NOREEN R COLLET V TOTAL PETROLEUM INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NOREEN R. COLLET,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 218179
Gratiot Circuit Court
LC No. 97-004801-NZ
TOTAL PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), in this perceived handicap discrimination case. We affirm.
This case arises from plaintiff’s application for employment at defendant’s oil refinery.
Defendant extended an offer of employment to plaintiff, subject to the results of a preemployment physical and a lifting test. Plaintiff’s physical revealed indications of heart and
cardiovascular problems, including an irregular heartbeat, a narrowed carotid artery, elevated
cholesterol and triglyceride levels, and heavy smoking. The physical also revealed that plaintiff’s
family had a history of strokes and other cardiovascular problems. Further, plaintiff failed the
lifting test when she was unable to lift a seventy-five pound weight to a specified height.
Defendant then withdrew its offer of employment.
Plaintiff claims that defendant’s failure to hire her for the refinery job constitutes
perceived handicap discrimination under the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act
(MHCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq.1 Plaintiff alleges that defendant
withdrew the offer of employment because it believed that she was at risk of suffering a stroke,
and therefore perceived her as a worker’s compensation risk. Plaintiff also alleges that the lifting
requirement was a pretext for defendant’s discriminatory act. Finally, plaintiff claims that
defendant violated the MHCRA by imposing a pre-employment physical that was not directly
related to any specific job requirement.
1
At the time of plaintiff’s suit, the act was known as the MHCRA. The Legislature subsequently
retitled the act as the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PDCRA). 1198 PA 20. This
opinion will refer to the act as the MHCRA.
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The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10). That court rule tests the factual basis underlying a plaintiff’s claim and permits a
circuit court to grant summary disposition when, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial
judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). A court reviewing such a motion must
consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion, and must grant that party the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Radtke
v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). We review de novo a trial court’s decision
to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich
331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
To establish a discrimination claim under the MHCRA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he
has a “handicap” as defined in the act, (2) his handicap is unrelated to his ability to perform the
duties of the position, and (3) he has been discriminated against in one of the ways described in
the act. Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 602; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). Before a court
can address a plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a specific position, any alleged
discrimination, or any pretext for discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that he is the type of
person to whom the statute applies—a person with a “handicap” as defined by the act. Chiles v
Machine Shop, Inc, 238 Mich App 462, 473; 606 NW2d 398 (1999).
Subsection 103(e) of the MHCRA2 defines a handicap as follows:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may
result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if
the characteristic:
(A) . . . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that
individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more of the major life
activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for
employment or promotion.
***
(iii) Being regarded as having a determinable physical or mental characteristic
described in subparagraph (i). [MCL 37.1103(e); MSA 3.550(103)(e).]
When a plaintiff brings a perceived handicap discrimination claim under subsection
103(e)(iii), he need not prove that he actually suffered from a handicap, as defined in subsection
103(e)(i). Instead, the plaintiff must merely prove that the employer regarded him as suffering
from a handicap, as defined in subsection 103(e)(i). Chiles, supra at 475. That is, the plaintiff
must prove that the employer regarded him as suffering from a determinable physical
2
Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 1, 1997. Accordingly, we apply the statutory language
in effect at that time.
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characteristic that substantially limits a major life activity and is unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability
to perform the duties of a particular job or position.
In other words, showing that an employer thought that a plaintiff was somehow
impaired is not enough; rather, a plaintiff must adduce evidence that a defendant
regarded the plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially limited a major
life activity. [Id.]
“Major life activities” include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Stevens v Inland
Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212, 217; 559 NW2d 61 (1996) (citations omitted). Although
working may constitute a major life activity, a medical condition that “interferes with an
individual’s ability to do a particular job, but does not significantly decrease that individual’s
ability to obtain satisfactory employment elsewhere, does not substantially limit the major life
activity of working.” Id. at 218.
Federal case law interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101 et seq.,
supports the same conclusion. In Murphy v United Postal Service, Inc, 527 US 516; 119 S Ct
2133; 144 L Ed 2d 484 (1999), the plaintiff was employed as a mechanic, a position which
required him to drive commercial motor vehicles. The defendant fired the plaintiff when it
discovered that he suffered from high blood pressure, based on the belief that the plaintiff’s
medical condition prevented him from obtaining a license to drive commercial vehicles. Id. at
488-489. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his handicap discrimination suit to the United
States Supreme Court, arguing that the defendant regarded his high blood pressure as
substantially limiting him in the major life activity of working. Id. at 490. The Supreme Court
held that, “to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must
be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job.” Id. at 491.
