PEOPLE OF MI V DATRELL L EFFINGER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212868
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-007780
DATRELL L. EFFINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b,
MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to a term of twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the
murder conviction and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first claims that the trial court’s comments denied him a fair and impartial
trial. However, defendant objected to only one of the court’s comments below and, thus,
appellate review of the remaining comments is precluded absent manifest injustice. People v
Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). If the trial court’s conduct pierces the
veil of judicial impartiality, a defendant’s conviction must be reversed. The appropriate test is
whether the court’s comments or conduct were of such a nature as to unduly influence the jury
and thereby deprive the defendant of his right to a fair and impartial trial. Id.
Viewed in context, the record does not reflect either that the court “thwarted” defense
counsel’s cross-examination of the sole eyewitness or that it criticized defense counsel
excessively. See People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 461-462; 421 NW2d 200 (1988).
Rather, the majority of the challenged remarks constituted a legitimate exercise of the trial
court’s responsibility to control the proceedings. See MCR 611(a); MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052.
The remaining comments were not of such a nature as to unduly influence the jury and thereby
deprive defendant of a fair trial.
II
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Defendant next claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Because
defendant failed to make a testimonial record in the trial court in connection with a motion for a
new trial or an evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to the facts contained on the record.
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Hedelsky, 162 Mich App
382, 387; 412 NW2d 746 (1987).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. A defendant must
also overcome the presumption that the challenged action or inaction was trial strategy. People v
Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because defense counsel failed to
subpoena and call an alleged alibi witness to testify. To support this claim, defendant submits on
appeal the affidavit of a relative, who averred that defense counsel was aware of the witness and
that the witness would have testified at trial that defendant was not at the scene of the crime.
Decisions regarding whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy, and an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel's competence with the benefit of hindsight.
People v Barnett, 163 Mich App 331, 338; 414 NW2d 378 (1987).
Defendant has failed to sustain his burden of proving that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Initially, we note that the affidavit attached to defendant's brief was not
part of the lower court record. MCR 7.210(A)(1) In any event, even assuming that counsel was
aware of the witness and had interviewed him, defense counsel could have chosen not to call him
for various reasons. Additionally, there is no evidence or affidavit from the actual witness
indicating what his testimony would be or that he would have testified. Indeed, the supporting
affidavit is from defendant’s relative as opposed to the actual witness. Defendant has failed to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the testimony would have altered the outcome of the
trial. See People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Defendant’s second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that defense counsel
failed to timely demand the production of an endorsed police witness, who reported that he was
unable to obtain any information from the victim because he was uncooperative. Here, the
officer’s partner, who was within three feet of the victim, testified at trial that the victim said:
“Trell and Bubble Gum had shot him.” A second officer, who was also at the scene, testified that
he heard the victim say “Terrell” shot him. The officers indicated that the victim was “not too
conscious,” “not doing too well,” and it was difficult for the victim to speak because of his
injuries. This description of the victim’s condition is not inconsistent with the endorsed officer’s
report that he was unable to obtain a name because the victim was uncooperative. Further, the
endorsed officer’s testimony would not have likely discredited his partner’s testimony, who was
within two or three feet of the victim. Moreover, the jury was aware of the contents of the
officer’s report because it was discussed on numerous occasions throughout trial. In addition, the
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trial court allowed defense counsel to use the report, although it was hearsay, because the officer
would not be testifying. As such, contrary to defendant’s claim, based on the evidence presented,
it is unlikely that, but for counsel’s failure to timely seek the production of the witness, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. Effinger, supra.
We likewise reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective because he
should have filed a motion to exclude the out-of-court photographic identification made by the
eyewitness because only one photograph was shown. Pretrial identification procedures that are
so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification constitute a denial of due process of law. Simmons v United States, 390 US
377; 88 S Ct 967; 19 L Ed 2d 1247 (1968); People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 168; 205 NW2d
461 (1973).
Here, the record demonstrates that this was not a typical photo lineup for the purpose of
identifying an assailant. Rather, the officer wanted to confirm that he had the correct “Trell,”
because there were other individuals named “Trell” in the neighborhood. The eyewitness
testified that he had known defendant for many years because they had lived in the same
neighborhood since their childhood. The eyewitness testified that he had seen defendant more
than a hundred times over the years, and was certain that defendant was the person who shot the
victim. In addition, there was evidence that the victim pointed out the house where the shooters
lived, and an investigation revealed that defendant’s relatives lived in that house. Hence, there is
no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to move to exclude the pretrial
identification, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Effinger, supra.
