MICHAEL GIBSON V TOTAL PETROLEUM INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL GIBSON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215665
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-004781-NZ
TOTAL PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal arises from the criminal prosecution of plaintiff for the armed robbery of one
of defendant’s gas stations on November 1, 1995. Defendant's employee, Rosalin Phillips, who
was working at the time of the robbery, identified plaintiff as the perpetrator on November 16,
1995. Plaintiff was arrested that day and bound over for trial following a December 8, 1995
preliminary examination, having spent the intervening three weeks in jail unable to post bond.
The only evidence presented during the preliminary examination was Phillips' testimony, in
which she identified plaintiff as the robber, and two sets of photographs used for comparison,
one a group of still frames from the gas station surveillance video that captured the events of the
robbery, the second plaintiff’s mugshots. On October 9, 1997, the court dismissed the charge by
an order of nolle prosequi.
Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil action against defendant, alleging malicious
prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant moved for
summary disposition, which the trial court denied, and now appeals by leave granted. We affirm.
We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Hanley
v Mazda Motor Corp, 239 Mich App 596, 600; 609 NW2d 203 (2000). Relevant to this appeal
are the grounds for denial of defendant's motion to the extent it was brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) and (10). Reviewing a motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(7), this Court
accepts as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations, construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
The affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence are considered in
order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. Summary disposition is
proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the documentary evidence shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto v
Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
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As a preliminary, but ultimately critical matter, we note our agreement with that portion
of the trial court's decision denying summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) because
discovery was not complete. Summary disposition prior to the completion of discovery is
premature, unless “further discovery does not stand a fair chance of uncovering factual support
for the position of the party opposing the motion.” Village of Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich
App 553, 566; 618 NW2d 23 (2000). In this case, none of the principal parties or witnesses had
been deposed at the time defendant moved for summary disposition and, as discussed below,
defendant's entitlement to summary disposition on each of plaintiff’s claims turns on Phillips'
state of mind, knowledge and motivations in identifying plaintiff as the robber. Because our
review of the current record leads us to the conclusion that further discovery may reveal evidence
supporting plaintiff’s allegation that Phillips provided information known to be false, we
conclude that the court's decision not to grant summary disposition at the current stage of the
proceedings was appropriate. Defendant may of course renew its motion for summary
disposition if additional discovery demonstrates that Phillips was truthful and reasonably
believed her identification of plaintiff was correct. MCR 2.116(E)(3).
Defendant first argues that plaintiff ’s defamation claim should have been dismissed
because Phillips' statements to the police are protected by an absolute privilege and her
statements to coworkers were made in good faith, and thus are protected by a qualified privilege.
The trial court denied summary disposition finding that the claim was predicated on statements
Phillips made to third-parties, her coworkers, rather than statements she made to the police, and
that summary disposition was premature where discovery was incomplete.
Communications considered absolutely privileged are not actionable. Kefgen v Davidson,
241 Mich App 611, 618; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). However, communications protected by a
qualified privilege may be actionable on a showing that they were made "with actual malice, i.e.,
with knowledge of [their] falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193
Mich App 1, 15; 483 NW2d 629 (1992). Whether a statement was made with actual malice is
generally a question of fact for the jury. Smith v Fergan, 181 Mich App 594, 597; 450 NW2d 3
(1989). Here, to the extent that Phillips' statements to her coworkers would be protected by a
qualified privilege, the trial court correctly determined that summary disposition was premature
where plaintiff had not yet deposed Phillips in the effort to establish whether she acted in good
faith or with malice in accusing him of the robbery.
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have dismissed plaintiff ’s claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress because Phillips’ identification of plaintiff was not
extreme and outrageous conduct.
A prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that a plaintiff
establish “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4)
severe emotional distress.” Teadt v Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, 237 Mich App 567, 582;
603 NW2d 816 (1999). “Liability for such a claim has been found only where the conduct
complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Id. In McCahill v Commercial Union Ins Co, 179 Mich App 761, 769-770; 446
NW2d 579 (1989), this Court concluded that a false accusation of criminal activity in
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combination with other conduct created a jury question with regard to whether the defendant's
conduct had been extreme and outrageous. As indicated, there is a chance that discovery will
reveal evidence in support of plaintiff’s claim that Phillips made a knowingly false accusation.
With uncertainty regarding other facts that may be elicited during discovery, it is possible the
evidence would create a legitimate question for the jury. Accordingly, we again conclude that
the trial court properly denied summary disposition on the ground that it was premature.
Next, defendant contests on three grounds the trial court's denial of summary disposition
on plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution. First, defendant contends that plaintiff cannot
establish that the criminal proceedings were instituted by defendant. Defendant also contends
that the trial court erred in denying summary disposition because probable cause to prosecute
plaintiff existed at plaintiff’s preliminary examination. Related to this argument, defendant
contends that plaintiff was estopped from re-litigating the issue of probable cause under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We find no merit in any of defendant's
contentions.
To establish a claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that the defendant has initiated a criminal prosecution against him, (2) that the
criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, (3) that the private person who
instituted or maintained the prosecution lacked probable cause for his actions, and
(4) that the action was undertaken with malice or a purpose in instituting the
criminal claim other than bringing the offender to justice. [Matthews v Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich, 456 Mich 365, 378; 572 NW2d 603 (1998).]
