PEOPLE OF MI V BARNEY KEVIN JAMES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 211331
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-003228
BARNEY KEVIN JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.548, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278,
two counts of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279,
conspiracy to commit murder, MCL 750.157(a); MSA 28.354(1), and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced
to concurrent terms of thirty to eighty years on the murder conviction, twenty to sixty years for
each assault with intent to commit murder conviction, six to ten years for each assault with intent
to commit great bodily harm conviction, and life imprisonment for the conspiracy to commit
murder conviction, to be served consecutive to the mandatory two-year sentence for the felonyfirearm conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for further action consistent with this opinion.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court’s conspiracy to commit murder instruction was
erroneous because it failed to advise the jury that it must find defendant guilty of conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder, and failed to define the requisite intent necessary for the offense.
We agree.
A trial court must instruct the jury concerning the law applicable to the case and must
fully and fairly present the case to the jury in an understandable manner. MCL 768.29; MSA
28.1052; People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 80; 537 NW2d 909, modified on other grounds 450 Mich
1212; 539 NW2d 504 (1995); People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 14; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
Jury instructions should be considered in their entirety, rather than extracted piecemeal, to
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determine whether there was error requiring reversal. People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 396; 563
NW2d 31 (1997). Even if somewhat imperfect, error will not be found if the instructions fairly
present the issues to be tried and sufficiently protect the defendant’s rights. Daoust, supra.
At the conclusion of presentation of the proofs, the trial court instructed the jury on both
first-degree murder and the lesser included offense of second-degree murder under count one.
Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on conspiracy to commit murder as follows:
The Defendant is charged with the crime of conspiracy to commit murder
in count six. Anyone who knowingly agrees with someone else to commit murder
is guilty of conspiracy.
To prove the Defendant’s guilt, the Prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the Defendant and someone else knowingly agreed to commit
murder.
Second, that the Defendant specifically intended to commit or helped
commit that crime.
Third, that this agreement took place on or about August 19, 1996.
If there was a conspiracy, you must decide whether the Defendant was a
member of it. You may only consider what the Defendant did and said during the
time the conspiracy took place. A finding that the Defendant was merely with
other people who were members of a conspiracy is not enough by itself to prove
that the Defendant was a member.
In addition, the facts [sic] that a person did an act that furthered the
purpose of an alleged conspiracy is not enough by itself to prove that that person
was a member of the conspiracy. It is not necessary for all the members to know
each other, or know all the details of how the crime will be committed, but it must
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant agreed to commit the
crime and intended to commit or helped commit it.
The Defendant is not responsible for the acts of other members of the
conspiracy, unless those acts are a part of the agreement or further the purposes of
the agreement. If the Defendant agreed to commit a completely different crime,
he is not guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. A person who joins a conspiracy
after it has already been formed is only responsible for what he agreed to when
joining, not for any agreement made by the conspiracy before he joined.
Members of a conspiracy are not responsible for what other members do
or say after the conspiracy ends.
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Defendant claims that the foregoing instruction was misleading because it failed to
distinguish for the jury between conspiracy to commit first- and second-degree murder and, in
light of the misleading instruction, there was no way to determine whether the jury found
defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit first- or second-degree murder. Defendant argues that
because the trial court did not instruct the jury that conspiracy to commit murder requires the
prosecution to show that defendant had a specific intent to commit premeditated murder at the
time the agreement was made, and that conspiracy to commit second-degree murder is not an
existing offense, the jury likely did not consider the requisite element of intent in reaching its
verdict.
A conspiracy has been defined as “a particular partnership in criminal purposes.” People
v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 345; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), quoting People v Atley,
392 Mich 298, 310; 220 NW2d 465 (1974).1 Under such a partnership, “two or more individuals
must have voluntarily agreed to effectuate the commission of a criminal offense.” Justice, supra
at 345. The gist of the offense of conspiracy lies in the unlawful agreement and, thus, it is critical
to establish that the individuals specifically intended to combine to pursue the criminal objective
of their agreement. Id. The conspiracy statute is a general one and makes no reference to
specific underlying offenses. See MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). Thus, as part of the
conspiracy instruction, the trial court must instruct the jury on the underlying offense the accused
is alleged to have conspired to commit unless it was previously defined in the instructions. See
CJI2d 10.1(6).
This Court has previously ruled that the offense of conspiracy to commit second-degree
murder does not logically exist:
Criminal conspiracy is a specific intent crime which arises from a mutual
agreement between two or more persons to do or accomplish a crime or unlawful
act. The gist of a criminal conspiracy is the specific, mutual agreement to perform
the crime in question; the conspiracy statute provides punishment for the actual
advance planning and agreement to perform the substantive criminal acts.
However, second-degree murder is distinguishable from first-degree murder in
that it does not require premeditation and in fact may not require a specific intent
to kill.
