CLIFTON CONRAD COPELAND V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CLIFTON CONRAD COPELAND,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN, STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, DETROIT RECEIVING HOSPITAL,
and REHABILITATION INSTITUTE, d/b/a
DETROIT REHABILITATION HOSPITAL,
No. 218144
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-818672-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
GARDEN CITY HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Wilder and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of summary disposition requiring defendant
State Farm, his no-fault insurer, to pay personal protection insurance benefits directly to
defendants State of Michigan, Detroit Receiving Hospital, and Detroit Rehabilitation Hospital.
We affirm.
This dispute arises from a 1997 motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff was injured.
Defendant hospitals are medical providers that treated plaintiff for his injuries following the
accident. After settling the underlying dispute regarding State Farm’s liability on plaintiff’s nofault claim in a previous case, State Farm issued checks payable to defendants jointly with
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plaintiff’s attorney. The hospitals declined to negotiate these checks.1 Plaintiff then filed the
instant declaratory judgment action, arguing that State Farm should pay no-fault benefits directly
to plaintiff so that plaintiff’s attorney’s lien arising from the previous action could be satisfied.
After State Farm moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10),
plaintiff responded by moving for declaratory judgment. The trial court ordered State Farm to
pay personal protection insurance directly to the remaining defendants.2
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it ordered State Farm to pay personal
protection benefits directly to the State of Michigan and the hospitals. Plaintiff points to MCL
500.3112; MSA 24.13112, asserting that it limits recovery of personal protection benefits to an
injured person. Because the interpretation of a statutory provision presents a question of law, this
Court’s review is de novo. Travelers Ins v U-Haul of Michigan, Inc, 235 Mich App 273, 279;
597 NW2d 235 (1999).
MCL 500.3112; MSA 24.13112 provides:
Personal protection benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an injured
person, or, in case of his death, to or for the benefit of his dependents. Payment
by an insurer in good faith of personal protection insurance benefits, to or for the
benefit of a person who it believes is entitled to the benefits, discharges the
insurer’s liability to the extent of the payments unless the insurer has been notified
in writing of the claim of some other person. If there is doubt about the proper
person to receive the benefits or the proper apportionment among the persons
entitled thereto, the insurer, the claimant or any other interested person may apply
to the circuit court for an appropriate order. The court may designate the payees
and make an equitable apportionment, taking into account the relationship of the
payees to the injured person and other factors as the court considers appropriate.
In the absence of a court order directing otherwise the insurer may pay:
(a) To the dependents of the injured person, the personal protection
insurance benefits accrued before his death without appointment of an
administrator or an executor.
(b) To the surviving spouse, the personal protection insurance benefits
due any dependent children living with the spouse. [Emphasis supplied.]
1
Although the record is not entirely clear on the reason the hospitals did not negotiate the
checks, the state is subrogated to plaintiff’s entitlement to any right of recovery for the cost of
hospitalization and treatment; the person receiving the benefits or a person acting on the person’s
behalf must sign an assignment of rights for those benefits. MCL 400.106(1)(b)(ii); MSA
16.490(16)(1)(b)(ii). The hospitals could have declined to negotiate the checks on the basis of
the assignment of rights.
2
The court also ordered that counsel for plaintiff be paid an attorney fee of $10,000. Plaintiff
does not challenge the amount awarded by the court.
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The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d
611 (1998). In determining the Legislature’s intent, we look to the language of the statute. Id. If
the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute is clear, further judicial interpretation is inappropriate.
Travelers Ins, supra at 279. The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning that a
statute clearly expresses. Professional Rehabilitation Associates v State Farm Mut Automobile
Ins Co, 228 Mich App 167, 172; 577 NW2d 909 (1998).
We conclude that a plain reading of the language, “for the benefit of an injured person,”
in § 3112 evidences the Legislature’s intent that payment of personal protection benefits not be
limited to the injured person as long as the payment is made for the benefit of that person.
