PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER K STERN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220744
Macomb Circuit Court
LC Nos. 98-000962-FC;
98-000964-FC;
98-000966-FC;
98-000972-FC
CHRISTOPHER K. STERN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Charges were brought against defendant in four separate cases. The cases were
consolidated and tried before a jury from May 4 through May 17, 1999. Following the jury trial,
defendant was convicted of the following in each case: In 98-000962-FC, defendant was
convicted of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA
28.788(2)(1)(a) (person under thirteen years of age), and two counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a) (person under thirteen years of age).
In 98-000964-FC, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In 98-000966-FC, defendant was
convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. In 98-000972-FC, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant was
sentenced to fifty to seventy-five years for each count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and
ten to fifteen years for each count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant appeals
as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to authorize
funds for defendant to hire a second psychiatric expert witness to support his insanity defense.
The trial court ruled that one psychiatric expert witness was sufficient in light of the
prosecution’s determination to only call one expert witness in rebuttal. A trial court’s decision
whether to appoint an expert witness is reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. People
v Carson, 220 Mich App 662, 678; 560 NW2d 657 (1996), adopting the findings of the
previously vacated opinion in People v Carson, 217 Mich App 801, 806; 553 NW2d 1 (1996).
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MCL 768.20a; MSA 28.1043(1) governs the appointment of an expert witness for an
indigent defendant, and provides, in pertinent part:
(3) The defendant may, at his or her own expense, or if indigent, at the expense of
the county, secure an independent psychiatric evaluation by a clinician of his or
her choice on the issue of his or her insanity at the time the alleged offense was
committed. The defendant shall notify the prosecuting attorney at least 5 days
before the day scheduled for the independent evaluation that he or she intends to
secure such an evaluation. The prosecuting attorney may similarly obtain
independent psychiatric evaluation. A clinician secured by an indigent defendant
shall be entitled to receive a reasonable fee as approved by the court.
In Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 74; 105 S Ct 1087; 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court held “that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution
requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant
cannot otherwise afford one.” In so holding, the Court stated:
. . . , the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the
indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his
personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the
indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we
have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the State
the decision on how to implement this right. [Id. at 83.]
Additionally, the Court specifically limited its holding by noting that a state is only obligated to
appoint one competent psychiatrist for a defendant. Id. at 78-79.
In the instant case, defendant was given funds to hire his first choice psychiatric expert
witness. Defendant was able to fully present his insanity defense through this expert witness.
Moreover, this is not a case where the prosecution had an advantage as a result of defendant’s
indigence. The prosecution limited itself to one expert witness. In sum, defendant had the
services of one competent expert witness, and no more is required by law. Id. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant additional funds for a second expert witness. Carson,
supra.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in determining that his statement to the
police was voluntarily made. “Whether a defendant’s statement was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary is a question of law that a court must determine under the totality of the
circumstances.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 417; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). This Court
will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is
clearly erroneous if it leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
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Specifically, defendant contends that his statement to the police was coerced by a promise
that defendant would receive counseling if he cooperated with the police. A Walker1 hearing was
held on May 4, 1999. Officer Stephen Triner testified that he was the officer in charge of
defendant’s case. On February 18, 1998, Triner was informed that defendant had arrived at the
Fraser Police Station at 10:10 p.m.2 Triner arrived shortly thereafter to interview defendant.
Triner testified that he did not notice any physical marks on defendant and defendant did not
complain about a lack of sleep. Defendant did not make any statements concerning promises
made by other authorities. Triner was unaware if defendant received any food on his journey.
Triner did not make any promises to defendant or indicate that the prosecution would be easy on
defendant if he made a statement.
Detective Mike White from the Charlevoix Police Department was also there for the
interview. His interest stemmed from similar charges involving the same victims for incidents
that occurred in Charlevoix. Defendant signed his rights form at 10:35 p.m. Defendant did not
appear to be under the affects of medication or narcotics. Defendant did not complain of a lack
of sleep. Defendant responded to questions and behaved appropriately during the interview.
Detective White conducted most of the interview. The interview lasted until approximately 2:30
a.m. Defendant initially requested that a tape recorder not be used to record his statement.
During the latter portions of the interview, defendant requested that the tape recorder be turned
on so that defendant could express his thoughts on the case. Triner testified that defendant was
told that defendant could stop the interview at any time. At the end of Triner’s testimony,
defense counsel indicated that on its face it appeared that there were no violations. The trial
court agreed and determined that defendant’s statement to the police was voluntary.
The test of voluntariness is “whether, considering the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by
its maker,’ or whether the accused’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired . . . .’” People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d
781 (1998), citing Columbe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602; 81 S Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037
(1961). In Cipriano, the Michigan Supreme Court outlined the following list of non-exclusive
factors to consider when determining the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement:
the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of
his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the
statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a
magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured,
intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the
accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
2
Defendant was arrested in Oklahoma and transported back to Michigan after waiving
extradition.
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was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.
[Cipriano, supra at 334.]
The absence or presence of any of these factors is not conclusive on the issue of voluntariness.
Rather, “[t]he ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made.” Id.
at 334.
In the instant case, we find no clear error in the trial court's determination that defendant’s
statement was voluntarily given. Although the Walker hearing transcript does not address
defendant’s educational history or his intelligence level, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that defendant was incapable of understanding the proceedings. Triner testified that defendant
was able to verbally communicate with the officers and did not indicate that he was unable to
read or write. Defendant had a history of experiences with the criminal justice system, including
two prior convictions as an adult. Accordingly, defendant had a basis for understanding the
circumstances surrounding the interview.
Officers Triner and White interviewed defendant for approximately four hours.
Defendant was only detained by the Fraser Police Department for approximately thirty minutes
before giving his statement. Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and signed the
rights form after it was read to him and after he had time to review the form. Moreover,
defendant was questioned shortly after his arrival at the Fraser Police Station, so there was no
unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he made his confession.
There was no evidence to suggest that defendant was injured, intoxicated, drugged, or in
ill health when he gave his statement. Triner testified that defendant did not appear to be under
the influence of any substances when he was questioned. Defendant was not in any observable
pain and did not request medication. Moreover, defendant was not denied food, sleep, or
medical attention. Triner testified that he offered defendant a beverage during the course of the
interview. Defendant declined and did not request a beverage or food during the interview.
According to Triner, defendant never appeared to lack energy or the capacity to focus on the
purpose of the interview.
Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that the officers coerced defendant’s
confession by withholding medical attention or making promises of counseling. There was also
no evidence that defendant was abused in any manner or threatened with abuse. Accordingly,
there is no evidence that defendant’s statement was involuntary or obtained in violation of his
due process rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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