TONY LOGAN V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TONY LOGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
CITY OF DETROIT and THE DETROIT POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
No. 214656
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-513630-CL
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BRENDA NIMOCK,
Defendant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants City of Detroit and the Detroit Police Department appeal as of right from a
judgment awarding plaintiff $200,000 on his complaint for sexual harassment under the Civil
Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. The jury found that defendant
Brenda Nimock1 sexually harassed plaintiff and that defendants-appellants City of Detroit and
the Detroit Police Department (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants) failed to take
prompt remedial action. Defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new
trial, and remittitur were denied. We affirm.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict
because the evidence failed to show that plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct
that created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment, and also failed to establish
respondeat superior liability. Defendants similarly argue that the jury verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence. We disagree with both of these arguments.
1
Defendant Nimock is not a party to this appeal.
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This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict de novo.
Allen v Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp, 225 Mich App 397, 406; 571 NW2d 530 (1997). “A
motion for a directed verdict . . . should be granted only when, viewing the evidence and all
legitimate inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no issues of
material fact with regard to which reasonable minds could differ.” Cipri v Bellingham Foods,
235 Mich App 1, 14; 596 NW2d 620 (1999). A trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial on
the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). “When a party
claims that a jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, we may overturn that
verdict ‘only when it was manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence.’” Ellsworth v
Hotel Corp, 236 Mich App 185, 194; 600 NW2d 129 (1999), quoting Watkins v Manchester, 220
Mich App 337, 340; 559 NW2d 81 (1996). This Court gives substantial deference to a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence and to the
trial court’s unique ability to judge the weight and credibility of the testimony. Ellsworth , supra
at 194.
MCL 37.2103(i); MSA 8.548(103)(i) provides, in pertinent part:
Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual
harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the
following conditions:
***
(iii) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with an individual’s employment . . . or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment.
To establish sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must
prove the following:
(1) the employee belonged to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to
communication or conduct on the basis of sex; (3) the employee was subjected to
unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; (4) the unwelcome sexual conduct
or communication was intended to or did in fact substantially interfere with the
employee’s employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment; and (5) respondeat superior. [Koester v Novi, 213 Mich App 653,
666; 540 NW2d 765 (1995), modified on other grounds 458 Mich 1 (1998).]
“[W]hether a hostile work environment existed shall be determined by whether a
reasonable person, in the totality of circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as
substantially interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.” Radtke v Everett, 442
Mich 368, 394; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). “[A]n employer may avoid liability under the CRA if it
adequately investigated and took prompt and appropriate remedial action upon notice of the
alleged hostile work environment.’” Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696, 702; 601
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NW2d 426 (1999), quoting Downer v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 191 Mich App 232, 234; 477
NW2d 146 (1991).
A review of the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination
that plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct that created an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment. The evidence indicated that plaintiff received unwelcomed,
sexually explicit notes and letters from Nimock, which she left on his car at work, at the precinct
desk, and with other officers. See Radtke, supra at 384 (observing that “the gravamen of a . . .
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome”). On one
occasion, Nimock approached plaintiff as he was sitting in his patrol car and propositioned him
for sex. She also made other unwelcome sexual advances, followed plaintiff around the precinct,
followed plaintiff in his scout car, and, in one incident, pressed her body up against plaintiff and
touched him inappropriately.
Defendants contend that Nimock’s conduct did not “substantially interfere” with
plaintiff’s employment because plaintiff received high performance ratings during the relevant
period. However, plaintiff presented evidence demonstrating that he was adversely affected by
Nimock’s conduct. Specifically, plaintiff presented evidence indicating that Nimock’s conduct
affected plaintiff’s relationship with his wife and children. Further, plaintiff’s partner testified
that plaintiff was so distracted by Nimock’s conduct that the partner became concerned about
plaintiff’s job performance. The evidence also established that plaintiff was placed on sick leave
for a period of time and also received both individual and family counseling because of the
situation.
We further find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that
defendants failed to take prompt and appropriate remedial action upon notice of the allegations.
The evidence demonstrated that plaintiff reported the situation to his supervisor, the internal
affairs department, and the EEO Coordinator. Although plaintiff’s supervisor arranged a meeting
with plaintiff and Nimock in an attempt to rectify the situation, the evidence indicated that the
harassment continued and, despite further complaints by plaintiff, no follow-up action was taken
by plaintiff’s supervisor. While the internal affairs department did conduct an investigation, the
department had no authority to recommend discipline or penalties or take any action in the
workplace. Although internal affairs ultimately recommended to the prosecutor’s office that
Nimock be charged with misdemeanor stalking, it took four months to conduct the investigation
and make the recommendation, during which time the harassment continued. There was no
evidence that defendants made any attempt to discipline or even speak to Nimock about the
situation during this time period.2
Plaintiff also complained to the EEO Coordinator, whose job it was to investigate
complaints of harassment. However, the evidence indicated that the coordinator did not take any
remedial action. Although she told plaintiff that she would investigate the situation, her only
action was to send a memo to the internal affairs department. The coordinator was presented
2
Nimock was eventually suspended and discharged for “insubordination, outside employment
and AWOL,” reasons unrelated to the situation with plaintiff.
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with plaintiff’s telephone tracer records documenting Nimock’s numerous telephone calls to his
home, she was aware that plaintiff was upset and attending counseling, and she received
numerous follow-up calls from plaintiff inquiring about the “investigation.” Despite all this, she
never interviewed or spoke to Nimock, never conducted an investigation, and never prepared a
complaint or a report.
In sum, sufficient evidence was presented to enable a reasonable person to conclude that
Nimock engaged in unwelcome conduct within the workplace so as to impose upon defendants a
duty to take remedial action, and that defendants failed to take appropriate remedial action upon
receiving adequate notice of the situation. Radtke, supra at 395. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for directed verdict. We likewise
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for a new
trial.
Next, defendants argue that the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff on his claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress was against the great weight of the evidence. Although
plaintiff’s complaint originally included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
plaintiff withdrew this claim before trial and it was not presented to the jury. Accordingly, this
issue provides no basis for relief.
Finally, we reject defendants’ assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
defendants’ motion for remittitur. Leavitt v Monaco Coach Corp, 241 Mich App 288, 305; 616
NW2d 715 (2000). The amount awarded was supported by the evidence. Henry v City of
Detroit, 234 Mich App 405, 414; 594 NW2d 107 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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