With regard to the first element, and defendant's first contention, we agree that a prosecutor's
exercise of his independent discretion in initiating and maintaining a prosecution is a complete
defense to an action for malicious prosecution against a private individual. Id. at 384. However,
if a person supplying information to a prosecuting officer knows the information to be false, "an
intelligent exercise of the officer's discretion becomes impossible and a prosecution based
thereon is procured by the person giving the false information." Renda v Int'l Union, UAW, 366
Mich 58, 83; 114 NW2d 343 (1962) quoting 3 Restatement, Torts § 653, pp 386-387. Stated
another way, it has been said that unless information furnished by a private individual "was
known by the giver to be false and was the information on which the prosecutor acted, the
private person has not procured the prosecution." Matthews, supra at 385 (emphasis included).
The robbery occurred on November 1, 1995. Phillips, at that time, gave police a general
description of the robber, then on November 16, 1995, provided the police with information that
led them to plaintiff. A police report dated November 16, 1995, details the extent of the police
investigation additional to Phillips' statements. Determining plaintiff’s identity based on a
license plate number Phillips provided, police compared plaintiff’s mugshot from a 1991 arrest
with the gas station security video which had captured the robbery. The report indicates that
officers observed a resemblance between plaintiff and the robber. They subsequently picked
plaintiff up at his place of employment and spoke with his employer, discovering that on
November 1, 1995, plaintiff had punched-in for work one hour after the time of the robbery.
With plaintiff’s consent they searched his car, discovering nothing that linked him with the
robbery. Also with plaintiff’s consent, they took him to the police station for questioning.
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Informing plaintiff that he was not under arrest, the police conducted an interview and a
polygraph examination. The report states that they advised plaintiff that he "did not pass the
polygraph." Plaintiff was arrested at this point.
At plaintiff’s preliminary examination, the only testimony presented was that of Phillips.
She testified that plaintiff was a regular customer, coming to the gas station with the same
companion every day between six and seven in the morning. She testified that she knew plaintiff
was the robber on the day of the robbery. She then testified that November 16, 1995 was the first
time plaintiff had returned to the gas station since the robbery. Phillips admitted that despite her
certainty that the robber was plaintiff, throughout the two-week period between the robbery and
November 16, 1995, she had not so informed the police, and had failed to provide any
information beyond her original general description. She explained that she had not provided the
additional information sooner because she had been scared.
The only other evidence presented at the preliminary examination was photographic, the
prosecution introducing plaintiff’s mugshots and the video stills of the robber. After submitting
the photos for comparison, the prosecution and defense argued the credibility of Phillips'
identification and the similarity of the persons in the photos. Though noting that the video
photos were "not the most phenomenal and true reproduction," the district court bound plaintiff
over finding that the facts on the record established probable cause and that the photos
established a question of fact to be presented to a jury.
On this record it can reasonably be concluded that notwithstanding the fact that the police
had conducted some independent investigation, plaintiff’s prosecution was initiated primarily on
the basis of Phillips' identification. Such a conclusion is further supported by the prosecutor's
petition to nolle prosequi, in which, moving to dismiss plaintiff’s case, the prosecutor cited three
grounds: First, that after enhancing the surveillance video images and comparing them to
plaintiff’s mugshots, it was determined that plaintiff and the robber were not the same person;
second, that plaintiff had passed a polygraph examination regarding the crime; and third, that no
other evidence implicated plaintiff in the crime. This petition arguably demonstrates that at the
times when plaintiff was arrested and bound over, the police were operating on Phillips'
information and the absence of contradictory evidence.1
The record presents a close question, and at this stage of the proceedings we are not
convinced that defendant is entitled to be shielded from liability on the charge of malicious
prosecution. Plaintiff did spend three weeks in jail, and, able to conduct only a limited crossexamination of Phillips during the preliminary examination, in support of this action plaintiff has
understandably submitted additional evidence challenging Phillips' credibility.2 Should it be
1
Though implicit in the main discussion, we note for emphasis that the limited police
investigation had discovered no additional evidence to support Phillips' identification of plaintiff.
Rather, it had failed to uncover an alibi and to that point in time had failed to conclusively
establish plaintiff’s innocence. Obviously, the police ultimately did establish plaintiff’s
innocence when the video stills were enhanced and a second polygraph examination was
conducted.
2
For example, plaintiff has submitted an affidavit in which he avers that his daily appearance at
(continued…)
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shown upon further discovery that Phillips knowingly provided false information to the police, in
light of plaintiff’s lack of a clear alibi it may be that intelligent exercise of the prosecuting
authorities' discretion was impossible. Renda, supra. Our resolution of the previous issues
already necessitating remand, we conclude that the requisite future proceedings may include
further development of this charge also.
With regard to defendant's remaining two contentions, if it is shown that Phillips gave
false information or failed to make a full and fair disclosure, the fact that the district judge found
probable cause to bind plaintiff over for trial will not permit defendant to escape liability for
malicious prosecution. See Fort Wayne Mortgage Co v Carletos, 95 Mich App 752, 758; 291
NW2d 193 (1980). Accordingly, despite the finding of probable cause at plaintiff’s preliminary
examination, the trial court did not err in denying summary disposition.
Lastly, we note that defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying defendant's
motion for summary disposition on plaintiff ’s negligence claim. Plaintiff, however, responds
that he did not allege a claim of negligence, but rather a claim of abuse of process. The meaning
and scope of the pleadings are left to the discretion of the trial court. Dacon v Transue, 441
Mich 315, 328; 490 NW2d 369 (1992). In light of our conclusions that the trial court properly
denied summary disposition with regard to the other issues, and because the trial court did not
determine the scope of plaintiff ’s pleadings, we decline to be the first to attempt interpretation of
plaintiff’s intent.
Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William B. Murphy
(…continued)
the gas station, at his regular morning time, was maintained during the two weeks between the
date of the robbery and the date of his identification and arrest.
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