Additionally, we reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the admission of the victim’s “dying declaration” identifying him as the shooter,
because the victim was not conscious of his impending death. In order to admit a statement as a
“dying declaration” under MRE 804(b)(2), the trial court must be satisfied that the following is
established: (1) the declarant must have been conscious of impending death; (2) death must
actually have ensued; (3) the statements are sought to be admitted in a criminal prosecution
against the individual who killed the decedent; and, (4) the statements must relate to the
circumstances of the killing. People v Parney, 98 Mich App 571, 581; 296 NW2d 568 (1979).
“‘Consciousness of death’ requires, first, that it be established that the declarant was in fact in
extremis at the time the statement was made and, secondly, that the decedent believed his death
was impending.” People v Siler, 171 Mich App 246; 251; 429 NW2d 865 (1988). The declarant
need not have actually stated that he knew he was dying in order for the statement to be
admissible as a dying declaration. Id.
Here, the victim was shot four times. When officers arrived on the scene, the victim was
laying in the grass next to a vacant lot, bleeding. Officers explained that the victim was “not too
conscious,” and “not doing too well.” The victim’s speech was slow, slurred and fainting, but
one officer indicated that he was certain that the victim said “Trell” and “Bubble Gum.” A
second officer testified that the victim was not doing very well and it was difficult for the victim
to speak. The victim, however, was able to say who shot him and point towards a house down
the street. The victim was taken by ambulance to the hospital and later pronounced dead. These
circumstances provide a sufficient basis for the trial court’s determination that the victim was
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conscious of his impending death when he made the statements to the officers. See, id.
Accordingly, because the testimony was admissible, defense counsel's failure to move to
preclude admission of the dying declaration does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel is not required to make a frivolous or meritless motion. See People v Gist, 188 Mich
App 610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991).
We also reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel denied him a fair trial because he
“opened the door” to defendant’s bad acts. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the
eyewitness: “you got bad blood with the Effingers . . . ?” The eyewitness thereafter testified
regarding an altercation between his friend and defendant. This was clearly a matter of trial
strategy. It is apparent, after reviewing the entire context of defense counsel’s questions, that he
was attempting to provide a motive for the eyewitness to falsely implicate defendant in this
shooting. Indeed, one of defendant’s theories was that the eyewitness was the actual shooter.
The fact that the eyewitness’ friend and defendant had a previous altercation would support such
a motive. This Court will not second-guess counsel in matters of trial strategy. People v
Stewart, 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996). The fact that the strategy chosen by
defense counsel was not effective does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel elicited bad acts testimony about defendant’s
uncle, Bubble Gum, from the victim’s sister. Specifically, on cross-examination, defense counsel
elicited the testimony that defendant’s uncle had raped the victim’s sister. Again, this question
was a matter of trial strategy. It appears from reading the exchange in its entirety, that defense
counsel was illustrating that there was tension between defendant’s uncle and the victim, and
attempting to implicate defendant’s uncle as the shooter. Indeed, at one point, in response to
defense counsel’s questions, the victim’s sister said: “So you’re saying that [defendant’s uncle]
was the shooter?” Again, the fact that the strategy chosen by defense counsel did not work does
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
Defendant next claims that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to
an officer’s testimony that he was “looking for” defendant before this incident. Given the brief
and isolated nature of the officer’s comment, defense counsel may have determined that an
objection would have called more attention to the alleged improper testimony. People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 287, n 54; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). We will not substitute our judgment for that of
counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will we assess counsel's competence with the
benefit of hindsight. Barnett, supra.
We also reject defendant’s claim the defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the prosecution’s questioning of an officer regarding defendant’s alibi before he actually
presented such a defense. Before a defendant actually presents an alibi at trial, the prosecution
may not comment on the defendant's filing of an alibi notice or a failure to produce corroborating
witnesses. People v Holland, 179 Mich App 184, 191; 445 NW2d 206 (1989). However, once a
defendant presents such a defense, the prosecution is permitted to attack the defendant’s alibi by
commenting on the weakness of the alibi testimony. Id. Here, during defense counsel’s opening
argument, he discussed defendant’s alibi at length on two occasions. Accordingly, any objection
in this regard would have been futile. Gist, supra.
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Defendant also argues that defense counsel failed to object to the several instances of
prosecutorial misconduct during trial. However, as hereafter discussed, because the prosecutor’s
conduct did not deny defendant a fair trial, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object. Id.
