PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL AVILES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217703
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 98-010954-FC
DANIEL AVILES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Fitzgerald and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of second-degree murder,
MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, felonious assault, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, and possession of
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.242(2). Defendant was
sentenced to concurrent terms of eighteen to forty-five years’ imprisonment for the murder
conviction, and forty to forty-eight months for the assault conviction, to run consecutively to the
mandatory two-year prison term for felony-firearm. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that his
statement to the police was voluntary. We disagree.
Whether a defendant’s statement was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is a question of
law that we review against the totality of the circumstances. People v Snider, 239 Mich App
393, 417; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Because this Court affords great deference to the trial court,
we will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The trial
court’s findings are clearly erroneous where, after an examination of the record, this Court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v Givans, 227
Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
A criminal defendant’s custodial statements are generally inadmissible at trial unless the
prosecutor establishes that the statement was voluntary. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 13;
551 NW2d 355 (1996) (Boyle J.). On appeal, defendant does not contest that he was advised of
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his Miranda1 rights. Rather, defendant claims that his inculpatory statement was involuntary
because it was the product of police coercion.
The use of an involuntary statement coerced by police conduct offends due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 386; 605 NW2d 374 (1999).
The following factors guide our determination whether a confession was voluntary:
. . . the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the
extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he
gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his
constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him
before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was
injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement;
whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether
the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with
abuse. [People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988).]
None of these factors should be given preemptive weight, rather, the controlling inquiry is
whether the totality of the circumstances suggests that the statement was freely and voluntarily
made. Id.; People v Manning ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 224898, issued
12/15/00), slip op p 17.
The record reveals that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights in Spanish at the
time of his arrest before being transported to the police station for questioning. A Spanish
speaking member of the Michigan State Police administered the warnings and acted as an
interpreter during the following six to seven hours of questioning. Defendant did not inform the
police that he was experiencing difficulties understanding their questions, therefore the record
does not support defendant’s assertion that he was unable to understand the Miranda warnings or
the investigators’ questions. A person speaking to the police by way of a translator is subject to
the same standards as one fluent in English. People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App
325, 335; 553 NW2d 692 (1996). Consequently, the police had no heightened obligation to take
steps to ensure that defendant understood his Miranda rights. Id.
Moreover, while acknowledging that defendant had little in the way of sustenance during
the police interview, this alone does not necessitate a finding of police coercion, particularly
where the police interviewing defendant also did not eat. Defendant’s failure to eat a meal before
he was arrested at approximately 11:00 a.m. can be attributed to his own eating habits, therefore
his subsequent hunger is not necessarily indicative of police coercion. See People v Young, 212
Mich App 630, 635; 538 NW2d 456 (1995).
Additionally, defendant’s allegations that the police used coercive tactics to obtain his
inculpatory statement present a credibility issue. When evaluating the voluntariness of a
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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statement, where a disputed issue turns on the credibility of witnesses, we defer to the superior
vantage point of the trial court. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d
822 (2000), quoting People v Sexton (After Remand), 236 Mich App 525; 601 NW2d 399 (1999)
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Because we are not left with the firm and definite conviction that the
trial court’s findings were mistaken, we decline to disturb them on appeal.
We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court committed error warranting
reversal when it informed the jury of its prior determination that defendant’s statement was
voluntary. In the instant case, that defendant gave the inculpatory statement was not disputed.
During cross-examination defendant expressly acknowledged giving the statement. Where the
making of a statement is not a contested issue at trial, the trial court’s comment to the jury
regarding its prior determination of voluntariness does not amount to error requiring reversal.
People v Corbett, 97 Mich App 438, 443; 296 NW2d 64 (1980).
Defendant next asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because inadmissible hearsay
evidence admitted at trial deprived him of his right to confront the witnesses against him under
the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US Const Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. We
disagree.
Whether defendant’s right of confrontation was violated is a constitutional issue we
review de novo. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 108; 605 NW2d 28 (2000). MRE 801(c)
defines “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Where a witness
testifies that a statement was made, rather than about the truth of the statement itself, the
statement is not hearsay. People v Harris, 201 Mich App 147, 150-151; 505 NW2d 889 (1993).
Here, the disputed statements by the testifying police officer was made in the context of
the prosecutor’s direct-examination and defense counsel’s cross-examination. During direct
examination, after testifying that defendant initially denied being involved in the murder, the
witness indicated that he continued to question defendant because “I had affirmation that
[defendant] was in possession of a pistol.” Later, in response to defense counsel’s allegations
that the witness coerced defendant into giving a statement, the witness testified, “the story I gave
[defendant] was a story I obtained from [the codefendant], and I wanted [defendant] to
understand.”
Viewed in context, the record is clear that rather than to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, these statements were offered to illustrate why the witness pursued his questioning of
defendant after he denied involvement in the offense, and to refute defense allegations that the
witness coerced defendant into giving a statement. Because the statements were not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, they were not hearsay within the meaning of MRE 801(c).
Consequently, defendant’s argument that the Confrontation Clause was violated by the
admission of this testimony is without merit. The primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is
to ensure the reliability of substantive evidence against the defendant by subjecting it to rigorous
cross-examination before the trier of fact. People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 356; 478
NW2d 901 (1991). Here, defendant’s failure to show that the disputed statements are hearsay is
fatal to his claim that he was denied the right of confrontation. Statements that are not offered to
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prove the truth of the matter asserted do not implicate constitutional concerns under the
Confrontation Clause. Cargill v Turpin, 120 F3d 1366, 1375 (CA 11, 1997). See also Dutton v
Evans, 400 US 74, 88; 91 S Ct 210; 27 L Ed 2d 213 (1970).
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the law of aiding
and abetting. This issue is not properly before this Court because defendant did not raise a timely
objection at trial. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Therefore we
review this unpreserved claim of error relating to jury instructions for plain error. People v
McCrady, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 215180, issued 12/19/00), slip op p
2; People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To avoid forfeiture of this
claim, defendant must demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial rights. Id.
We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the trial court
committed error requiring reversal. People v Canales, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Docket No. 221452, issued 12/12/00), slip op, 2. A trial court must instruct the jury concerning
the law applicable to the case in an understandable manner. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140,
151; 607 NW2d 767 (1999). Even where the trial court’s instructions are somewhat imperfect,
there is no error if the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. Id.
A jury may be instructed on aiding and abetting where there is evidence that (1) one or
more persons were involved in committing the crime, and (2) the defendant’s role in the crime
may have been less than direct participation in the wrongdoing. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App
139, 157; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). To prove guilt on an aiding and abetting theory, the
prosecution must show that (1) defendant or some other person committed the underlying crime,
(2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that aided and assisted the commission
of a crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime, or had knowledge that
the principal intended its commission at the time of giving aid or encouragement. People v
Smielewski, 235 Mich App 196, 207; 596 NW2d 636 (1999); People v King, 210 Mich App 425,
431; 534 NW2d 534 (1995).
After reviewing the jury instructions, we are satisfied that the trial court properly
instructed the jury with regard to the law of aiding and abetting.2 Because defendant has not
2
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial
court’s instructions. This issue is not properly before this Court because defendant did not
include this issue in his statement of the issues in his brief on appeal. People v Yarbrough, 183
Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d 419 (1990). Nonetheless, in light of our conclusion that the trial
court properly instructed the jury, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
without merit. See People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8, 27; 620 NW2d 537 (2000).
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demonstrated plain error, he has forfeited this issue on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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