Because the payments made by State Farm to the State of Michigan and the hospitals clearly
inured to plaintiff’s benefit, the trial court’s order was proper.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Hicks v Citizens Ins Co of America, 204 Mich App 142; 514 NW2d
511 (1994), is misplaced. In Hicks, supra, this Court concluded that the defendant no-fault
insurer was liable for the plaintiff’s medical expenses after the state mistakenly paid Medicaid
benefits to the plaintiff’s medical provider. However, this Court did not address the issue
whether such benefits must be paid directly to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court should have awarded statutory prejudgment
interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013(5); MSA 27A.6013(5), and penalty interest pursuant to MCL
500.3142(3); MSA 24.13142(3). We review de novo an award of interest pursuant to MCL
600.6013; MSA 27A.6013. Everett v Nickola, 234 Mich App 632, 638; 599 NW2d 732 (1999).
We also review de novo an award of interest pursuant to MCL 500.3142; MSA 27A.13142.
Attard v Citizens Ins Co of America, 237 Mich App 311, 319; 602 NW2d 633 (1999).
MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013, which provides for prejudgment interest in civil actions,
provides:
(5) For complaints filed on or after January 1, 1987, if a judgment is
rendered on a written instrument, interest shall be calculated from the date of
filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12%
per year compounded annually, unless the instrument has a higher rate of interest.
In that case interest shall be calculated at the rate specified in the instrument if the
rate was legal at the time the instrument was executed. The rate shall not exceed
13% per year compounded annually after the date judgment is entered.
MCL 500.3142; MSA 24.13142, governing penalty interest on no-fault claims, states:
(1) Personal protection insurance benefits are payable as loss accrues.
(2) Personal protection insurance benefits are overdue if not paid within
30 days after an insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and of the amount of
loss sustained. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after
the proof is received by the insurer. Any part of the remainder of the claim that is
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later supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after the
proof is received by the insurer. For the purpose of calculating the extent to
which benefits are overdue, payment shall be treated as made on the date a draft or
other valid instrument was placed in the United States mail in a properly
addressed, postpaid envelope, or, if not so posted, on the date of delivery.
(3) An overdue payment bears simple interest at the rate of 12% per
annum.
Statutory interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013 is intended to compensate
a party for delay in receiving damages following the filing of a complaint. Attard, supra at 319;
Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 218 Mich App 351, 356; 554 NW2d 43 (1996). Our
Supreme Court has held that an insurance policy is a “written instrument” within the meaning of
§ 6013. Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341, 346; 578 NW2d 274 (1998).
The imposition of prejudgment interest pursuant to MCL 600.6013, MSA 27A.6013 is
mandatory. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 540; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). A plaintiff
is entitled to prejudgment interest even if the trial court did not specifically include it in its order.
Dept of Treasury v Central Wayne Co Sanitation Authority, 186 Mich App 58, 64; 463 NW2d
120 (1990). The prejudgment interest statute is to be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
McKelvie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 203 Mich App 331, 339; 512 NW2d 74 (1994). However, a
court may disallow prejudgment interest for periods of delay where the delay was not the fault of,
or caused by, the debtor. Eley v Turner, 193 Mich App 244, 247; 483 NW2d 421 (1992);
Phinney, supra at 541.
We conclude that the delay in providing no-fault benefits in this case was not attributable
to State Farm. The record indicates that State Farm attempted to compensate the State of
Michigan, and the hospitals by paying plaintiff’s no-fault benefits; however, checks issued by
State Farm payable jointly to plaintiff’s attorney and his medical providers were not negotiated
by the hospitals. The facts of the present case do not present a situation where the insurer was
delaying litigation solely to extend the time at which to pay. See Beach v State Farm Mut
Automobile Ins Co, 216 Mich App 612, 624; 550 NW2d 580 (1996). Thus, disallowing
prejudgment interest was appropriate under the circumstances. Eley, supra at 247.
We also conclude that penalty interest is not appropriate in the instant case because
defendant State Farm was not dilatory in paying its claim. The purpose of the no-fault act’s
penalty provision is to penalize insurers for misconduct relating to no-fault claims. Attard, supra
at 320. Our review of the record reveals that State Farm withheld payments partly to ensure that
the State of Michigan and the hospitals received full payment before plaintiff’s attorney deducted
his fee. Because any delay did not result from defendant State Farm’s misconduct, penalty
interest was not warranted here.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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