than another armed robbery conviction as part of his criminal history.
Furthermore, whether to impose an increased sentence as authorized by the habitual
offender act is discretionary with the sentencing court. People v Alexander, 234 Mich App 665,
673; 599 NW2d 749 (1999). Because of defendant’s habitual offender status, the penalty for
many different felonies would be potentially the same. Nonetheless, the court may consider the
underlying crime, but using its discretion, sentence a defendant to a less severe penalty than that
allowed under the habitual offender statutes. In fact, the court in this case chose not to sentence
defendant to life in prison even though it could have. See MCL 769.12(1)(a); MSA 28.1084
(1)(a). Obviously, it is always preferable for a defendant to be convicted of the least serious
crime possible both for the immediate sentencing ramifications and for future criminal history
considerations.
For these common sense reasons, defendant simply cannot plausibly argue that if given a
choice between an armed robbery conviction and a UDAA conviction, he would have chosen an
armed robbery conviction. Defendant simply cannot assume that in the absence of the UDAA
instruction, he would have been acquitted of all charges.
As part of his ineffective assistance of counsel argument, defendant also asserts that the
“only” reason that he was not “completely acquitted” was that the UDAA instruction was given
“contrary to law formulated by the Michigan Supreme Court.” For the reasons discussed above,
the UDAA instruction was not given “contrary” to law, and defendant’s claim that he would have
been acquitted but for the UDAA instruction is a bold assumption, especially in the complete
absence of any argument from defendant that there would have been insufficient evidence to
support an armed robbery conviction.
Next, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to “vigorously urge the
trial judge to give a cautionary or limiting instruction” regarding defendant’s other bad acts and
by failing to object to the court’s refusal to give such an instruction upon the prosecutor’s
request. We disagree. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must
show that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995), quoting Strickland,
supra, 466 US at 687. The record reveals that the prosecutor requested a cautionary instruction,
but the court denied it. As previously stated above, in light of the ample evidence supporting
defendant’s convictions, any error on the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was harmless.
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Thus, defendant cannot satisfy the second prong of an ineffective assistance claim because he
cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request the instruction.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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