1
The statutory provision proscribing conspiracy simply states the punishment for conspiring to
commit the substantive offense:
Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an
offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of
the crime of conspiracy punishable as provided herein:
. . . [T]he person convicted under this section shall be punished by a penalty equal
to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime
he conspired to commit and in the discretion of the court an additional penalty of
a fine of $10,000.00 may be imposed. [MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1).]
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In Hamp, supra, p 103, the Court reasoned:
“Since prior ‘planning’ and ‘agreement’ are necessary, mandatory requisite
elements of the crime of conspiracy, we find it analytically consistent to ‘plan’ to
commit first-degree murder but logically inconsistent to ‘plan’ to commit seconddegree murder. To prove a conspiracy to commit murder, it must be established
that each of the conspirators have [sic] the intent required for murder and, to
establish that intent, there must be foreknowledge of that intent. Foreknowledge
and plan are compatible with the substantive crime of first-degree murder as both
the crime of conspiracy and the crime of first-degree murder share elements of
deliberation and premeditation. Prior planning denotes premeditation and
deliberation. The elements of conspiracy, conversely, are incompatible and
inconsistent with second-degree murder. One does not ‘plan’ to commit an
‘unplanned’ substantive crime. It is not ‘absence’ of the elements but the
‘inconsistency’ of the elements which lead [sic] us to conclude that one conspires
to commit first-degree murder but not second-degree murder.”
Because of this logical inconsistency, we conclude as a matter of law that
there is no crime of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. [People v
Hammond, 187 Mich App 105, 107; 466 NW2d 335 (1991), citing People v
Gilbert, 183 Mich App 741, 749-750; 455 NW2d 731 (1990).]
See also People v Buck, 197 Mich App 404, 409; 496 NW2d 321 (1992), rev’d in part on other
grounds 444 Mich 853; 508 NW2d 502 (1993).
Thus, because conspiracy to commit second-degree murder is not an offense under
Michigan law, for the following reasons we find that the conspiracy to commit murder
instruction provided to the jury was not an accurate statement of the law.
First, although the trial court’s conspiracy instruction essentially mirrored the language
provided in CJI2d 10.1-10.3, the trial court did not reiterate the substantive offense to which the
conspiracy related (first-degree murder) and, instead, simply noted that it had previously
instructed the jury on the elements of first- and second-degree murder. Because conspiracy to
commit second-degree murder does not exist under Michigan law, the trial court should have but
did not make it clear to the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit
murder they must find that the conspiracy was to commit first-degree murder, i.e., that the
conspiracy involved premeditation and deliberation.
In this unique circumstance, the use note to CJI2d 10.1, advising the trial court to define
the underlying crime in conjunction with the conspiracy instruction only when the crime charged
has not been previously defined, does not apply. Since the jury was instructed on the elements of
both first- and second-degree murder and because conspiracy to commit second-degree murder is
not an existing offense, the trial court should have advised the jury in some fashion that only the
elements of first-degree murder applied to the conspiracy charge. The trial court’s failure to
distinguish between the degrees of murder in relation to the conspiracy charge resulted in a
misleading and inadequate instruction.
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Second, we are mindful that any doubts regarding the particular offense of which a
defendant has been convicted should be resolved in favor of the accused. See Dumas, supra at
402; People v McNary, 43 Mich App 134, 142-143; 203 NW2d 919 (1974), rev’d in part on
other grounds 388 Mich 799; 201 NW2d 845 (1972); People v Smith, 14 Mich App 502, 505;
165 NW2d 640 (1968), aff’d 383 Mich 576; 177 NW2d 164 (1970). Here, defendant was
convicted of both conspiracy to commit first degree murder and the lesser offense of seconddegree murder. By convicting defendant of second-degree murder, the jury ostensibly found that
defendant did not possess the requisite premeditation and deliberation necessary for first-degree
murder, a finding inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of guilty on the conspiracy charge. On the
existing record, then, we are led to the conclusion that the verdict itself suggests that the jury did
not clearly understand that the instruction on conspiracy to commit murder was the equivalent of
an instruction on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
By this finding, we do not mean to imply that juries are incapable of understanding less
than perfect instructions and correctly applying the law to the facts in a given case. Rather, we
emphasize that in this case the jury’s findings, that defendant had a premeditated intent for
purposes of the conspiracy charge (the only intent possible) but lacked a premeditated intent in
the commission of the murder, are inconsistent and irreconcilable, and can only be the product of
insufficient understanding of the conspiracy instruction.