Defendant’s final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that defense counsel failed
to advise him of his right to testify at trial. This issue is without merit. Defendant does not claim
that he was ignorant of his right to testify or that he would have testified. He also fails to indicate
what testimony he would have provided had he testified. See People v Simmons, 140 Mich App
681, 685-686; 364 NW2d 783 (1985). Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief on this
basis.
III
Next, defendant raises numerous claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant failed to
object to the alleged improper remarks and hence appellate review is precluded unless a curative
instruction could not have eliminated any possible prejudice or failure to consider the issue
would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557
(1994); Paquette, supra, 341-342.
Our review of the record reveals that defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial
because of the allegedly improper conduct by the prosecutor. Rather, the challenged remarks and
conduct by the prosecutor were either proper responses to defense counsel’s arguments or
reasonable inferences from the evidence produced at trial. People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16;
260 NW2d 58 (1977); People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72,76; 574 NW2d 703 (1997); People
v Fisher, 220 Mich App 133, 156; 559 NW2d 318 (1996). Moreover, although a prosecutor may
not vouch for the credibility of a witness, she may argue from the facts that a witness is credible.
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). A prosecutor need not state
her argument or inferences in the blandest possible terms. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669,
678; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Therefore, defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.
IV
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s instruction that the jury should consider only
the evidence presented, as opposed to the lack of evidence, denied him a fair trial. Because
defendant did not object to this instruction at trial, our review is limited to the question of
whether relief is necessary to avoid manifest injustice. See People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540,
544-545; 494 NW2d 737 (1993); People v Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 37; 543 NW2d 332 (1995).
The trial court’s instruction was given directly after the prosecutor’s objection to
defendant’s insinuation that the prosecutor’s waiver of a police witness could be considered as
evidence. It is apparent that the instruction related only to the prosecutor’s waiver of the police
witness. Moreover, in its final instructions before deliberations, the trial court indicated to the
jury that a reasonable doubt is a fair doubt growing out of the evidence, the lack of evidence, or
the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence in a case. Viewing the instructions as a whole,
defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court’s cautionary instruction, given after the
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prosecutor’s objection, denied him a fair trial or failed to sufficiently protect his rights.
Therefore, defendant has forfeited review of this unpreserved issue.
V
We further reject defendant’s claim that he was entitled to a mistrial based on the trial
court taking judicial notice of the fact that there are at least two types of handguns. This Court
reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v
Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 175; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). A mistrial should be granted only
for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to
receive a fair trial. People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 227; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
The court could properly take judicial notice of the difference between a revolver and an
automatic handgun because the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute and is capable of accurate
demonstration by resorting to easily accessible sources of unquestioned accuracy. See People v
Toodle, 155 Mich App 539, 547; 400 NW2d 670 (1986); People v Burt, 89 Mich App 293, 297298; 279 NW2d 299 (1979). Further, defendant does not claim that the trial court’s description
was incorrect, merely that it was “simplistic” and “misleading.” Additionally, the difference
between the two types of handguns was not material to his case. We note that the trial court did
not provide a cautionary instruction pursuant to MRE 201(f), but defendant failed to request such
an instruction. See Haywood, supra, 229. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial.
VI
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to a new trial because there was no on-therecord waiver of his right to testify. There is no requirement that there be an on-the-record
waiver of a defendant's right to testify. Simmons, supra, 684. Further, where a defendant is
represented by counsel, the trial court has no duty to determine whether a defendant’s waiver of
the right to testify is knowing and intelligent. Id.; see also, People v Harris, 190 Mich App 652,
661-662; 476 NW2d 767 (1991). Therefore, this issue is also without merit.
VII
We also reject defendant’s claim that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentence is
disproportionate. A sentence constitutes an abuse if discretion if it violates the principle of
proportionality by being disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Defendant's twenty-year minimum sentence is within the sentencing guidelines recommended
range of ten to twenty-five years and, thus, is presumptively proportionate. People v Broden, 428
Mich 343, 354-355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987); People v Eberhardt, 205 Mich App 587, 591; 518
NW2d 511 (1994). Defendant has failed to demonstrate any unusual circumstances to overcome
the presumption of proportionality. People v Piotrowski, 211 Mich App 527, 533; 536 NW2d
293 (1995); People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
VIII
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Finally, we reject defendant's argument that the cumulative effect of several errors
deprived him of a fair trial. Because no cognizable errors were identified that deprived defendant
of a fair trial, reversal under the cumulative effect theory is unwarranted. People v Sawyer, 215
Mich App 183, 197; 545 NW2d 6 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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