PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM BLAKE CARTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222467
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 97-008799-FH
WILLIAM BLAKE CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a;
MSA 28.747(1). He was sentenced to two years’ probation, and ordered not to drive a motor
vehicle as a term of that probation. He appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant contends that his conviction for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding a police
officer was based on insufficient evidence. We disagree.
MCL 750.479a; MSA 28.747(1), establishes five elements necessary to convict a
defendant for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding: (1) the law enforcement officer must have been
in uniform and performing his lawful duties and his vehicle must have been adequately identified
as a law enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor vehicle, (3) the
officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights must have ordered the defendant to stop,
(4) the defendant must have been aware that he had been ordered to stop, and (5) the defendant
must have refused to obey the order by trying to flee from the officer or avoid being caught.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish his identity as the driver
and to establish that the driver intentionally fled the officers. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and determine whether a rational factfinder could conclude that the essential elements of the
crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569
NW2d 641 (1997). Questions of credibility are left to the jury. Our review of the record leads us
to conclude that there was sufficient evidence on both issues.
After the vehicle stopped, both the passenger and driver ran from the vehicle. The driver
ran behind his vehicle and in front of the police vehicle. As he ran in front of the police cruiser,
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defendant was clearly visible due to the headlights, overhead lights, and spotlights that were
turned on the suspect’s car. The driver then ran into the neighborhood bordering the road. A
third state police trooper testified that he was in the area when a police broadcast came over the
radio. The trooper saw an individual matching the broadcast description run across the street in
front of his vehicle. He followed the suspect and attempted to catch the individual on foot. He
did not catch the individual, went back to his vehicle, and then noticed defendant walk up onto
the porch of a home with a group of people. The trooper walked over to the porch and asked
defendant to come over to him. Defendant did so, and the trooper noticed that defendant’s
breathing was labored and recognized him as the person he had been chasing. When defendant
was brought back to the two troopers who had stopped the car, he was identified as the driver.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was ample evidence from
which to conclude that defendant was the driver.
We further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove (1) that the troopers
ordered the driver to stop the vehicle, (2) that the driver of the vehicle was aware of the troopers’
order, and (3) that the driver refused to stop the vehicle. There was testimony that the trooper
who was driving the police vehicle activated the overhead lights as the white Oldsmobile exited
Interstate 94 at the Huron Road exit, that the driver increased the vehicle’s speed after the lights
and siren were activated, and that the vehicle continued onto Huron Street and made a left turn at
the first light. The driver and passenger both ran from the vehicle after it finally stopped. While
there was no direct evidence that the driver was aware of the order to stop, the circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences which arise from it sufficiently establish that the driver
intentionally disregarded an order to stop.
Defendant also contends, in the context of his sufficiency argument, that the trial court
reversibly erred in excluding testimony concerning whether defendant owned the vehicle.
Evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless-error analysis. People v Price, 214 Mich App 538,
546; 543 NW2d 49 (1995). A preserved, nonconstitutional error is not ground for reversal
“unless after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more
probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484,
495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). In this case, even assuming that the ruling by the trial court
was error, the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to a new trial because, although there had been
a pre-trial discovery order, it was not revealed until mid-trial that the trooper who chased him had
prepared a police report. We do not agree.
This Court, in People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262; 591 NW2d 267 (1998), discussed the
implications of a failure by the prosecution to comply with a discovery request made by a
defendant. In that case, the defendant claimed prejudice due to the prosecution’s failure to
disclose certain information concerning witnesses which could have been used as impeachment
evidence against them during their testimony. Id. at 280-281. This Court stated:
[i]n order to establish a Brady [v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d
215 (1963)] violation, a defendant must prove: (1) that the state possessed
evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he did not possess the evidence nor
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could he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the
prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. [Lester, supra, 232 Mich App at 281282.]
Here, defendant has not shown that the delay in disclosing the report affected the outcome
of the trial. The statements in the report were used to impeach the trooper who prepared the
report by pointing out discrepancies between his report and his earlier testimony. Given that
defendant was provided an opportunity to use the late-disclosed report and that the information
disclosed was relevant to the witness’ credibility but not otherwise material to the case, we
conclude that defendant was not denied his due process rights by the late disclosure of the report.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court exceeded its authority when it ordered defendant
not to drive a motor vehicle for the length of his two-year probation. Defendant relies on the
provision of MCL 750.479a; MSA 28.747 that requires the sentencing court to order the
secretary of state to suspend the convicted individual’s license for one year. We find no abuse of
discretion by the trial court.
“It is well settled that probation is a matter of grace, not of right. Whether probation is to
be granted, and its conditions, are determinations that rest in the sound discretion of the trial
court based upon authority provided by the Legislature.” People v Whiteside, 437 Mich 188,
192; 468 NW2d 506 (1991). A sentencing court is authorized to “impose other lawful conditions
of probation as the circumstances of the case require or warrant or as in its judgment are proper.”
MCL 771.3(4); MSA 28.1173(4). Thus, only if the condition is unlawful or unwarranted given
the facts of the case can a defendant prove that the court has abused its discretion to set the terms
of probation.
There is no reason to conclude that the fleeing and eluding statute, which mandates a oneyear suspension of the driver’s license of a person convicted of that crime, preempted the broad
authority the Legislature granted courts to set the terms of probationers. See People v Dickens,
144 Mich App 49, 56; 373 NW2d 241 (1985). Indeed, we do not believe that the fleeing and
eluding statute is even inconsistent with the sentence imposed in this case under the probation
statute. Although defendant argues that the statute allows only a one-year suspension of his
license, while the trial court suspended the license for two, it appears that in fact the trial court
merely prohibited defendant from driving for two years. Nowhere in the sentencing transcript
does it appear that the trial court suspended defendant’s license for two years. In any event, a
primary goal of statutory construction is to read statutes to avoid conflict with each other. People
v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998). Doing so in this case leads us to the
conclusion that the Legislature intended the trial court to have discretion to set the terms of a
defendant’s probation as well as mandating at least a one-year suspension of a defendant’s
driving license upon being convicted of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding. Thus, defendant’s
probation term is not unlawful, and we find no error.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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