We further find that the preserved, instructional error in this case was not harmless. This
Court will not set aside a verdict on the basis of instructional error or misdirection of the jury
unless such error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096; Dumas, supra
at 408-409. The only question properly before the jury on the conspiracy charge was whether
defendant conspired with his co-defendants to commit first-degree murder. Assuming the jury
obeyed the instructions to follow the law as it was given by the trial court, see People v Graves,
458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), it is both possible and plausible, particularly in view
of its second-degree murder verdict, that the jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit
second-degree murder. Because the determination whether defendant possessed the requisite
mental state for conspiracy to commit murder was a factual question for the jury, and on this
point the jury was misguided and insufficiently instructed, we are unable to conclude that the
instructional error was harmless. Accordingly, defendant’s conspiracy to commit murder
conviction is reversed.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on CJI2d
16.15. We disagree.
At trial, defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury in accordance with CJI2d
16.15 which instructs that the act of the defendant must be the cause of death.2 The trial court
2
CJI2d 16.15 states as follows:
[There may be more than one cause of death.] It is not enough that the
defendant’s act made it possible for the death to occur. In order to find that the
death of [name deceased] was caused by the defendant, you must find beyond a
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denied the request, noting that the instruction was not intended for use in cases involving aiding
and abetting, concert of action, or conspiracy. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on the
murder charge as follows:
The Defendant in count one is charged with the offense of first[-]degree
premeditated murder. The statute defining that offense, insofar as the same is
material, reads: A person who commits any of the following is guilty of first[]degree murder: Murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or any
other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
In count one the Defendant is charged with the offense of first[-]degree
premeditated murder. To prove this charge, the prosecution must prove each of
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the Defendant caused the death of James White. That is, that
James White died as a result of being shot.
Second, that the Defendant intended to kill James White.
Third, that this intent to kill was premeditated. That is, thought out before
hand.
Fourth, that the killing was deliberate, which means that the Defendant
considered the pros and cons of the killing, and thought about and chose his
actions before he did it. There must have been real and substantial reflection for
along enough to give a reasonable person a chance to think twice about the intent
to kill. The law does not say how much time is needed. It is for you to decide if
enough time passed under the circumstances of this case. The killing cannot be
the result of a sudden impulse without thought or reflection.
Fifth, that the killing was not justified, excused or done under
circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime.
Under the law of the State of Michigan, where the offense of first[-]degree
murder is charged, the Court must charge the jury on the offense of common law
murder, statutorily classified as murder in the second degree. The second[]degree murder statute, insofar as the same is material, reads: All other kinds of
murder shall be murder of the second degree.
You may also consider the lesser charge of second[-]degree murder,
murder in the second degree. To prove this charge, the Prosecutor must prove
each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
reasonable doubt that the death was the natural or necessary result of the
defendant’s act.
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First, that the Defendant caused the death of James White. That is, that
James White died as a result of being shot.
Second, that the Defendant had one of these three states of mind: He
intended to kill, or he intended to do great bodily harm to James White, or he
knowingly created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm, knowing that
death or such harm would be the likely result of his actions.
Third, that the killing was not justified, excused, or done under
circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime.
The difference between first[-]degree premeditated murder and second[]degree murder is that for first[-]degree premeditated murder, the Defendant must
have actually intended to kill, and have premeditated the victim’s death, and have
deliberated or substantially reflected upon the killing beforehand.
Such premeditation and deliberation is not required for second[-]degree
murder. For second[-]degree murder the Defendant must have actually intended
to kill, or have intended to do great bodily harm, or have created a very high risk
of death or great bodily harm, with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was
the probable result.
Defendant argues that the italicized language in the first element of the first- and seconddegree murder instruction was improper because by instructing the jury that defendant could be
found guilty of murder if the jury found that James White died as a result of a gunshot, without
further instructing that it must find defendant actually fired the fatal shot, the trial court relieved
the prosecution of proving an essential element of the offense, that defendant caused James
White’s death. Defendant claims that the trial court’s instruction effectively shifted the burden to
defendant to prove that someone other than defendant fired the shot that killed James White.
Defendant contends that an instruction in accordance with CJI2d 16.15 would have clarified that
the jury was required to find that defendant’s actions were the actual cause of James White’s
death in order to find him guilty of murder.
After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial court that CJI2d 16.15 was
not an appropriate instruction under the circumstances. The jury was adequately informed that it
must find defendant caused the death of James White in the first element of the murder
instruction. Defendant’s theory of the case was that he was wrongly accused of shooting James
White, that he was misidentified by those witnesses who named him as the perpetrator or placed
him at the scene of the crime, and that James White was shot by his uncle, Joseph White.
