CHARLES J BROWN V HENKELS & MCCOY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES J. BROWN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
HENKELS & McCOY and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
No. 224072
WCAC
LC No. 98-000713
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the opinion and order of the Worker’s
Compensation Appellate Commission reversing the magistrate’s open award of benefits. We
reverse and reinstate the award.
Plaintiff, a pipefitter, was employed by defendant Henkels & McCoy, who provided
plaintiff with a ¾ ton pickup truck. In connection with his use of the truck, plaintiff signed an
agreement drafted by defendant stating: “You have been assigned a vehicle for the convenience
of the company. Your Class 1 Driver status is a privilege and not a benefit.” Plaintiff used the
pickup for transportation to and from work and to store his tools, making it unnecessary for him
to first drive to defendant’s offices and then to the work site. Plaintiff testified that he would
sometimes pick up pipefitting supplies on his way to and from work. However, plaintiff was not
compensated for the drive to or from work and was responsible for the costs of fueling and
maintaining the vehicle. On the morning of December 18, 1995, plaintiff was seriously injured
in a head-on automobile accident.
Plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the bureau, alleging a disability on the basis of
residual problems attributable to the injuries he suffered in the accident. The magistrate found
that plaintiff remained partially disabled from fractured bones in his feet, but that he had
otherwise recovered from his injuries. The magistrate determined that plaintiff’s injuries
occurred in the course of his employment because defendant supplied the truck and “was
deriving a benefit from plaintiff’s activities in driving that company truck directly to the job site.”
Defendant appealed the decision to the commission, which, in a split decision, reversed
the magistrate’s finding that the injury occurred in the course of plaintiff’s employment. The
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majority concluded that the magistrate’s analysis assumed facts not in evidence and found that
the benefit derived by defendant from plaintiff’s use of the truck was “speculative.” The
commission also found as a matter of law that the magistrate erred by concluding that “the mere
fact of plaintiff driving the employer’s vehicle was sufficient to meet the test for
compensability,” and reversed the award of benefits. The dissent argued that under “well
established principles” of Michigan law, “the employer that undertakes to provide transportation
to and from work on a regular basis, transforms that trip into work related travel.” The
commission did not address defendant’s claim that the magistrate erred in finding the existence
of a continuing disability.
The WCAC’s factual findings, made within its authority, are conclusive in the absence of
fraud; judicial review is limited to whether the commission applied the correct legal standard and
whether there is any evidence in the record to support its findings. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA
17.237(861a)(14); Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 709; 614 NW2d 607
(2000); Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 269; 484 NW2d 227 (1992). However,
questions of law involved in any final order of the WCAC are reviewed de novo. DiBenedetto v
West Shore Hospital, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). Whether an employee’s
injuries arose in the course of his employment presents a question of law if the facts are not in
dispute; otherwise, such issues present mixed questions of fact and law. Koschay v Barnett
Pontiac, Inc, 386 Mich 223, 225; 191 NW2d 334 (1971); Zarka v Burger King, 206 Mich App
409, 411; 522 NW2d 650 (1994).
Plaintiff argues that the WCAC erred as a matter of law and exceeded the scope of its
authority in finding that his injuries did not occur in the course of his employment. We agree.
Generally, injuries sustained by an employee while going to and coming from work are
not compensable under the worker’s compensation act. Camburn v Northwest School District
(After Remand), 459 Mich 471, 478; 592 NW2d 46 (1999); Botke v Chippewa Co, 210 Mich App
66, 69; 533 NW2d 7 (1995). However, exceptions to the general rule have been established
where
(1) the employee is on a special mission for the employer, (2) the employer
derives a special benefit from the employee's activity at the time of the injury, (3)
the employer paid for or furnished employee transportation as part of the
employment contract, (4) the travel comprised a dual purpose combining
employment-related business needs with the personal activity of the employee, (5)
the employment subjected the employee to excessive exposure to traffic risks, or
(6) the travel took place as a result of a split-shift working schedule or
employment requiring a similar irregular nonfixed working schedule. [Collier v J
A Fredman, Inc, 183 Mich App 156, 160; 454 NW2d 183 (1990); Forgach v
George Koch & Sons Co, 167 Mich App 50, 59; 421 NW2d 568 (1988).]
Konopka v Jackson Co Rd Comm, 270 Mich 174; 258 NW 429 (1935), held that where the
transportation to and from work is furnished by the employer, a traffic accident while going to or
coming from work arises in the course of the employment. See also Chrysler v Blue Arrow
Transport Lines, 295 Mich 606, 608-609; 295 NW 331 (1940) (employee covered by worker’s
compensation act where his contract of employment provided for free transportation in one of the
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employer’s trucks to and from the home city); Lemanski v Frimberger Co, 31 Mich App 285;
187 NW2d 498 (1971) (employer paid for employee’s transportation to and from the job site
pursuant to contract); Stark v L E Myers Co, 58 Mich App 439, 442-443; 228 NW2d 411 (1975)
(stating that one of the relevant considerations is “[w]hether [the] employer paid for or furnished
employee transportation”); Torres v Armond Cassil Co, 115 Mich App 690, 694; 321 NW2d 776
(1982) (employee covered by act because employer furnished transportation on a daily basis);
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Roe (On Rehearing), 226 Mich App 258, 263-265;
573 NW2d 628 (1997). Thus, plaintiff in this case clearly comes within the exception where the
employer furnishes the employee’s transportation to and from work, and the WCAC erred as a
matter of law in finding that this could not form the basis for the magistrate’s opinion.
The commission cited Forgach v George Koch & Sons Co, 167 Mich App 50, 59; 421
NW2d 568 (1988), as support for its decision; however, we do not read that case as requiring that
more than one of the exceptions to the going and coming rule be met. Even if Forgach could be
interpreted as requiring that a claimant meet more than one of the exceptions, the evidence in this
case established that the employer received a special benefit from plaintiff’s use of the truck.
The WCAC erred in failing to consider the import of the parties’ agreement regarding the
vehicle, which expressly stated that plaintiff’s use of the truck was for “the convenience of the
company.” This evidence, coupled with testimony establishing that plaintiff’s use of the truck
enabled him to work more efficiently, constituted competent, material, and substantial evidence
in support of the magistrate’s finding that the employer derived a special benefit from plaintiff’s
use of the truck. Because the magistrate’s findings must be considered conclusive by the
commission if supported by such evidence, MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3), the
WCAC exceeded the scope of its authority in engaging in de novo fact-finding.
Reversed and remanded for consideration of the remaining issue. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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