IN RE DAVIS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LARRY DAVIS, JR., DANIEL S.
DAVIS, CANDACE L. DAVIS, and SIERRA D.
DAVIS, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 225112
Ogemaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 95-010026-na
CHARLA DAVIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LARRY DAVIS,
Respondent.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Charla Davis (hereinafter “respondent”) appeals as of right from
the family court’s order terminating her parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii),
(c)(i), and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), and (g). We affirm.
Because the minor children were Indian children, a dual burden of proof was required in
order to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 25 USC 1912(f); MCL 712A.19b(3); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3). As this Court explained in In re Elliott, 218 Mich App 196, 209-210; 554
NW2d 32 (1996):
[T]he [trial] court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that “continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical harm to the child,” and the court must also find that clear
and convincing evidence supports termination under the applicable state statutory
ground.
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Our review of the record convinces us that the family court did not clearly err in finding that the
statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence.
Additionally, the court credited and accepted the testimony of Martha Snyder, an American
Indian expert under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq., who testified that she
had “absolutely no doubt, beyond any doubt,” that “[t]hese children would be at risk, definitely at
risk,” if returned to the parents. The court expressly found that the risks included emotional,
physical and spiritual dangers. Accordingly, we conclude that the family court did not err in
finding that the dual burden of proof for Indian children was met.
Finally, because the ICWA contains no prohibition against the use of hearsay in
termination proceedings, and because, pursuant to MCR 5.974(F)(2), the court was free to
consider all relevant and material evidence,1 even though such evidence may not be legally
admissible at trial, the family court’s consideration of hearsay evidence was not error. Further,
the requisite finding based on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody of the
children by respondent will likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children
was supported by the expert’s admissible testimony, which may be based on hearsay information
in accordance with MRE 703 and MRE 704. Thomas v McPherson Center, 155 Mich App 700,
708-709; 400 NW2d 629 (1986).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
1
Respondent concedes that the challenged evidence was relevant.
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