Defendant did not claim that there was an intervening cause of White’s death and, in fact,
it was undisputed that James White died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. Furthermore,
there was no evidence introduced at trial to support defendant’s theory that Joseph White or
someone other than defendant or his co-defendants shot the decedent. While Officer McDowell
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of the Detroit Police Department testified that Joseph White disclosed the location of a
previously hidden assault rifle, McDowell also testified that Joseph denied shooting the rifle that
evening. In addition, though Officer McDowell testified that he believed Joseph White was in
possession of the rifle at the time of the shooting and might have shot the rifle on the night in
question, he acknowledged there was no evidence to this effect and that his belief was
speculative. For this reason, he never placed his opinion in this regard in the incident report.
Further, Joseph White testified that he was not in possession of a gun at the time James White
was shot.
Finally, Detroit Police Officer Pauch, an expert in firearms identification, testified that
none of the sixteen shell casings found at the scene of the shooting matched the rifles in
evidence, including the rifle discovered with the help of Joseph White. The defense declined to
cross-examine Officer Pauch or offer any evidence to rebut his expert opinion. Thus, the trial
court properly denied the request for CJI2d 16:15, since the only evidentiary issue before the jury
was whether the fatal shot was fired by defendant or one of his co-defendants, not whether James
White died as a result of a gunshot fired by Joseph White, or another, intervening form of
homicide.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s theory at trial was two-fold: (1) that defendant fired the fatal
gunshot killing James White, or (2) if defendant did not fire the fatal shot, he participated in the
offense as an aider and abettor. The trial court’s instruction clearly related to the jury that it must
find defendant’s conduct, either as a principal or an aider and abettor, caused the death of James
White. On these facts, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that to find defendant
guilty of murder, it must find defendant fired the fatal shot because he could be found guilty of
the charged offense as an aider and abettor in the shoot-out even if one of his co-defendants fired
the shot that killed James. People v Brown, 184 Mich App 567, 571; 459 NW2d 19 (1990);
People v Daniels, 172 Mich App 374, 381-382; 431 NW2d 846 (1988); People v Dykes, 37 Mich
App 555, 559; 195 NW2d 14 (1972). We are not convinced that the trial court’s murder
instruction, particularly on the element of causation, was misleading or inaccurate. See People v
Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 348; 578 NW2d 692 (1998), lv granted 460 Mich 851; 595 NW2d
858 (1999). When viewed in its entirety, the murder instruction adequately related the issues to
the jury and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. Dumas, supra at 396; Daoust, supra at 14.
III
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court made a number of erroneous evidentiary
rulings. We review a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998); People v Rice (On Remand), 235
Mich App 429, 439; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Upon review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s rulings.
First, we find that evidence pertaining to the alleged firebombing of Reginald Vines’
mother’s house was irrelevant to the charged offenses against defendant. MRE 402. The alleged
firebombing occurred more than one year after the shooting that killed James White and had no
bearing on defendant’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. Moreover, the alleged
perpetrators of the firebombing were not identified or otherwise connected to the shooting in this
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case and their conduct over a year after the charged offense was of no relevance to any material
issue in this case. Further, defendant was allowed to introduce evidence concerning previous
disputes or “bad blood” between himself and his accusers for the purpose of showing bias and
motive. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
We likewise reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
of pending charges against prosecution witnesses arising out of their involvement in the alleged
firebombing. Defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the evidence was admissible to
show that the witnesses may be susceptible to pressures from the prosecution and may have a
personal motive for testifying in a certain manner. Defendant did not argue this basis for
admission of the evidence at trial, and did not otherwise demonstrate that the witnesses charged
with the firebombing were indeed susceptible to prosecutorial pressures or testifying pursuant to
an agreement. An objection based on one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate
attack based on a different ground. People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d 778
(1993). Therefore, we deem this argument abandoned. People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236,
248; 575 NW2d 316 (1997).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that
Tyrone Knowles pleaded guilty to firebombing defendant’s mother’s house the day after the
shooting and that he was sentenced to five to twenty years in prison for that conviction.
However, we agree with the trial court’s ruling that the evidence was inadmissible because the
offense did not involve an element of theft, dishonesty, or false statement as required by MRE
609. Parcha, supra at 241. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Lastly, defendant claims that he was “prejudiced by the manner in which the judge
responded to the proffered evidence.” However, defendant did not object to any of the alleged
improper remarks by the trial court and, thus, has not preserved this issue for appellate review.
People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). In the absence of a timely
objection, this Court will only review claims of trial court misconduct to avoid manifest
injustice. Id.
A trial court has wide discretion and power in the matter of trial conduct. Id. Portions of
the record should not be taken out of context in order to show trial court bias; rather, the record
should be reviewed as a whole. Id. A trial court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial
impartiality where its conduct or comments unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive the
defendant of a fair and impartial trial. Id. After reviewing the challenged comments in the
context of the entire record, we conclude that the jury was not unduly influenced and defendant
did not suffer manifest injustice by any of the trial court’s remarks. Accordingly, we decline to
further review this unpreserved claim. Paquette, supra.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further action consistent with this
opinion.
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We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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