Consequently, in light of petitioner’s skills and the array of jobs available
to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded
as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence
demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a
particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. [Id. at 492.]
In the present case, plaintiff contends that defendant regarded her as handicapped because
it believed that her cardiovascular condition prevented her from working. Even if defendant did
perceive plaintiff’s cardiovascular condition as one that interfered with her ability to perform
heavy manual labor in its oil refinery, plaintiff’s claim of perceived handicap discrimination must
nevertheless fail. Plaintiff does not contest the proofs presented by defendant that it offered her a
different position, performing office work. Based on this unrebutted evidence, plaintiff can
prove, at best, that defendant regarded her as unable to perform a particular job. Plaintiff has
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failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant regarded her as unable to engage in the major
life activity of working.3
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed her discrimination claim
against defendant under MCL 37.1202(1)(d); MSA 3.550(202)(1)(d), because defendant refused
to hire her based on a physical examination that was not directly related to the requirements of
any specific position. We disagree. At the time plaintiff filed her complaint, § 202 of the
MHCRA stated, in pertinent part:
(1) An employer shall not:
***
(d) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an individual on the basis of physical
or mental examinations that are not directly related to the requirements of the
specific job.
Plaintiff argues that defendant required her to take a physical examination, during which
she was asked questions about her cardiovascular condition and about her family’s history of
stroke. Plaintiff contends that this information had nothing to do with her ability to perform any
position for defendant.
In order to resolve plaintiff’s claim, we must determine the position for which plaintiff
applied. Plaintiff contends that she applied for an operator position at defendant’s oil refinery,
not a maintenance position. In contrast, defendant contends that the entry level position at the
refinery is a “B Board” position, and that all “B Board” employees perform both operator and
maintenance functions, including heavy manual labor. In support of this contention, defendant
produced a complaint filed by plaintiff with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, on which
plaintiff claimed that she applied for a “B Board” position. Further, defendant produced a copy
of the transcript from plaintiff’s deposition, where she admitted that the entry level position at the
refinery was a “B Board” position, and admitted that an employee could only move into an
operator position after serving on the “B Board” for at least six months’ time. Plaintiff does not
counter defendant’s argument that all entry level positions at the refinery are “B Board”
positions. Neither does she counter defendant’s argument that union seniority rules prohibited
defendant from hiring plaintiff directly into an operator position.
The trial court indicated that it was “undisputed” that plaintiff had applied for a “B
Board” position. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we must
conclude that she applied for the “B Board” position, which included heavy maintenance duties.
Plaintiff produced no evidence to the contrary, relying instead on her own subjective beliefs that
she was being considered for a different position. Furthermore, plaintiff’s representations to the
3
Given our conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove that defendant regarded her medical
condition as a “handicap,” as defined by the MHCRA, we need not address plaintiff’s argument
that defendant’s articulated reason for withdrawing the employment offer was mere pretext for
employment discrimination.
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Department of Civil Rights and her deposition testimony contradict her allegation in the present
case that she was applying only for an operator position. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court properly determined that plaintiff applied for a “B Board” position.
Applying plaintiff’s subsection 202(1)(d) claim to the position for which she applied, we
must determine whether the physical examination was directly related to the requirements of that
position. Defendant produced evidence that the “B Board” position involved maintenance duties
which included extremely heavy physical labor. Plaintiff presented no evidence contesting the
requirements of the maintenance position.4 We conclude that an employee’s cardiovascular
condition and susceptibility to stroke are relevant to his ability to perform heavy physical labor.
Therefore, plaintiff’s claim under subsection 202(1)(d) must fail.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
4
Plaintiff does contest defendant’s assertions that maintenance employees were required to lift
seventy-five pounds above their heads and wear respirators to protect them from toxic fumes.
Plaintiff argues that both of these criteria constitute mere pretexts for discrimination. Because
we conclude that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof under both subsection 103(e)(iii)
and subsection 202(1)(d), we need not decide the issue of pretext.
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